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March 27, 2010

LRB on Yemen


Unhappy Yemen
Tariq Ali

I left for Yemen as Obama was insisting that ‘large chunks’ of the country were ‘not fully under government control’, after Senator Joseph Lieberman had cheerfully announced that it was a suitable target for war and occupation. The sad underwear bomber who tried to blow up the Amsterdam flight on Christmas Day had triggered a new interest in the country, and in al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), by claiming that while he was converted to hardcore Islamism in Britain, his crash course in suicide terrorism, mercifully inadequate, had been provided by AQAP somewhere in Yemen.
Yemen is a proper country, unlike the imperial petrol stations dotted across other parts of the Arabian Peninsula, where the ruling elites live in hurriedly constructed skyscrapers designed by celebrity architects, flanked by shopping malls displaying every Western brand, and serviced by wage-slaves from South Asia and the Philippines. Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, was founded when the Old Testament was still being written, edited and collated. It’s true that the new Mövenpick hotel in the heart of the city’s diplomatic enclave is reminiscent of Dubai at its worst – when I was there it was pushing its Valentine’s Day Dinner Menu – but in Yemen the elite is careful and doesn’t flaunt its wealth.
read more

LRB on Yemen



Unhappy Yemen


Tariq Ali



I left for Yemen as Obama was insisting that ‘large chunks’ of the country were ‘not fully under government control’, after Senator Joseph Lieberman had cheerfully announced that it was a suitable target for war and occupation. The sad underwear bomber who tried to blow up the Amsterdam flight on Christmas Day had triggered a new interest in the country, and in al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), by claiming that while he was converted to hardcore Islamism in Britain, his crash course in suicide terrorism, mercifully inadequate, had been provided by AQAP somewhere in Yemen.

Yemen is a proper country, unlike the imperial petrol stations dotted across other parts of the Arabian Peninsula, where the ruling elites live in hurriedly constructed skyscrapers designed by celebrity architects, flanked by shopping malls displaying every Western brand, and serviced by wage-slaves from South Asia and the Philippines. Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, was founded when the Old Testament was still being written, edited and collated. It’s true that the new Mövenpick hotel in the heart of the city’s diplomatic enclave is reminiscent of Dubai at its worst – when I was there it was pushing its Valentine’s Day Dinner Menu – but in Yemen the elite is careful and doesn’t flaunt its wealth.

read more

The old walled city was rescued from extinction-via-modernisation by Unesco (and later the Aga Khan Trust) in the 1980s, and the old wall rebuilt. The ninth-century Great Mosque is currently being restored by a team of Italian experts working with local archaeologists who are uncovering artefacts and images from a pre-Islamic past. Whether they will manage to locate a small structure said to have been built on the same site during the Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime remains to be seen. Sana’a’s architecture is stunning, like nothing else in Arabia or anywhere else in the world. Its buildings – skyscrapers eight or nine storeys high – were constructed in the tenth century and renovated 600 years later in the same style: lightly baked bricks, decorated with geometric patterns in gypsum and symmetrical stone carvings (wood was unavailable or in short supply). What is missing are the hanging gardens on every floor that gripped the imagination of medieval travellers.[*]

The net result of the West’s worries about the AQAP effect is that the US will send $63 million in aid to Yemen this year. A fifth has already been earmarked for weaponry, much of the rest will go to the president and his cronies, and some into the pockets of the military high command. What’s left will be fought over by the bosses of different regions. (The sum doesn’t include the Pentagon’s remittance for counterterrorism, which last year amounted to $67 million.) A Yemeni businessman told me that he’d been taken aback a few years ago when the then prime minister, an apparently respectable and moderate man, demanded a 30 per cent rake-off from a deal he’d been negotiating. Seeing the shock on the businessman’s face, the PM reassured him: 20 per cent of that was for the president.

I wondered how serious the threat from AQAP really was. How many members of the organisation were in the country and how many were visitors from the other side of the Saudi border? Abdul Karim al-Eryani, a 75-year-old former prime minister and still an adviser to the president, received me in the large library in the basement of his house. He spoke interestingly and at length about Yemeni history, stressing the continuities between pre-Islamic and Islamic cultures in the region. He complained that the Arabic dialect spoken by the bedouin of Nejd (an area now part of Saudi Arabia) had been the largest single source for the modern Arabic dictionary at the expense of the real root of the language, the dialect used by the Sabeans (who lived in what is now Yemen), 5000 words of which were excluded by the dictionary-makers. Later he told me that thanks to the Nigerian bomber he had been visited by the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman. Friedman, having asked his questions, went back to the US and told his readers that the city ‘was not Kabul … yet’, but that AQAP was a ‘virus’ that needed urgent attention before the spread of the disease became uncontrollable. He didn’t speculate on the cause of the infection. But when I asked Eryani to estimate the size of AQAP, his response was a mischievous smile. ‘Three or four hundred?’ I pressed. ‘At the maximum,’ he replied, ‘the very maximum. The Americans exaggerate greatly. We have other problems, real and more important.’

His view was reiterated by Saleh Ali Ba-Surah, the minister for higher education, a grandee educated in East Germany, like many others from what until 1990 was the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, the southern part of the present state. The two parts of what now constitutes the Republic of Yemen – ruled over for the past 20 years by Ali Abdullah Saleh, who, like Mubarak and Gaddafi, is grooming his son to succeed him – were for most of the last century representatives of strikingly different sociologies. While armed tribes dominated the northern highlands where Sana’a is situated, workers, intellectuals, trade unionists, nationalists and, later, Communists were strong in Aden and its hinterland.

