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December 30, 2006

An Execution In Vain


So it finally came to that. No more Saddam, no more number one excuse to shed so many gallons of blood. The same people who fought so adamantly for Schiavo's life rooted for the swiftest extermination of this one. Both deaths were more of a political parade than affirmations of any democratic or ethical principle. The execution that resolves nothing and marks nothing. All the sides to the conflict will make something out of it to prolong the very same conflict.

The picture was taken by a French correspondent in an Indian city of Kolkata where a Moslem boy mourns Saddam's death with a very Christian tradition of lighting candles and Hindu flower offerings. Globalization at its kitschiest.

December 28, 2006

A Poem du jour

on your birthday

it was so important to keep a book, to tape a movie
so I could share them with you later,
to watch you watch it, to read your face while you read it
so I could throw away the book we'd read
so I could give away the tape we'd see
for the experience we'd share would be there forever

Now, that forever came and went away,
the books are being slowly sold
the tapes all smashed and trashed,
(some, though, replaced by DVDs and such)
but the lingering sensation of void, of loss
of "what-should-have-happened"
is slowly draining me.

Anticipation of happiness is so much nicer
than the aftertaste of abandonment

December 27, 2006

Amazing Boy Soprano


...singing a very taxing Mozart's Queen of the Night area. Even if you hate opera, you have to appreciate the talent of this young fella.

December 24, 2006

December 23, 2006

American Roulette

by Kurt Andersen
In our winner-take-all casino economy, the middle class is getting royally screwed. A call to arms for populism, before it’s too late.
Photo by Valera Meylis 2006. Click me to see a larger image A couple of weeks back, out in Omaha, I happened to share a ride to the airport with a pair of United pilots. Both were classics of the type—trim, square-jawed, silver-haired, twangy-voiced white men, one wearing a leather jacket. Sam Shepard or Paul Newman could’ve played them. They spent the entire trip sputtering and whining—about being baited and switched when their employee ownership of the airline had been evaporated by its bankruptcy, about the default of their pension plan, about their CEO’s 40 percent pay raise, about the company to which they’d devoted their whole careers and now didn’t trust a bit, and, in effect, about turning from right-stuff demigods who worked hard and played by the rules into disrespected, sputtering, whining losers. The next morning back in New York, I read the news about the record-setting bonuses on Wall Street, an aggregate amount 1,100 percent higher than in the go-go year of 1986. The 2006 revenues at just one bank, Goldman Sachs, were larger than the GNPs of two-thirds of the countries on Earth—a treasure chest from which the firm was disbursing $53.4 million to its CEO and an average of $623,000 to everybody who works at the place.
Ordinarily, I would shrug and move on with New Yorkerly indifference—the pilots are still flying, their reduced pensions notwithstanding, and I wouldn’t trade my life for any banker’s. But I haven’t been able to stop thinking about my jump-cut visions of those defeated pilots and the megabonused Wall Street guys shopping for $15 million apartments. And as a result, this holiday fortnight has felt to me fully Dickensian—the jolly bourgeois bustle and glow, as usual, but also in the foreground the conceited, unattractive rich, our Dombeys and Bounderbys and unredeemed Scrooges.
A month ago, I was ragging on CNN for presenting Lou Dobbs’s hour of pissed-off populism as if it were a traditional nightly news show, and I still think it has a serious truth-in-packaging problem. But (like Dickens’s Mr. Gradgrind, with his epiphany about the poor in Hard Times) I now get Dobbs’s and his followers’ anger and disgust about the ongoing breaches of the social contract, an American economic system that seems more and more rigged in favor of the extremely fortunate.
I know capitalism is all about creative destruction, that the pain of globalization must be endured and flexible labor markets are good; inequality is endemic; life is uncertain and unfair, sure, yeah, of course. We’re all Reaganites now—or at least no longer socialists by instinct. But during the past two decades we’ve not only let economic uncertainty and unfairness grow to grotesque extremes, we’ve also inured ourselves to the spectacle. As America has become a lot more like Pottersville than Bedford Falls, those of us closer to the top of the heap have shrugged and moved on.
The asymmetry between the Goldman boss’s compensation and that of his average employee—85 times as big—is virtually Ben-and-Jerry’s-like these days: An average CEO now gets paid several hundred times the salary of his average worker, a gap that’s an order of magnitude larger than it was in the seventies. In Japan, the ratio is just 11-to-1, and in Britain 22-to-1.
This is not the America in which we grew up.