The country had been united centuries earlier under the leadership of the Zaidi Shia imams, whose temporal power was dependent on tribal loyalty and peasant acquiescence. Southern Yemen broke away in 1728; an expanding British Empire then occupied Aden and its coast in 1839 (the same year it began its occupation of Hong Kong). The limping Ottoman Empire snatched a chunk of northern Yemen soon afterwards, but had to give it up after the First World War. Under the benign gaze of the British, the imams of the Hamid-ed-Din family took back control of the North. In 1948 the ruler, Yahya Muhammad, was assassinated by one of his bodyguards and his son Ahmad, a fierce isolationist, took over. For him the choice was simple: his country could be dependent and rich or poor but free. As he became more and more eccentric – drugged on morphine and spending most of the day with his cronies in a neon-lit room playing with the toys he had been accumulating since he was a child – discontent mounted. There wasn’t a single modern school or railway station or factory in the country and scarcely any doctors.

Bets were placed as to whether the imam’s exiled brother would return and bump him off or whether Nasser’s supporters in the army would lose their patience first. Ahmad was opposed to Nasser’s Arab nationalism and in 1960, at Saudi instigation, had the state radio station broadcast a denunciation of Nasser that was bound to elicit a reply from Egypt. Cairo Radio declared war, but before the issue could be decided Ahmad died. Within a week the chief of the bodyguard, al-Sallal, joined nationalist military officers to seize power. The imamate had ended. In Aden thousands demonstrated their support for the new regime, simultaneously making it clear that Britain’s continued colonial occupation of the South would be resisted. Fearful of both radical nationalism and its possible Communist backers, Washington and London decided that the imams must be restored to power. The British, desperate to teach Nasser a lesson to avenge the humiliation of Suez, were far more gung-ho than the United States. The Americans’ main worry was that the Yemeni infection might spread to the rest of the peninsula and that, if the Saudi intervention backfired, nationalist currents might sweep Saudi Arabia itself, severely damaging the monarchy. The Saudis began to nurture the imams’ supporters and woo conservative Northern tribesmen with a combination of primitive Islamism and cash.

The political and military leaders of the new state in the North were weak and confused. Nasserite intellectuals in the government took advantage of this indecision and finally persuaded the army to appeal directly to Nasser. The Egyptians, with Soviet and Chinese support, dispatched an expeditionary force of 20,000 soldiers. A lengthy civil war fought by Cold War proxies – to put it simply, Saudis v. Egyptians – followed, costing 200,000 Yemeni lives and leaving the North a complete wreck. The Egyptians were men from the Nile valley and the mountainous terrain was alien to them. Convinced of their invincibility, they failed to take advice, treating their local allies as both inferior and irrelevant; and as the civil war reached a stalemate and opposition to Egyptian methods that included the use of chemical weapons increased, working-class dissent in Sana’a and Taiz was brutally crushed. The war ended in an unsatisfactory compromise in 1970. The Egyptians had emulated the Saudis by trying to buy off the tribes, with the result that their power was greatly enhanced in the new dispensation, as was that of sundry divines and preachers. The war had cost the Egyptians a million dollars a day and the lives of 15,000 soldiers, with three times that number wounded. The subsequent demoralisation of the army may well have contributed to its defeat in the Six-Day War. In any case, Israel’s blitzkrieg in June 1967 sounded the death-knell of Arab nationalism.

Map of Yemen

The civil war caused many left-wing nationalists and Communists in North Yemen to flee to Aden. There, British soldiers, French veterans from Algeria and Belgian mercenaries were recruited by Colonel David Stirling’s company, Watchguard International Ltd, for operations behind enemy lines. In the South too the nationalists were divided, with Cairo backing the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY) and more radical groups congregating under the banner of the National Liberation Front (NF). Both were determined to expel the British, while the British, determined to hang on as long as they could to a strategically important base, increasingly resorted to imprisonment without trial and torture. In 1964 Harold Wilson had said that British forces would remain in the region but that power would be handed over in 1968 to the so-called Federation of South Arabia, in which he hoped that the Adenese would be kept under control by sultans from the hinterland.

The plan backfired badly after whole villages were bombed into oblivion by the RAF. As Bernard Reilly, a long-serving colonial officer who had spent most of his life in Aden, put it: ‘Pacification of a country unaccustomed to orderly government could not be effected without collective punishment of collective acts of violence such as brigandage.’ The leaders of these tribes were unwilling to be pacified. A ferocious struggle now began in the streets of the Crater, one of the oldest areas of Aden. By 1967 the NF were using bazookas and mortars in Aden and targeting military and RAF bases. The Labour government decided to cut its losses and withdraw. ‘Regretfully,’ a letter from the Colonial Office informed its native collaborators, ‘protection can no longer be extended.’ The Israeli victory in June 1967 did not help the British since the NF was not an Egyptian pawn, unlike FLOSY, which was gravely weakened. An NF-led general strike paralysed Aden and guerrilla attacks compelled the colonial administration to cancel the celebrations scheduled to mark the queen’s birthday. Six months later, on 29 November 1967, with the closure of the Suez Canal depriving Aden of much of its value to the British, the British finally left, after 128 years. As Humphrey Trevelyan, the last high commissioner, waved a hurried farewell from the steps of the plane returning him to London, the Royal Marine Band from HMS Eagle played ‘Fings Ain’t Wot They Used To Be’.

The National Liberation Front had won, but they had no plan for rebuilding the country. Its members came from different currents of the left: pro-Moscow, Maoists, supporters of Che Guevara, a few Trotskyists and orthodox nationalists. All immediately agreed to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and this was done on 3 December 1967. But disputes soon began. The NF Congress passed a motion put forward by the radicals that demanded agrarian reforms, an end to illiteracy, the formation of a people’s militia, a purge of the civil and military apparatus, support for the Palestinian resistance and close co-operation with Russia and China. The new elected leadership was dominated by the left. An attempted putsch by the army almost led to civil war as armed guerrilla detachments surrounded the military camps and disarmed the officers. By May 1968 it was clear that the right wing of the NF had no intention of implementing the conference resolutions. A 14 May Movement was created to mobilise support for the reforms. There were clashes with the military followed by a strange hiatus reminiscent of the July Days of 1917 in Petrograd. The right thought it had won and boasted that ‘the organisers of the 14 May Movement, having read a lot of Régis Debray, imagined that they were carrying out “a revolution within the revolution”.’ But within a year the left had triumphed.

The 1970 constitution proclaimed the country a socialist republic – the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen – against the advice of both China and the Soviet Union. (In October 1968 the Chinese foreign minister, Chen Yi, himself then under siege by Red Guards, had told a visiting South Yemeni delegation that ‘your every claim about constructing socialism and raising slogans which are impractical and provocative offer, by their nature, sharp weapons to your adversaries.’) What followed was tragically predictable. An economically backward state embarked on creating structures that institutionalised austerity and universalised scarcity. Promoting industrialisation via state enterprises might have been helpful had it not been for the imposition of a total ban on petty-commodity production. To this was added a state monopoly of all modes of communication, strict control over what was allowed to be said or published, and the exclusion of all parties other than the Yemeni Socialist Party. It was a mockery both of socialism and of the promises made during the anti-colonial struggle. What is undeniable is that the new system of universal education and healthcare as well as the advancement of women marked a huge step forward for the region. Saudi Arabia was not pleased.

In due course the neighbouring powers – North Yemen, the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia – set to work with Reaganite encouragement on a counter-revolution from within, of the sort then being attempted in Nicaragua with the Contras. In Ali Nasser, a crude, semi-literate apparatchik obsessed with absolute power, who became the PDRY’s president in 1980, they found an instrument. For more than a year the president plotted against the charismatic Abdul Fateh Ismail, his predecessor as president and a leader of the struggle against the British, who had resigned for ‘health reasons’ and taken a long break in Eastern Europe. Ismail still had many supporters among the leadership when he returned from Moscow in 1985, and was soon re-elected to the PDRY Politburo, where he commanded a majority.

On 13 January 1986, Ali Nasser’s car was seen outside the Central Committee building (a replica of similar monster structures in Eastern Europe), where a meeting of the Politburo had been scheduled. But Ali Nasser didn’t appear at the meeting. Instead his well-built bodyguard, on heavy drugs and carrying a Scorpion machine-gun, entered the room and shot dead the vice-president, Ali Ahmed Antar, before shooting everyone else in the room. Four key Politburo members, including Ismail, were killed, together with eight Central Committee members. Elsewhere, Ali Nasser’s men were creating havoc: Ismail’s house was destroyed by mortar shells and there was wild shooting around the city. At 12.30 p.m. Aden radio and TV broadcast that the president had circumvented an attempted coup by the right and that Ismail and his collaborators had been executed. Three hours later the BBC Arabic Service announced that the ‘moderate and pragmatic’ president of Yemen had foiled a coup attempt by hardline Communists. This was the line adopted by most of the Western media, which wrote of it as the defeat of a Moscow-backed attempt to further radicalise the country, this despite the fact that Gorbachev was now in power. As news of the killings spread in Aden crowds began to gather and troops recaptured the Ministry of Defence and its operations room from Ali Nasser’s men. Battles raged throughout the night. Numerous unarmed Party members, trade unionists and peasant leaders were killed by Nasser’s troops: lists had been prepared well in advance. But after five days of heavy fighting, the ‘pragmatic moderates’ were defeated. Ali Nasser fled to North Yemen and later Dubai. He now runs a ‘cultural centre’ in Damascus, where he has various business interests.

The shoot-out at the Central Committee meeting was the beginning of the end for the PDRY. The Western proxies in the region who had organised the whole affair now spoke of the socialist gangsters who were running the country. As the Soviet Union was collapsing negotiations began with the North and the country was quickly unified in May 1990 with a five-member presidential council representing both sides. The following year a new constitution lifted all restrictions on freedom of speech, press and association.

The unification did not work out well. The Southerners felt their interests had been betrayed, and constant bickering did not augur well for the future of the coalition government created after the election. Socialists from the South accused gangs backed by Ali Saleh, the former North Yemeni president, now president of the united country, of attacking their supporters in Sana’a and elsewhere. Relations rapidly deteriorated and there were skirmishes in the South between the remnants of the PDRY army and Northern troops. A short-lived but full-scale war erupted in 1994, with the full participation of jihadi groups and Osama bin Laden, who lent his support to Ali Saleh. The Southerners were crushed, not just militarily, but their culture and economy too. There were land grabs, urban property was stolen, women were pressured to veil themselves from head to foot (‘If we didn’t they called us prostitutes and there were many rapes. We were brutalised into this,’ a woman whose face was uncovered told me in Aden).