Back before the Second World War, in the teens and twenties, the richest one-half of one percent of Americans received 11 to 15 percent of all income, but from the fifties through the seventies, the income share of the superrich was reasonably cut back, by more than half. The rich were still plenty rich, and American capitalism worked fine.
Starting in the late eighties, however, the piece of the income pie taken each year by the rich has once again become as hugely disproportionate as it was in the twenties. Meanwhile, the median household income has gone up a measly 15 percent during the past quarter-century—and for the last five years it has actually dropped.
It used to be that when the economy thrived and productivity grew, pay for working people rose accordingly. Yet as the Times reported this past summer, the first six years of the 21st century look to be “the first sustained period of economic growth since World War II that fails to offer a prolonged increase in real wages for most workers.”
People have put up with all this because it happened so quickly and for the same reason that the great mass of losers in casinos put up with odds that favor the house: The spectacle of a few ecstatic big winners encourages the losers to believe that, hey, they might get lucky and win, too. We have, in effect, turned the U.S. into a winner-take-all casino economy, substituting the gambling hall for the factory floor as our governing economic metaphor, an assembly of individual strangers whose fortunes depend overwhelmingly on random luck rather than collective hard work. And it’s been unwitting synergy, not unrelated coincidence, that actual casino gambling has become ubiquitous in America at the same time.
I don’t know about you, but I find casinos, for all their adrenaline and glitz, pretty depressing places. Risk-taking is fabulous, central to the American ethos—but not when it’s involuntary. Too many Americans have been too suddenly herded into our new national economic casino, and without debate turned into the suckers whose losses become the elite’s winnings.
That’s the central argument of Yale political scientist Jacob Hacker’s valuable new book, The Great Risk Shift. Beyond our recent reversion to extreme, twenties-style income inequality, he presents data explaining the new sense of economic dread hanging over Americans. We all know that in this globalized, ultracompetitive age, job security has been beggared, but Hacker attaches startling numbers to the national anxiety. In short, people’s incomes are swinging wildly—like winnings in a casino. In 1970, a family in any given year had a one-in-fourteen chance of its income dropping by half; today, the chance is one in six. No wonder mortgage foreclosures and personal bankruptcies have quintupled during the same period. Middle-class Americans live more and more with the kind of gnawing existential uncertainty that used to be mainly a problem of the poor.
The Great Society programs of the mid-sixties—Food Stamps, Head Start, Medicaid, Medicare—were the final flowering of a social-welfare era that began with FDR’s New Deal 30 years earlier. The countervailing rightward pendulum swing—deregulation and tax cuts under Reagan, welfare reform under Clinton, still more tax cuts under Bush—has dominated our political economy for nearly the past 30 years.
In other words, the time seems to be ripening for a transformative surge of new passion and policy and political traction around the idea of economic fairness. Blaming illegal Mexican immigrants and dollar-an-hour Chinese workers for our troubles is an easy way to vent, but Lou Dobbs’s other regular targets are pretty much on the mark: corporate greedheads and their craven enablers in the political class.
For more than a generation, the Republicans have pitched themselves as the good-old-days party, appealing to the nostalgic hunger for the wholesome, coherent society and culture of mid-century, before life went crazy around 1968. What the Democrats can do now is the same thing, only different—that is, appeal to the nostalgic hunger for the sense of basic economic security and fairness that prevailed before life went crazy around 1986.
Just as Republicans depicted Democrats as insanely freewheeling social experimenters determined to lavish money on the undeserving poor, the caricature can be convincingly reversed: Now the GOP is the party of arrogant, reckless risk-takers—invading Iraq, denying climate change, privatizing Social Security—determined to lavish money on the undeserving rich.
Populism has gotten a bad odor, and not just among plutocrats—for most of the political chattering class, it is at least faintly pejorative. But I think that’s about to change: When economic hope shrivels and the rich become cartoons of swinish privilege, why shouldn’t the middle class become populists? What Professor Hacker calls “office-park populism” will be a main engine of any new cyclical progressive renaissance. The question is whether we’ll elect steady, visionary FDR-like national leaders—Bloomberg? Obama?—who can manage to keep populism’s nativist, Luddite tendencies in check.
I think practical-minded political majorities can be brought together to fix the big, important things that have nothing to do with religious faith or sex. In polls, between 60 and 70 percent of people now think “it is the responsibility of the federal government to make sure all Americans have health-care coverage” “even if taxes must be raised.” Universal health coverage, protecting everyone against the mammoth downside economic risk of illness, would empower people to take constructive economic risks, freeing them to move to new jobs or start new businesses. We could enact de facto compensation caps for top executives, either by limiting the tax deductibility of CEO pay or, as in Britain, by making CEO pay subject to a shareholder vote every year. We can raise—and certainly not further reduce—taxes on the extremely well-to-do.
We’ve had a bracing, invigorating run of pedal-to-the-metal hypercapitalism, but now it’s time to ease up and share the wealth some. We can afford to make life a little more fair and a lot less scary for most people. It’s not only a matter of virtue and national self-image. Because the future that frightens me isn’t so much a too-Hispanic U.S. caused by unchecked Mexican immigration, but a Latin Americanized society with a high-living, blithely callous oligarchy gated off from a growing mass of screwed-over peons. I think we need to put up with the Republicans’ complaining about “class war!” now in order to avoid a real one later.

December 17, 2006

Terry Eagleton On Stereotypes

Oh Joy! Some of my busier friends requested that there is simply no time to read long articles, and that it would be very nice (of me, I presume) to have a digest of sorts, a bait, if you wish, to see if it be of any value to them... Here are the excerpts from this extraordinary review.

...Some stereotypes are simply neutral, another fact which Typecasting fails to note. Swedes, for example, are very often tall, fair and blue-eyed. This is neither a criticism nor a commendation, simply a fact. There are no doubt postmodern theorists who would argue that the blue-eyedness of Swedes is a cultural construct rather than a biological phenomenon, but it is best to give such people a wide berth, rather as it is with those who ask you whether you have been washed in the blood of the Lamb. Many stereotypes, to be sure, are vicious and repellent, but it is scarcely very original to say so. The discourse of stereotyping has long been exhausted. Nothing is now more predictable in cultural theory than an aversion to the predictable...
...Stereotypes are sometimes thought to be offensive because they are fixed and inflexible, but the fixed is not necessarily to be regretted, or the fluid to be celebrated. Capitalism is endlessly fluid, whereas the demand that the Israelis stop mistreating the Palestinians should be unwavering. The belief that the malleable is always preferable to the immovable is a postmodern cliché. There is a good deal about human history which ought not to alter (educating our children, for example), and quite a lot of change which is deeply undesirable. Change and permanence are not related to each other as radicalism is to conservatism. In any case, all genuine radicalism respects tradition. It respects among other things the tradition of resistance to racial stereotypes, rather than the tradition of promoting them. One of the interesting features of this study is just how robust a history of opposition to such belittling images there has been down the centuries. It didn’t all begin with modern-day liberal pluralism...
...Without stereotyping of some kind, social life would grind to a halt. If the plumber turns up to fix the drains dressed in tights and a tutu, I would naturally be liberal-minded enough to invite him to perform a few pirouettes at the sink; but if the bank manager insists on discussing my loan in Latvian, I might take my business elsewhere. Human freedom is a question of life being reasonably predictable, not of being joyously liberated from rules...

Now read the whole darn thing by clicking below...