When I arrived in Aden I realised that AQAP was the least of the country’s problems. Most people in South Yemen are desperate to regain independence from the North. ‘This is not unification but occupation,’ I was told on numerous occasions. The people are leaderless and there are strong rumours in Sana’a that the old killer Ali Nasser is being readied for a political return by Ali Saleh, who sees him as a ‘unifying figure’. Meanwhile demonstrations in villages and small towns see the Yemeni flag and Ali Saleh’s portraits defaced and the old PDRY standard raised. Repression inevitably follows, further increasing the bitterness. On 1 March the security forces surrounded and destroyed the house of Ali Yafie, who had publicly burned an effigy of the president on the previous day. Yafie and eight members of his family, including his seven-year-old granddaughter, were killed. Government propaganda accused him of being an AQAP member.

On the night of 4 January the security forces in Aden surrounded the house of Hasham Bashraheel, the publisher-editor of Al-Ayyam: the newspaper, founded in 1958, had regularly reported on and published photographs of state atrocities. It had, for example, carried photos of the dead after security forces opened fire on ex-soldiers demanding their pensions, and the paper was banned in May 2009, although its offices continued to be a meeting place for journalists, intellectuals and civil rights activists. When the security forces surrounded the building supporters of the paper gathered there too, and shots were fired in the air to disperse them. Then mortar shells were fired: the publisher and his family, including two young grandchildren, were inside. Miraculously they survived by sheltering in a basement room. The next morning Bashraheel and his two sons surrendered in public view, to make it harder for the army to kill any of them. A local activist informed me that ‘friends in the police’ had told him that the security forces had two unidentified corpses in the boot of an unmarked car. If Bashraheel and his family had been killed, the other bodies would have been planted inside and identified as AQAP members shot during the raid. One guard employed by the family was shot dead as he tried to surrender. His father was arrested at the funeral a few days later. The publisher himself was charged with ‘forming an armed group’. The British ambassador, Tim Torlot, has apparently sent a memo to the Foreign Office suggesting that the irresponsible independent media are the problem. My informant in Sana’a claims to have seen this document. Torlot is notorious in Yemen for having left his wife for a glamorous American who worked for the Yemen Observer, owned by Ali Saleh’s press secretary.

I travelled through the South, from Aden to Mukallah, and when I saw Shibam I forgot about politics for a moment. This walled city of mud-brick skyscrapers, some of them more than a hundred feet high, is a living museum. No wonder Pasolini filmed much of his Arabian Nights here. He did more. On his return to Rome he raved about the architecture till Unesco declared the city a World Heritage site. Last year, while they were photographing it from a hill overlooking the town, four South Korean tourists were killed by a suicide terrorist from the North. I asked locals about AQAP. One of them came close to me and whispered: ‘Do you want to know where al-Qaida are based?’ I nodded. ‘In an office next to the president.’ In both Sana’a and Aden I encountered similar views. On Christmas Eve the regime dropped bombs and released drones (with US guidance) on two Southern villages where, they claimed, Anwar al-Awlaki, the Yemeni-American preacher who trained the underwear bomber, was hiding. They didn’t find him but more than a dozen civilians were killed.

The regime has also faced a rebellion in the Northern province of Sa’ada, which borders Saudi Arabia. The highland population there is irritated by Wahhabi encroachments and, getting no help from the Sana’a government, decided to defend themselves. Tribal militias captured a few Saudi soldiers with the result that on 5 November last year the world caught its first glimpse of the Saudi Air Force in action (it should be the most powerful air force in the region after the US and Israel, but its planes usually rust away in desert warehouses). Ali Saleh obligingly describes the revolt as a Shia rebellion backed by Tehran, which had to be put down with force. But few believe this. The Yemeni army had embarked last August on Operation Scorched Earth, which destroyed villages and drove 150,000 villagers from their homes. Because of the news blackout and banning of relief organisations, the scale of government atrocities is unclear. Muhammad al-Maqaleh, a leader of the Yemeni Socialist Party and editor of the party’s paper, the Socialist, managed to get some eyewitness reports and put them up on the web last September. He described a military air strike that killed 87 refugees in Sa’ada, and accompanied the reports with photographs. He was held without trial for four months, tortured and threatened with execution. Finally brought to court, he revealed what had been done to him. Sana’a is certainly not Kabul, but if the regime continues to use force on this scale new civil wars seem probable.



[*] See The Architecture of Yemen: From Yafi to Hadramut by Salma Samar Damluji (2007).



March 26, 2010

LRB on 3K years of Christianity



Our Supersubstantial Bread
Frank Kermode

A History of Christianity: The First 3000 Years by Diarmaid MacCulloch. Allen Lane, 1161 pp, £35.00, September 2009, ISBN 978 0 7139 9869 6



Eamon Duffy, whose opinion of this book will not be lightly disputed, remarks on its jacket that ‘everyone who reads it will learn things they didn’t know.’ Most lay reviewers will think this an understatement; yet the scope of the project, its distance from anything that might be described as parochial, may persuade them that the records of Christianity, preserved and interpreted for the most part by assiduous priests and scholars, deserve a few moments of their attention. Consider, as one instance among a thousand (I’ll come back to them), the decisions or ‘Definitions’ of the ecumenical Council of Chalcedon (451 CE). Even if we have never heard of them they are valid today. And the words of St Augustine, issuing eloquently from North Africa in the fourth and fifth centuries, would be debated as matters of life and death more than a thousand years later in Calvin’s Geneva and in the American colonies – even in some modern Nonconformist churches.
We may envy a tradition so firmly established, though cruelty and fanaticism seemed inevitable adjuncts of theological certitude. It is well known that this history contains many instances of virtue and sanctity, enough perhaps to rival or outdo those of folly and wickedness. Both belong equally to the record. The material documenting these achievements and delinquencies is presented to the historian as an enormous quarry of data inviting further refinement. Few readers will underestimate the achievement of a historian who is willing to take on what he himself calls a ‘risibly ambitious project’ and, with every appearance of pleasure, control a narrative that runs from ‘Greece and Rome (c.1000 BCE-100 CE)’ to ‘Culture Wars (1960-Present)’, dealing generously with the bewildering profusion of enthusiastic and schismatic variations on the 2000-year ground bass of Christianity.
read more The ‘3000 years’ of the book’s subtitle begin, then, in the ancient world, with Greece and Rome, the latter being the dominant world power at the time of the birth of Jesus. It has not escaped Christian notice that the coming together of the birth of Jesus and the reign of Augustus, the first emperor, might have been divinely arranged: that Augustus was inspired to ensure a peaceful pause in imperial history in order to accommodate the tranquil arrival of Jesus into a world supposed to have been, for a moment, free of imperial wars. Such was the Augustan peace. Later, over the centuries, there would be more collaborations, less mythical, between faith and empire, as in the reigns of Constantine and Charlemagne.