Have you seen my Dada boss?
Terry Eagleton
Typecasting: On the Arts and Sciences of Human Inequality by Ewen ed. Ewen · Seven Stories, 555 pp, $34.95
If the authors of this book sound like a firm of estate agents, it’s because they have virtuously repressed their first names as a protest against gender stereotyping. But one wonders if they have failed to carry this resistance far enough. There are, after all, several million Ewens knocking around the globe, and this particular pair might fear that their unique personalities are threatened by a blandly generic term. Perhaps the best strategy would be to vary one’s surname from day to day to avoid the indignity of being labelled.
Stereotypes, however, are not always pejorative, whatever these authors may think. They write in their preface of the ways that ‘deeply ingrained stereotypes shed negative light on a wide range of populations and communities’; but the assumption that all such typecasting is negative is itself a postmodern stereotype. The Welsh do not take kindly to being regarded as a race of cunning runts permanently coated in coal dust and sheep shit, but they tend to protest rather less hotly when one praises their musical abilities. The Scots prefer to be thought hard-headed rather than tight-fisted. Lancastrians like to hear that they are warmer than people from Dorking, but not that they are generally fatter as well. Stereotypes may be objectionable because they cram complex individuals into general categories, but they can do this in admiring as well as demeaning ways. Though this does not necessarily constitute a defence of them, one would expect a couple of authors who set out to write a 500-page book on the subject to notice the fact.
Some stereotypes are simply neutral, another fact which Typecasting fails to note. Swedes, for example, are very often tall, fair and blue-eyed. This is neither a criticism nor a commendation, simply a fact. There are no doubt postmodern theorists who would argue that the blue-eyedness of Swedes is a cultural construct rather than a biological phenomenon, but it is best to give such people a wide berth, rather as it is with those who ask you whether you have been washed in the blood of the Lamb. Many stereotypes, to be sure, are vicious and repellent, but it is scarcely very original to say so. The discourse of stereotyping has long been exhausted. Nothing is now more predictable in cultural theory than an aversion to the predictable.
It would make for a bolder, more innovative study than this one to put in a good word for stereotypes, even though academics at certain American universities might find themselves under fire for doing so. Those of us who are not American academics, however, may feel less constrained. It is an open secret, for example, that Ulster Protestants are not by and large dandyish aesthetes notable for their extravagant wordplay and surreal sense of humour. The English middle classes are for the most part less physically and emotionally expressive than Neapolitan dockers. It is unusual to meet a working-class Liverpudlian who dresses for dinner, other than in the sense of putting on a shirt. Corporation executives tend not to be Dadaists.
Stereotypes are sometimes thought to be offensive because they are fixed and inflexible, but the fixed is not necessarily to be regretted, or the fluid to be celebrated. Capitalism is endlessly fluid, whereas the demand that the Israelis stop mistreating the Palestinians should be unwavering. The belief that the malleable is always preferable to the immovable is a postmodern cliché. There is a good deal about human history which ought not to alter (educating our children, for example), and quite a lot of change which is deeply undesirable. Change and permanence are not related to each other as radicalism is to conservatism. In any case, all genuine radicalism respects tradition. It respects among other things the tradition of resistance to racial stereotypes, rather than the tradition of promoting them. One of the interesting features of this study is just how robust a history of opposition to such belittling images there has been down the centuries. It didn’t all begin with modern-day liberal pluralism.
The case for stereotypes is a materialist one. If a group of people have shared roughly the same material conditions over long periods of time, it would be astonishing if they were not to manifest some cultural and psychological traits in common. Only idealists and liberal individualists find this hard to swallow. This does not mean that such people will all be clones of one another; but habits of mind, patterns of behaviour and emotional dispositions are bound up with the way we live with others, rather than being purely personal affairs. It is not true, for example, that the Irish are a feckless bunch much given to carousing, but this stereotype may be based on the fact that work on an Irish tenant farm involved sporadic bouts of hard labour while allowing for a fair degree of leisure time. On a rented smallholding, working harder might not prove profitable to the tenant: what mattered was the size of your farm rather than your rate of productivity. In any case, the landlord might confiscate whatever improvements you might make to the property by raising the rent. All this, when transported to the context of building English roads and canals, was quite likely to look like bone-idleness to the industrially disciplined natives. Besides, the Irish enjoyed their numerous feast days, and saw no point in overdoing things.
That the Irish sometimes display a cavalier attitude to the law, compared say to middle-class suburban Americans, is not entirely without foundation either. But this is largely because the law in Ireland was for several centuries a colonial implant, not because Celts are genetically anarchistic. Most liberals would scoff at the belief prevalent on the streets of Belfast and Derry that Catholics and Protestants can be visually distinguished from each other. But Northern Irish Catholics and Protestants stem by and large from different ethnic groups, and in some cases, if by no means all, this is reflected in their physical appearance. As usual, popular mythology is not entirely mythical.
Academics who study these facts are known as sociologists, and like Stalinists have no interest at all in individuals. Without stereotyping of some kind, social life would grind to a halt. If the plumber turns up to fix the drains dressed in tights and a tutu, I would naturally be liberal-minded enough to invite him to perform a few pirouettes at the sink; but if the bank manager insists on discussing my loan in Latvian, I might take my business elsewhere. Human freedom is a question of life being reasonably predictable, not of being joyously liberated from rules. Unless we can calculate the effects of our actions, which includes the way others might typically respond to them, we will be incapable of realising our projects effectively.
All this, to be sure, is a long way from slit-eyed Japs and nigger minstrels. But it is important to distinguish between those collective images which have some basis in reality, and those which are pure fantasy. Generally speaking, the English upper middle classes are more reserved than, say, Robin Williams, but this is more a matter of their prep schools than their genes. To reject this claim in anti-stereotyping spirit is an excuse not to do something about the prep schools. English sangfroid has much to do with how you should treat colonials, and liberals who defend the English against this stereotype do less than justice to colonialism. Refusing to acknowledge that the Scots have not been famed for their cuisine is to suppress the history of poverty which underlies this fact. The real argument is not over whether people sometimes conform to type, but whether the causes of this are historical or biological.
Ewen and Ewen might belatedly concede that some stereotypes are neutral or affirmative, while continuing to condemn the more negative varieties. But some derogatory stereotypes are perfectly justified; and if only these authors would stop thinking almost exclusively of gender and ethnicity, they might come to recognise the fact. Some of the most abusive stereotypes of US corporate lawyers are far too tender-minded. One should not let the Nazis off the hook by denying that they tended to share a particularly repulsive set of personal characteristics.
You can always tell a liberal by his aversion to labels. Yet some labels are surely admirable. Nobody enjoys being called a female Caucasian, but ‘anti-racist’ is a different affair. It is neurotic to object to a label like ‘anti-racist’ because someone might think this was all there was to your inexhaustibly complex personality. This would be rather like never wearing purple because someone might think you did so all the time. A clutch of medieval nominalists aside, the idea that generic categories are invariably falsifying dates largely from Romanticism. Even the politically correct Ewen and Ewen concede that stereotyping in the literal sense (the word refers originally to an improved 18th-century printing technique) hastened the growth of a mass readership. Materially if not always culturally, stereotyping was a progressive affair.
For pre-Romantic aesthetics, the typical is a far more compelling matter than the individual. Just as Samuel Johnson could not enjoy a literary work he judged morally repugnant, so he thought the individual trifling and rather tedious compared to the universal. He just couldn’t see the point of particularity. Hegel, too, praised the typical; but by this he meant a fusion of the individual and the universal, by which general truths could be fleshed out in sensuously specific form. Pace the neoclassicists on the one hand and the postmodernists on the other, there need be no necessary opposition between the two. This Hegelian synthesis then became the basis of much subsequent Marxist criticism, all the way from Engels to Lukács. The typical was the opposite of the isolated individual, but also of the stereotype – of the reduction of individuality to a lifeless schema. In modern literary terms, it was the enemy of both Modernism and naturalism.
With Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, however, individuality reigns supreme. Nietzsche regarded language as a form of violence, riding roughshod over the uniqueness of things in its unavoidable generality. A tepid word like ‘leaf’ had to make do for all the millions of uniquely different bits of foliage on the planet. Language is a sinister simplification of reality. It is a curious kind of nominalism which fails to see that the generic nature of language is no more a deficiency than buttonholes are a flaw in a jacket. But it underpins a good deal of postmodern thought, sinking to its nadir in the work of Michel Foucault. ‘Naming,’ Ewen and Ewen write in Foucauldian vein, ‘is a form of exercising power,’ a claim which implies that power is always objectionable. It is not a view that the powerless generally share.
Typecasting is an encyclopedic browse through the annals of stereotyping, with a particular focus on the United States. The book contains some surreally potted history, whisking us from feudalism to Jefferson in three pages; it also feels the need to explain what ‘homo sapiens’ and ‘xenophobia’ mean, though not ‘genealogies’ or ‘taxonomy’. Even so, it is crammed with intriguing data. We learn that it was the journalist Walter Lippmann who introduced the term ‘stereotype’ into American culture; that Marx always judged the mental qualities of a stranger from the shape of his head, which may be carrying materialism a bit too far; and that so-called nigger minstrels in the United States were quite often blacked-up Jews and Irishmen who may have hoped to ingratiate themselves in this way with white society. Noses are of supreme importance. According to one phrenologist, ‘the nose alone . . . tells the story of its wearer’s rank and condition.’ In the view of one O.S. Fowler, acquisitiveness ‘is on each side of the middle portion of the nose . . . causing breadth of nose in proportion to the money-grasping instinct as in Jews’. For Johann Kaspar Lavater, the nose is ‘the foundation, or abutment, of the brain’. 19th-century phrenologists taught that nations with smaller heads were more easily conquered than those with large ones, while an inability to blush was thought to be characteristic of criminal types. Franz Joseph Gall, who invented phrenology, believed that the moral and religious faculties were located at the top of the brain, since this was the area of the skull closest to God.
Roosevelt, Coolidge and Churchill all expressed their enthusiasm for eugenics, and Rockefeller money funded eugenic research in Nazi Germany. The Kellogg cereal business supported the Race Betterment Foundation in the US, which awarded medals in a Fitter Families for Future Firesides contest with the inscription ‘Yea, I have a goodly heritage.’ Unexpectedly, however, William Jennings Bryan, who prosecuted John Thomas Scopes for promoting evolutionary theory in the 1920s, turns out to have been less of a villain than he is usually painted. Scopes may have famously defended evolution, but he was also a keen advocate of eugenics, a creed which the anti-Darwinist Bryan rejected on grounds of social justice.
There are some eminently readable accounts here of the great scientific stereotypers, from Lavater’s new science of physiognomy to Linnaeus’s animal taxonomies, from Francis Galton’s physical measurements of ‘deviants’ to Lombroso’s infamous inquiries into the typical criminal cranium. (Today’s standard line on criminals is the reverse of this sham science, though just as suspect: the latest cliché is that criminals look just like you and me, always have a polite word for their neighbours, but keep themselves to themselves.) Galton, who coined the term ‘eugenics’ and whose racist arguments had some influence with his cousin Charles Darwin, frequented the slave markets of Constantinople; he noted how delighted young African women seemed to be at the prospect of their impending enslavement. ‘They seemed as merry as possible at the prospect of being sold,’ he enthuses, ‘and of soon finding, each of them, a master and a home.’ He also ranked women he passed in the street in terms of their beauty, though this is a practice hardly confined to eugenicists.
Typecasting does an excellent job of reminding us just how fearful of racial degeneration some of our recent ancestors were. Around the turn of the 20th century, mass immigration into the United States, in the wake of the emancipation of African-Americans, provoked a positive orgy of eugenicist anxiety. The American lawyer Madison Grant, whose book The Passing of the Great Race became Hitler’s bible, waxed lyrical about the distinction between ‘the Piccadilly gentleman of Nordic race and the cockney costermonger of the old Neolithic type’. The moral significance of nostrils and ear-lobes became something of a national obsession. Before that, the scientific inspection of supposed ethnic types had often enough merged with spectacle and entertainment, as with the exhibiting of the so-called Hottentot Venus in 19th-century London. Spectators could feel her protruding buttocks for an extra fee. When she died at the age of 26, the naturalist Georges Cuvier removed her genitals and presented them with a flourish to a gathering of the Academy of Science. There were public parades of ‘Bushmen’, wild men of Borneo and ‘Man-Eating Feegees’. Many of those exhibited did not survive their public exposure.
How far can you deduce reality from appearances? For Dickens, there is a continuum between the physical and the moral, as characters wear their consciousness like an eccentric piece of clothing. This is not true for George Eliot, for whom the truth of things cannot be read off from how they present themselves. If they could, Marx commented, there would be no need for science. What you see is not what you get. Yet Marx regarded the deceptive way in which capitalism presented itself to the observer as a material part of it, while Lenin spoke in similar terms of the ‘reality of appearances’. It is a phrase which Oscar Wilde, a man who was superficial in the deepest possible way, would surely have endorsed. Freud considered the ego and its impressions a kind of fiction, but one deeply anchored in the reality of the unconscious. For his part, Nietzsche dismissed this whole surface/depth model as a clapped-out piece of Platonism. Depths were a metaphysical illusion; but if one could not speak of depths then one could not speak of surfaces either. Swift plays both sides of the street in Gulliver’s Travels: there is an obvious link between the minuteness of the Lilliputians and their moral pettiness, but the gigantic hulks of the Brobdingnagians do not reflect any particular impulse to aggression.
If the art which finds the mind’s construction in the face is as bogus as Shakespeare’s Duncan suspects, does this leave us with a disabling dualism? The other side of stereotyping is the puritan insistence that what matters is what’s ‘inside’. To avoid being typecast, the self is dematerialised. The external trappings of human beings are discarded as so much dross. In Kantian style, freedom and value lie within, not in the degraded world of phenomena. It is hard to know how to avoid the more odious forms of stereotyping without falling for this lofty idealism; and if only Ewen and Ewen had reflected on their topic as much as they have researched into it, the point might have occurred to them. Their concept of stereotyping is as narrow as their survey of it is wide.
In one sense, stereotyping is the inevitable truth of existence in an increasingly uniform world. Like most distorted perceptions, it has its roots in reality. To view it as no more than a false perception, as this book tends to do, is to risk emptying it of substance. Yet stereotypes are by no means the whole truth either, even if the absurd ideology which insists that everyone is ‘special’ will not do either. The dilemma is beautifully captured in an exchange in Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman, in which Biff Loman angrily urges his deluded father to back off from his fruitless search for recognition: ‘Pop, I’m a dime a dozen and so are you!’ To which Willy returns the dignified response: ‘I am not a dime a dozen! I am Willy Loman and you are Biff Loman!’ And both of them of course are absolutely right.
Terry Eagleton is John Edward Taylor Professor of English Literature at Manchester University. His latest book is How to Read a Poem.