The languages that recorded these coincidences were Greek and Latin. But the world into which Jesus was born was polyglot; the Jews who were the first Christians mostly spoke Aramaic, as Jesus did, though in Alexandria, which had a large Jewish population, their language was Greek, and so was their Bible; and the language of early Christianity was Greek also. Variant styles of religion soon developed. The Jerusalem variety, which was controlled by a brother of Jesus, remained in many ways close to Judaism, while the energetic Paul opened up the new religion to Gentiles, even if they failed to practise circumcision and observe dietary laws. The Greek of these Jews was what modern scholars, at ease with Plato and Sophocles, loftily call ‘marketplace’ Greek. It was quite unlike Aramaic, a Semitic dialect, and unlike Latin, the language of the Roman oppressor, though Paul used Latin to obtain release from prison. Like Cicero, he was a Roman citizen.

Such is the exciting blend of cultures, languages and religions dealt with in the early pages of this book. A thousand pages later, as it reaches a temporary halt, MacCulloch is equably discussing some of the very latest things in religion, and recording the almost incredible success not only of Roman Catholicism but of a great diversity of lesser churches and sects. As nearly always, he explains these diversities patiently, if not always with complete approval. He seems to feel less than his usual warmth about the Jesuits, and he writes with special keenness about what might be called the ‘plot’ of Vatican II: the return to Rome of Giovanni Battista Montini, an agent of change; the arrival there in 1962 of 2000 bishops, only half of whom were European; the reluctant appointment of a Vatican press officer, ‘although, with a disdainful symbolism, he was not actually given anywhere to sit during his attendance at the council’s proceedings.’

MacCulloch’s purpose in describing such scenes and explaining their complicated theological consequences is to ‘seek out what I see as the good in the varied forms of the Christian faith, while pointing clearly to what I think is foolish and dangerous in them’. His book is meant to be useful, and it meets this promise everywhere. Its critical apparatus is as admirable as its general scope. The annotation is surprisingly up to date (notes can easily fall out of date during the writing of a 1000-page book). There is a decent index, which might well have been more elaborate. MacCulloch is fond of the word ‘structure’, and an interest in structure is evident in the clean lines and elegant connections of his arguments. On some matters he seems even more enthusiastically well informed than on others – on church music, for instance, and church architecture – but he speaks on all subjects with learned and affable authority.

Though he does not regret the Anglicanism of his formative years, and indeed recalls it with affection, MacCulloch thinks it necessary on the present occasion to state that he no longer gives it his assent; he will no longer say that Christianity – ‘or indeed any religious belief’ – is ‘true’. Instead, he offers himself as ‘a candid friend of Christianity’, by profession a historian with a special interest in the religious tumults and contentions of the 16th century in Europe. Already celebrated as a historian of that epoch, MacCulloch has had much practice in recording its doctrinal disputes, but also the sometimes closely related horrors of religious persecution, the massacres, the torture, the recourse by almost all parties to the burning of opponents.

How could Calvin, whose studies in Christian doctrine had, and continue to have, such enduring influence, be so preoccupied with the problem of whether or not to burn Servetus, a rival theologian, or just mercifully behead him? ‘Inexplicable thy justice seems,’ Milton’s Adam complained, and so it must have seemed to many who ventured into what might seem disinterested debate, only to be censured, exiled, tortured and burned alive. We may be amazed by the apparent insignificance of points at deadly issue, but any theologian before the advent of modernism would probably have thought the blame should rest with us, with our failure to see what was genuinely important; and of course the ability to do so is connected with the felt need to eliminate obtuse or defiant opponents.

MacCulloch does not fail to deplore the cruelties of his story: not only the sadism of the burnings but, in the long course of history, fraud and simony on an almost inconceivably grand scale. They belong to the story he is telling and must be spoken of there, however little the historian enjoys them. And inevitably there are other occasions when history is troubling to the historian: for example, when his professional scepticism clashes with strongly held beliefs on the part of characters in his story. The story of the Resurrection provides such a moment.

MacCulloch has been discussing the Passion narratives, which, as he says, differ from the Nativity stories in Matthew and Luke in that they contain improbable occurrences yet ‘feel like real events’. The tale is of a betrayal; as well as the Roman and Jewish officials, a named individual is accused of it. It may be thought that the historian’s job is clearly to recount and explain these human acts, not to endorse claims to the truth of whatever it was those agents may themselves have believed, for example about the existence of God or the raising of Lazarus or the posthumous appearances of Jesus, or anything else in the narrative. The historian knows well enough that the Resurrection was or is the very centre of Christian belief; but is not required to do more than report it, and report that the characters in the story responded to it as they did, if they did, by believing it. For them these were real or true events, though not real or true in any ordinary sense. In his youth MacCulloch had been able to accept their truth without question. Now he is not.