TLS: Freelance by Michael Greenberg

by Michael Greenberg

When I asked for the book Nigger by Randall Kennedy at my local bookstore the other day, the white sales clerk, apparently unfamiliar with the title, was speechless. I had uttered the word that Christopher Darden, the prosecutor in the O. J. Simpson trial, called "the filthiest, dirtiest, nastiest slur in the English language". Overhearing my request, a black clerk cheerfully led me to the African American Studies section where several copies of the book subtitled The strange career of a troublesome word -were to be found.
Kennedy points out the "peculiar social capital" of the n-word, with its supple multiplicities of meaning. The writer Claude Brown called nigger "the most soulful word in the world". For the Rapper Tupac Shakur, nigga stood for "Never Ignorant, Gets Goals Accomplished". Kennedy writes that his father proudly declared himself "a 'stone nigger' -by which he meant a black man without pretensions... unafraid to enjoy himself loudly despite the objections of condescending whites or insecure blacks". Kennedy's mother, on the other hand, deployed the word to mean "discreditable Negroes, a group that, in her view, constituted a large sector of the African American population". The comedian Chris Rock, in one of his most popular routines, says: "I love black people, but I hate niggers". The cover story by John Ridley in this month's Esquire begins: "Let me tell you something about niggers. Always down. Always out.