If the life story of Jesus had ended with the Crucifixion, MacCulloch writes, he might still have had a place in history, perhaps as a martyr in the Jewish cause; but not as the founder of a religion. For that there had to be the Resurrection. The post-Resurrection events were uncanny (persons vanishing through solid doors, the behaviour of Thomas and so on), but whoever originally told these stories believed them in quite a different sense from the way their authors believed the infancy stories, or the way they strike a modern historian.

What must be his reaction when he contemplates the Resurrection in its place at the heart of Christianity and compares with it the idea as it emerges from his enlightened but restricted perception of it? How will his account of it affect his own beliefs? ‘This Resurrection,’ MacCulloch says, ‘is not a matter which historians can authenticate; it is a different sort of truth, or statement about truth. It is the most troubling, difficult affirmation in Christianity, but over 20 centuries Christians have thought it central to their faith. Easter is the earliest Christian festival, and it was for its celebration that the Passion narratives were created by the first Christians.’ This enormous book, which attends so elegantly and so seriously to so many arguments concerning Christian truth, has no more to say about this central dispute, though it cannot have been far from MacCulloch’s thoughts as he pondered the relations between truth and statements about truth.

The other day I came across a long forgotten interview I did with Graham Greene in 1963. Speaking of The End of the Affair, he said that he had made ‘an appalling mistake’ in that novel, and the mistake was ‘the introduction of something which had not got a natural explanation’. He found it impossible to carry on with the original scheme of the novel when its principal figure was dead and his invented events were obeying a fictional logic not of his but of God’s devising. It was as if the woman and her lover belonged to different orders of truth. Greene believed in God as a plotter; but he could not reconcile God’s and the human plot. It was, perhaps, like trying to reconcile truth and statements of truth.

The Resurrection is far from being the only theological stumbling block or scandal encountered in this history. It is a book full of conflicts which have, over the millennia, shaped the thinking and sometimes the conduct of the priestly classes; they require of the historian that he report them correctly and credibly. The Jesus of the gospels is intelligible as a man; he is carefully described, even to his manner of speaking; he is recognisable as a preacher who, like many of his contemporaries, was preoccupied with the imminence of apocalypse; humanity was living in the end-time. Among these early Christians, and indeed to a remarkable extent throughout the Christian era, religious thought was ‘end-directed’: apocalypse would come like a thief in the night. This is a point made repeatedly: the end being nigh, there were many worldly matters it would be a waste of time to attend to. The historian will describe beliefs of that kind without being end-directed himself.

Sometimes the language of the end-directed can be baffling. What, in the Lord’s Prayer, is meant by ‘our daily bread’? The expression has been muttered by millions since the very beginning of Christianity; it seems clear enough, but in fact it isn’t. The Greek word epiousios, translated as ‘daily’, does not mean ‘daily’. It is a rare word and the sense is obscure; the most likely learned guess seems to be that it refers to a special bread that will be needed the next day if in the meantime the kingdom should happen to come overnight and the faithful be hungry. Without some explanation from a learned expositor the poor must have thought it was just an odd way of referring to daily food, and they have probably gone on thinking so, with some reason. The Vulgate – the Catholic Bible – offers the plausible supersubstantialis for epiousios, and the Geneva Bible glosses it thus: ‘such as is sufficient for this day’. On balance the Vulgate is probably nearer the mark, but, as MacCulloch argues, ‘“give us this day our supersubstantial bread” never caught on as a popular phrase in prayer.’ Jesus, addressing God, says Abba instead of ‘Father’. This way of addressing God is apparently unknown in Jewish tradition; the Aramaic word Abba, MacCulloch writes, means something more like ‘dad’ than ‘father’. The followers of Jesus are told to use the normal Greek word for ‘father’ (pater). Is there a reason for this? The learned must always behave as if there were.

It is impossible to give a clear notion of the virtues of a book so encyclopedic in its account of the relevant history, geography, art and philosophy of its subject. Matters that greatly interest the tireless MacCulloch – from the architecture of Hagia Sophia to the Lithuanian Reformation, from Wesley’s ministry to that of Pat Robertson, from the Great Schism to the Great Awakenings, from Pentecostalism in South Korea to Lyndon Johnson’s support of Martin Luther King – must be neglected. Instead I take a hint from MacCulloch’s defence of the interest to be taken in theological argument: ‘No history of Christianity which tries to sidle past its theological disputes will make sense.’

It is possible to argue that manifold and fine-drawn as they were, the major controversies and decisions originated in the huge and controvertible claim that Christ is both God and man. The author who willingly recounts the great historical events, from the Babylonian captivity on, must not sidle past dozens of arcane but disputatious Greek theological formulas. Happily, MacCulloch seems to enjoy this microscopic Greek theology as much as the great battles, the movements of peoples, the great schisms, the rise of Islam. He relates, as historians do, the folly of great leaders, the relations between political power and religious faith, Constantine’s decisive conversion, the large imperial achievements of Justinian and Charlemagne. The mysterious evolution of papal power is another important part of his subject. But so is what may sometimes seem to us the barren quibbling of theologians.