Always complaining that they can't catch a break". Ridley exhorts "niggers and old-school shines" to get off the "Liberal Plantation" and side with "the most accomplished blacks", such as Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell. Jesse Jackson wants the word banned as "hate speech, no matter who uses it".
At a club in Los Angeles a couple of weeks ago, the comedian Michael Richards, known for his role on the TV show Seinfeld, exploded at a group of black men in the audience who were talking among themselves during his routine. He paced the stage shouting, "Nigger, nigger, oohh, I'm going to be arrested for saying nigger", in what appeared to be an entranced and self-immolating mantra. "Fifty years ago, we'd have you upside down with a fork up your ass!" Richards seemed to revel in the smashing of the taboo, even as he knew it had turned him into a pariah. A few days later, he was on Jesse Jackson's radio programme, Keep Hope Alive, pleading for forgiveness. "I'm shattered. It was anger, not bigotry. I was in a place of humiliation." In a fit of tortured grandiosity, he declared, "America must begin healing".
Jackson pronounced Richards in need of psychiatric help. A plea of temporary insanity may be his only hope for salvaging his career. After a diatribe against Jews, Mel Gibson claimed what the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders calls "Alcohol-Induced Mood Disorder", and checked himself into rehab. Richards might find his diagnosis in an adult form of "Expressive Language Disorder", or if that fails, a problem with "Impulse-Control".
Psychiatry and racism have a long partnership. In 1851, Samuel Cartwright, who specialized in "diseases of the Negro", claimed that several forms of mental illness were peculiar to blacks, including an obsessive desire for freedom -a "flight from home madness" -for which Cartwright invented the term "drapeta- mania", from the Latin drapeta, meaning fugitive. In their book Madness in America, Lynn Gamwell and Nancy Tomes describe how Cartwright thought that any slave who attempted to run away more than twice was insane.
Many years ago, my friend Roy and I would sometimes spit racial putdowns at each other in a deranged, bitterly purgative, machine-gun style. We argued the relative power of the words "kike" and "nigger". To Roy, nigger was a magical word, with an inexplicable capacity to denigrate and elevate at the same time.
"It makes me crazy with rage, but it confers instant superiority on me too, since the speaker can only be the lowest kind of worm." For my part, I explained that "kike" had the added sting of betrayal, since it was invented by German-American Jews to differentiate themselves from Eastern European immigrants whose names often ended with "ki". The equivalent term for African Americans is "Uncle Tom", referring to the enslaved hero of Harriet Beecher Stowe's abolitionist novel. Its pejorative meaning dates at least to 1920, when Marcus Garvey used it at a rally: "The time for cowardice is past. The old-time Negro has gone-buried with Uncle Tom". Malcolm X called Martin Luther King "a modern-day Uncle Tom", which resulted in King being pelted with eggs in New York.
Henry Louis Gates was in New York recently to promote The Annotated Uncle Tom's Cabin which he co-edited with Hollis Robbins. "How did the hero of this seminal novel become the epithet among blacks for the worst thing a black man could be?" he asked. Gates says that the novel can now be read as "a story about the children of God, the Israelites coming out of Egypt. A story about a people with a future". At the panel discussion I attended, someone asked Gates whom he would call an Uncle Tom. "Martin Luther King", he said, "but not in the way that Malcolm X meant it. Tom was a Christ-like figure who turned the other cheek and died while trying to protect two black women from mortal harm." He called the moment in the 1960s, when blacks turned on blacks in the Civil Rights movement, "our very own version of the Inquisition".
Leaving the event, I met Shelby, an elderly African American woman who used to own a bar she sarcastically called the Mayflower. She was eager to talk about Richards's outburst. "Don't you love it when people show their true colours? All the menace just drips away. It's a relief." She seemed to be excusing Richards when she compared him to the comedian Red Foxx, who frequented her bar. "Red was mean. He had to be. The audience is the enemy. He won them over so he could cut off their noses." The friend accompanying Shelby hadn't heard the Richards story and Shelby asked me to tell it. As soon as I began, she interrupted. "I'll take over. You won't be able to get yourself to say 'nigger' in front of me."

TLS: On Subject of Pain

Ouch!
Druin Burch

review of
WORST OF EVILS. The fight against pain. By Thomas Dormandy. 560pp. Yale University Press. Pounds 19.99 ($35). 0 300 11322 6
Photo by Valera Meylis 2006. Click me to see a larger image Years ago, New Scientist invited readers to propose Standard International units for beauty. A "Helen" was the most popular suggestion, with a "milli-Helen" defined as enough beauty to launch a single ship. Like beauty, pain is not a sense to which objective units can be applied, units of heat or light, pressure or frequency. It used to be widely believed that nerve cells were hollow tubes through which packets of "sensation" passed. A lump of sound travelled along an auditory nerve, a portion of light along a visual one. Pain was usually considered to be an excess of another sensation -the eyes hurt when they received too much light, a punch felt unpleasant because the sense of touch was overwhelmed. But early in the twentieth century, all sensory nerves were shown to transmit largely uniform pulses of electrical depolarization.
Sensory stimuli, regardless of their nature, are in fact transduced by nerve cells into waves of electrical charge that are conducted towards the brain.
Whether a person becomes conscious of the impulse depends on the context. Tread on a pin while running for your life from an axe-wielding maniac and you may not feel it, just as rugby players occasionally manage to break bones without immediately knowing. But stand on the pin while walking in a relaxed fashion to the bathroom and you are likely to notice. In both cases, the sensory impulse from your foot will have been the same. Pressure sensors will have picked up the force of the pin, but they can only lead to an experience of pressure, not pain. There is nothing in the electrical depolarization itself that can clue the brain in to understanding something about the modality of sensation: that depends on labelled-line coding. Nerves arriving at the brain's visual cortex, for example, are "labelled" as supplying information about sight. Trigger them by rubbing your eyes hard and you "see" the result. The brain has no way of knowing that the impulses were actually caused by pressure. Pain is not an excess of another sensation, and awareness of it depends on specialized sensors, ones designed to pick up signs of tissue damage. But they are not pain fibres, since what they sense is not pain -that quality only exists within our consciousness. Bump your knee and it might not hurt until you notice the blood -tissue damage itself does not cause a predictable emotional response. The fibres that sense damage are called nociceptive, referring to their sensibility to noxious stimuli. Pain, like beauty, really is all in the mind.
Thinking about the physiological reality of pain is not helped by the peddling of misinformation at primary schools. Aristotle thought that there were five senses, but he also believed that men had more teeth than women. It is not clear why one of these mistakes is still cheerfully passed down. Nor is it something that particularly interests Thomas Dormandy in his book Worst of Evils: The fight against pain. His mind is not on the mechanisms of pain: his chapter on the topic is eight pages long, and he is dismissive enough to regard the distinction between pain sensors and nociceptors as pedantic. Like the other (infrequent) mistakes in his lengthy book, this reflects neither ignorance nor stupidity. Dormandy is quite capable of grasping whatever he chooses to focus on; his trouble is only that he finds so many things clamouring for his attention. Worst of Evils is partly a wholesale history of medicine and partly an account of medical and cultural approaches to pain.
Chiefly, though, it is an almost six-hundred-page collection of human lives, a dazzlingly random compendium of stories, facts and footnotes, which add little to the main thrust of the narrative. The chief glory and failing of this haphazard and fascinating book is an overwhelming delight in trawling through history to scoop up the fun bits.
Dormandy begins with the Ancient Greeks and Romans, for whom he has something of a schoolboy's reverence: "Freud never missed a chance to display his familiarity with the Classics", reads a footnote, and Dormandy suffers from the same affliction. His generalizations are provocative, entertaining -and sweeping. It is plainly wrong, for example, that initiation ceremonies are always male and always painful, and hard to believe that "After the annexation of Egypt the regularity of bowel movements became a prime concern of every Roman citizen".
Dormandy's review of Classical accounts of pain pays as much attention to myths as to treatments, and it takes little care to differentiate the two: "The garden lettuce gathered when young and tender had an established reputation as a mollifier of grief. But it could also encourage frenzy". Dormandy talks of the Greeks and Romans having "a plethora of effective painkillers" without convincingly establishing that they actually did. Dioscorides may well have been familiar with the bark of the willow tree, and he may well have used it to try to ease pain, but this is not to say he used it skilfully enough for the aspirin within it to help anybody. Later in his book, Dormandy shows himself fully aware that pre-modern painkillers were pretty useless, but it doesn't get in the way of him relishing the detail of two millennia of mostly potty treatments. Partly these stories get covered because they tell us something about contemporary beliefs; mainly because Dormandy finds them too juicy to resist.
After the glories of Graeco-Roman lettuces come the Dark Ages of European saints, a God-given opportunity to tell tales of miracles, as well as to spend time discussing the emotional and moral meanings of pain. "O how happy am I to be in pain!" cries out St Therese of Lisieux, and Dormandy suggests that the cult of contempt for the body, of spurning pleasure and welcoming pain, undermined the development of attitudes and therapies that would have reduced the mass of human suffering. Maimonides, the twelfth-century Jewish refugee who became a successful doctor in Saladin's Middle Eastern Empire, is on Dormandy's side: "The Lord gave us tears to shed . . . . Do not try to stem their flow.
When potions and vapours fail to ease the pain, lamentations often relieve the suffering". Dormandy applauds him (not least because Maimonides provides a good excuse to dip into twelfth-century history) without exploring the thought much further. Weeping can be a way of experiencing and digesting pain, or it can be a technique for evacuating it: the difference is important. But Dormandy prefers biographical narratives to philosophy, so instead of pursuing this, we learn -with potted life histories of everyone involved -that Celsus, Galen and Rhazes did not divide pain into qualitative categories, whereas Avicenna, the great Shia scholar, split it into fifteen.
"Medical stagnation during the High Middle Ages is sometimes attributed to the hostile attitude of the Church", Dormandy announces, dismissing this existing generalization and replacing it with one of his own. He enjoys it all so much he quite overlooks the fact that, in practical terms, medicine had been entirely stagnant pretty much since it began. As David Wootton's recent Bad Medicine (reviewed in the TLS, September 15, 2006) has so pithily argued, the whole idea of Ancient medical history is a myth. Doctors may have changed their fashions, but their treatments were, by and large, consistently worthless. It took science to change everything, and science had certainly not arrived during the High Middle Ages. So what should a historian talk about? The thirteenth century, for example, provides little by way of genuine advancements in pain control. Dormandy doesn't pause for a moment.
He simply picks up the efforts of the Italian Lanfranc in the field of cosmetic ointments, and argues that people are miserable if they look bad and that misery is a form of pain. This is infuriatingly correct, but as Dormandy repeats the strategy -randomly selecting the bits of human history he wishes to relate to pain -it undermines him. If cosmetic appearances are relevant in the thirteenth century, why do we never hear of them again? What, for that matter, about the pain of being made fun of in the playground, or of being persecuted for the colour of your skin? To call something psychosomatic, James Thurber once pointed out, is like referring to a female wife.
Dormandy briefly plays with the idea that emotional and physical pains cannot be separated, but soon he flees back towards conventional stories of medical history.
Accounts of the discovery of the circulatory and respiratory systems add to the tempting illusion that Dormandy gives of steady medical progress. But neither discovery brought health or relief to the suffering, and they belong in a history of physiology rather than one of pain. Dormandy knows this. He notes that William Harvey's discoveries brought no benefits with them, but tells us all about them anyway. Likewise, Wren may well have been an architect, and Malpighi the discoverer of the filtering apparatus of the kidney, but how is either fact relevant to the subject of pain? The history of syphilis is a diversion; opium provides the excuse for launching off all over the place about the role of drugs in art. Opiates do more than relieve dysphoria, they also induce euphoria: "What a resurrection", Dormandy quotes from Thomas de Quincey, "from the lowest depth of the inner spirit! . . . That my pain had vanished was now a trifle in my eyes; this negative effect was swallowed up in the abyss of divine enjoyment thus suddenly revealed". The effect is to suggest that pain can hardly be considered without thinking about pleasure; yet Dormandy fails to follow up these wider suggestions, and The Worst of Evils frequently seems hamstrung by its overly medical perspective. Opium was used to ward off the pangs of living as much as the specific pains of the body: Dormandy describes it being used to soothe the terrors of babyhood and the miseries of living in Norfolk. It is enough to make the reader hungry to hear something profound just in time for Dormandy to retreat back into hospitals and surgeries. He writes at length about drugs that ease angina or treat malaria, he talks of heart transplants and cancer cures and hospital-acquired infections. Infections, like angina and malaria and cancer, all cause pain. But disappointments as well as diseases do this, and having raised his eyes beyond medicine, it is disappointing that Dormandy rushes reflexively back to it.
For all of his breadth, Dormandy leaves a huge amount unsaid. The evolutionary context of pain comes in for a review that is frustratingly brief: "Pain as a stop command is of great evolutionary significance". He points out that pains can helpfully cause us to rest or to lay off rich food, but that they can also exceed in magnitude anything that would be useful. The pain of peritonitis saves no one from death; it only makes that death more horrible, largely because evolution has no impetus to make life tolerable for those about to die.
What happens in the final moments of human life is not subject to natural selection. We remain at the whims of processes designed for other purposes, of what Darwin called the "ineluctable consequences of structural design".
Nevertheless, there are some points to be made about our evolutionary capacity for pain. Visceral pains are vague things, as people quickly discover if they try accurately to describe them.
The nature of the pain is uncertain -is it a gripe, a burn, a stabbing? -and they are poorly localized in time and space. It is hard to say exactly when they started or to locate them with a fingertip. The evolutionary and mechanical reasons -the ultimate and proximal causes -for this poor spatial and temporal resolution are interesting. Many people are familiar with the homunculi of movement and sensation, the hugely distorted human figures that represent the level of detail with which different bits of our bodies are represented in our brains (massive faces, tongues, lips, hands and genitals, sparse limbs and backs and bellies). Dormandy could profitably have reviewed this information, and compared it to the maps of pain that evolution has left us with.
Dormandy launches into a whole chapter about Renoir and the relationship between his art and the pain of his rheumatoid arthritis; he discusses centuries of theories about the relationship between pain and spirituality, good and evil, and human development. No "Victory over Pain", he concludes, "can be celebrated until the treatment of mental hurt has advanced at least as far as has the treatment of physical suffering". He is right, but his assumption that medicine is the field on which this battle will be won is mistaken, and seems flat against his magnificent ability to take an interest in the lives and eccentricities of a host of cultures and characters. Philosophy, economics and art can have more impact on mental hurt than pills -and more on physical health, too, when it comes to it. Dormandy could have written so much more, or disciplined himself to write so much less, and have profited from either choice. Instead he settles for something in between. Worst of Evils is written with a lack of focus, and a wealth of gusto. It is a stylish, frustrating, disappointing pleasure.