For a rough idea of this material it might be helpful to attend for a moment to the work of one council of bishops, accounted the fourth, and held at Chalcedon, near Constantinople, in 451. More than 500 bishops, summoned by the emperor in Constantinople, turned up with the intention of settling certain disputed points of doctrine which already had a history; they were mostly devoted to differences concerning such matters as the relation of Christ’s humanity to his divinity, and of the Son to the Father. Chalcedon was meant to deal with the Eutychean heresy, which maintained that the incarnate Christ had but one nature (this was called Monophysitism) as against the Orthodox doctrine, which was Dyophysite. Monophysitism had many exotic variants, including Theopaschitism (literally ‘those who held that God had suffered’ on the cross). Gibbon’s remark on ‘the happy flexibility’ of the Greek tongue comes to mind.

Chalcedon condemned Eutyches and issued a statement of faith called the Chalcedonian Definition. It claimed that Christ was ‘perfect in divinity and perfect in humanity, the same truly god and truly man, of a rational soul and a body; consubstantial with the Father as regards his divinity, and the same consubstantial with us as regards his humanity’. This Definition was accepted by most though not all the churches; it left a legacy of bitterness, especially in the East. Some describe it as ‘an important moment in the consolidation of Christian doctrine’. It was a compromise, but not enough of a compromise: the Nestorians needed to maintain that the two natures remained distinct despite the Definition. It is easy to imagine the difficulty of disputes about the Trinity, when the relations of three Persons had to be defined and reconciled. But here the authority of St Augustine, reinforced seven centuries later by that of St Thomas Aquinas, prevailed.

In the wake of Chalcedon there developed a tremendous row about theotokos (Greek for ‘the bearer of God’), an important title of honour for the Virgin in the West, but with implications for the eternality of the Son – a doctrine the Nestorians did not accept. This quarrel is remembered because of the subtlety of the Greek distinction between homoousios (‘of one substance’) and homoiousios (‘of similar substance’).

MacCulloch suggests that the passion for detail and definition, and the need to dispute over a single iota, reflect the dependence of the laity on exact liturgical performance. I have said very little about some of the arguments he considers; his book studies in some depth the complexities of the Reformation, and the flourishing, thus far, of the modernism that it was one purpose of Vatican I to suppress. He watches them like a candid friend, without zeal to destroy. At the end of Decline and Fall, Paul Pennyfeather, now a divinity student, having said goodnight to a drunken survivor of his life in the fast lane, settles down in his Oxford room to read. ‘So the ascetic Ebionites used to turn towards Jerusalem when they prayed. Paul made a note of it. Quite right to suppress them.’ MacCulloch says little or nothing about the Ebionites, presumably because there was little to say. But he wouldn’t have suppressed them; instead, he would have asked, in his gentle way, why they turned towards Jerusalem. It seems they were vegetarian and denied the divinity of Christ, but Paul Pennyfeather isn’t concerned with the graver liturgical heresies.

March 25, 2010

LRB on Christianity



Our Supersubstantial Bread


Frank Kermode


A History of Christianity: The First 3000 Years by Diarmaid MacCulloch
Allen Lane, 1161 pp, £35.00, September 2009, ISBN 978 0 7139 9869 6


Eamon Duffy, whose opinion of this book will not be lightly disputed, remarks on its jacket that ‘everyone who reads it will learn things they didn’t know.’ Most lay reviewers will think this an understatement; yet the scope of the project, its distance from anything that might be described as parochial, may persuade them that the records of Christianity, preserved and interpreted for the most part by assiduous priests and scholars, deserve a few moments of their attention. Consider, as one instance among a thousand (I’ll come back to them), the decisions or ‘Definitions’ of the ecumenical Council of Chalcedon (451 CE). Even if we have never heard of them they are valid today. And the words of St Augustine, issuing eloquently from North Africa in the fourth and fifth centuries, would be debated as matters of life and death more than a thousand years later in Calvin’s Geneva and in the American colonies – even in some modern Nonconformist churches.

We may envy a tradition so firmly established, though cruelty and fanaticism seemed inevitable adjuncts of theological certitude. It is well known that this history contains many instances of virtue and sanctity, enough perhaps to rival or outdo those of folly and wickedness. Both belong equally to the record. The material documenting these achievements and delinquencies is presented to the historian as an enormous quarry of data inviting further refinement. Few readers will underestimate the achievement of a historian who is willing to take on what he himself calls a ‘risibly ambitious project’ and, with every appearance of pleasure, control a narrative that runs from ‘Greece and Rome (c.1000 BCE-100 CE)’ to ‘Culture Wars (1960-Present)’, dealing generously with the bewildering profusion of enthusiastic and schismatic variations on the 2000-year ground bass of Christianity.

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The ‘3000 years’ of the book’s subtitle begin, then, in the ancient world, with Greece and Rome, the latter being the dominant world power at the time of the birth of Jesus. It has not escaped Christian notice that the coming together of the birth of Jesus and the reign of Augustus, the first emperor, might have been divinely arranged: that Augustus was inspired to ensure a peaceful pause in imperial history in order to accommodate the tranquil arrival of Jesus into a world supposed to have been, for a moment, free of imperial wars. Such was the Augustan peace. Later, over the centuries, there would be more collaborations, less mythical, between faith and empire, as in the reigns of Constantine and Charlemagne.

The languages that recorded these coincidences were Greek and Latin. But the world into which Jesus was born was polyglot; the Jews who were the first Christians mostly spoke Aramaic, as Jesus did, though in Alexandria, which had a large Jewish population, their language was Greek, and so was their Bible; and the language of early Christianity was Greek also. Variant styles of religion soon developed. The Jerusalem variety, which was controlled by a brother of Jesus, remained in many ways close to Judaism, while the energetic Paul opened up the new religion to Gentiles, even if they failed to practise circumcision and observe dietary laws. The Greek of these Jews was what modern scholars, at ease with Plato and Sophocles, loftily call ‘marketplace’ Greek. It was quite unlike Aramaic, a Semitic dialect, and unlike Latin, the language of the Roman oppressor, though Paul used Latin to obtain release from prison. Like Cicero, he was a Roman citizen.