December 16, 2006

Poem du jour

Special needs

In the clear light of a cloudy summer morning
The idiot boy, holding his father's hand,
Comes by me on the Quay where I sit writing.

His father spots me looking up, and I don't want
To look as if I wished I hadn't, so
Instead of turning straight back to my books
I look around, thus making it a general thing
That I do every so often -
To watch the ferries, to check out the crowd.

The father's eyes try not to say "Two seconds
Is what you've had of looking at my boy.

Try half a lifetime." Yes, the boy is bad:
So bad he holds one arm up while he walks
As if to ward off further blows from heaven.
His face reflects the pain at work behind it,
But he can't tell what it is:

He can only moan its secret name.
The Nazis, like the Spartans, would have killed him,
But where are the Spartans and the Nazis now?
And really a sense of duty set in early,
Or at least a sense of how God's ways were strange:

After the death of Alexander
The idiot boy Philip was co-regent
To the throne of a whole empire,
And lasted in the role for quite a while
Before his inevitable murder,
Which he earned because of somebody's ambition,
And not because he couldn't clean his room.

They're gone. I can look down again, two thoughts
Contesting in my head:

"It's so unfair, I don't know what to do"
Is one. The other is the one that hurts:
"Don't be a fool. It's nothing to do with you."
A lady wants a book signed.
I add "Best wishes" -
All I will do today of being kind -
And when I hand it back to her, the sun
Comes out behind her. I hold up one arm.

Clive James

December 15, 2006

Diane Kirkland's Georgia Woods











Photos by Diane Kirkland. Please visit her website
If you want to see the whole portfolio, please download this PDF file. Keep in mind it is about 22MB in size.

Diane Kirkland's Landscapes










Photos by Diane Kirkland. Please visit her website.

December 12, 2006

December 11, 2006

Poem du jour

Another drought morning after a too brief dawn downpour,
uncountable silvery glitterings on the leaves of the withering maples—

I think of a troop of the blissful blessed approaching Dante,
“a hundred spheres shining,” he rhapsodizes, “the purest pearls . . . ”

then of the frightening brilliant myriad gleam in my lamp
of the eyes of the vast swarm of bats I found once in a cave,

a chamber whose walls seethed with a spaceless carpet of creatures,
their cacophonous, keen, insistent, incessant squeakings and squealings

churning the warm, rank, cloying air; of how one,
perfectly still among all the fitfully twitching others,

was looking straight at me, gazing solemnly, thoughtfully up
from beneath the intricate furl of its leathery wings

as though it couldn’t believe I was there, or were trying to place me,
to situate me in the gnarl we’d evolved from, and now,

the trees still heartrendingly asparkle, Dante again,
this time the way he’ll refer to a figure he meets as “the life of . . .”

not the soul, or person, the life, and once more the bat, and I,
our lives in that moment together, our lives, our lives,

his with no vision of celestial splendor, no poem,
mine with no flight, no unblundering dash through the dark,

his without realizing it would, so soon, no longer exist,
mine having to know for us both that everything ends,

world, after-world, even their memory, steamed away
like the film of uncertain vapor of the last of the luscious rain.

C.K. Williams

A view from my window tonite...

Photo by Valera Meylis 2006. Click me to see a larger image

December 10, 2006

Poem du jour

Trees in High Wind

As if the undersides of leaves were fish, and the fish silver
like mist or moon and leaves were moving faster
than your eye could catch. As if something was floating,
risiing to the surface, soon to be discovered -
the names of horses streaming as they galloped
through weed that rippled rising in a green river.
As if the past were leaves and leaving and the still window
were still, and leaves were skin, and your skin younger.
As if your eyes half closed and the slit of light got brighter,
caught in liquid glass, flicking towards amber.
As if this blaze of white on grass were more than clover
and blue an unseen cloud, and cloud already half over -
the whole valley a green sea and the waves churning
and you a child in rough weather shouting louder and louder
as you sail into leaves and come to no land ever.

Susan Wicks

The power of makeup



















Do I have to add that it was sent to me by a woman and that there is not a single man in this lineup? :)

December 9, 2006

Poem du jour

Piano Solo

I like the black keys better.
I like the lights turned down low.
I like women who drink alone
While I hunch over the piano
Looking for the pretty notes.

Charles Simic

December 8, 2006

Poem du jour

Narrowness

Day after day,
my neighbors' cats in the garden.

Each in a distant spot
like wary planets:

one brindled gray,
one black and white,
one orange.

They remind of the feelings,
how one cannot know another completely.

The way two cats cannot sleep
in one patch of mint-scented shade.

Jane Hirschfield

December 7, 2006

December 6, 2006

A Russian TV ad

A very funny Russian TV ad about the sysadmins here . I cannot give away the punch line, but the ad is about the importance of a good Internet provider.

Насколько вы русский?

Проверить здесь
Я оказался "понаехавший тут" :)