Such is the exciting blend of cultures, languages and religions dealt with in the early pages of this book. A thousand pages later, as it reaches a temporary halt, MacCulloch is equably discussing some of the very latest things in religion, and recording the almost incredible success not only of Roman Catholicism but of a great diversity of lesser churches and sects. As nearly always, he explains these diversities patiently, if not always with complete approval. He seems to feel less than his usual warmth about the Jesuits, and he writes with special keenness about what might be called the ‘plot’ of Vatican II: the return to Rome of Giovanni Battista Montini, an agent of change; the arrival there in 1962 of 2000 bishops, only half of whom were European; the reluctant appointment of a Vatican press officer, ‘although, with a disdainful symbolism, he was not actually given anywhere to sit during his attendance at the council’s proceedings.’

MacCulloch’s purpose in describing such scenes and explaining their complicated theological consequences is to ‘seek out what I see as the good in the varied forms of the Christian faith, while pointing clearly to what I think is foolish and dangerous in them’. His book is meant to be useful, and it meets this promise everywhere. Its critical apparatus is as admirable as its general scope. The annotation is surprisingly up to date (notes can easily fall out of date during the writing of a 1000-page book). There is a decent index, which might well have been more elaborate. MacCulloch is fond of the word ‘structure’, and an interest in structure is evident in the clean lines and elegant connections of his arguments. On some matters he seems even more enthusiastically well informed than on others – on church music, for instance, and church architecture – but he speaks on all subjects with learned and affable authority.

Though he does not regret the Anglicanism of his formative years, and indeed recalls it with affection, MacCulloch thinks it necessary on the present occasion to state that he no longer gives it his assent; he will no longer say that Christianity – ‘or indeed any religious belief’ – is ‘true’. Instead, he offers himself as ‘a candid friend of Christianity’, by profession a historian with a special interest in the religious tumults and contentions of the 16th century in Europe. Already celebrated as a historian of that epoch, MacCulloch has had much practice in recording its doctrinal disputes, but also the sometimes closely related horrors of religious persecution, the massacres, the torture, the recourse by almost all parties to the burning of opponents.

How could Calvin, whose studies in Christian doctrine had, and continue to have, such enduring influence, be so preoccupied with the problem of whether or not to burn Servetus, a rival theologian, or just mercifully behead him? ‘Inexplicable thy justice seems,’ Milton’s Adam complained, and so it must have seemed to many who ventured into what might seem disinterested debate, only to be censured, exiled, tortured and burned alive. We may be amazed by the apparent insignificance of points at deadly issue, but any theologian before the advent of modernism would probably have thought the blame should rest with us, with our failure to see what was genuinely important; and of course the ability to do so is connected with the felt need to eliminate obtuse or defiant opponents.

MacCulloch does not fail to deplore the cruelties of his story: not only the sadism of the burnings but, in the long course of history, fraud and simony on an almost inconceivably grand scale. They belong to the story he is telling and must be spoken of there, however little the historian enjoys them. And inevitably there are other occasions when history is troubling to the historian: for example, when his professional scepticism clashes with strongly held beliefs on the part of characters in his story. The story of the Resurrection provides such a moment.

MacCulloch has been discussing the Passion narratives, which, as he says, differ from the Nativity stories in Matthew and Luke in that they contain improbable occurrences yet ‘feel like real events’. The tale is of a betrayal; as well as the Roman and Jewish officials, a named individual is accused of it. It may be thought that the historian’s job is clearly to recount and explain these human acts, not to endorse claims to the truth of whatever it was those agents may themselves have believed, for example about the existence of God or the raising of Lazarus or the posthumous appearances of Jesus, or anything else in the narrative. The historian knows well enough that the Resurrection was or is the very centre of Christian belief; but is not required to do more than report it, and report that the characters in the story responded to it as they did, if they did, by believing it. For them these were real or true events, though not real or true in any ordinary sense. In his youth MacCulloch had been able to accept their truth without question. Now he is not.

If the life story of Jesus had ended with the Crucifixion, MacCulloch writes, he might still have had a place in history, perhaps as a martyr in the Jewish cause; but not as the founder of a religion. For that there had to be the Resurrection. The post-Resurrection events were uncanny (persons vanishing through solid doors, the behaviour of Thomas and so on), but whoever originally told these stories believed them in quite a different sense from the way their authors believed the infancy stories, or the way they strike a modern historian.

What must be his reaction when he contemplates the Resurrection in its place at the heart of Christianity and compares with it the idea as it emerges from his enlightened but restricted perception of it? How will his account of it affect his own beliefs? ‘This Resurrection,’ MacCulloch says, ‘is not a matter which historians can authenticate; it is a different sort of truth, or statement about truth. It is the most troubling, difficult affirmation in Christianity, but over 20 centuries Christians have thought it central to their faith. Easter is the earliest Christian festival, and it was for its celebration that the Passion narratives were created by the first Christians.’ This enormous book, which attends so elegantly and so seriously to so many arguments concerning Christian truth, has no more to say about this central dispute, though it cannot have been far from MacCulloch’s thoughts as he pondered the relations between truth and statements about truth.

The other day I came across a long forgotten interview I did with Graham Greene in 1963. Speaking of The End of the Affair, he said that he had made ‘an appalling mistake’ in that novel, and the mistake was ‘the introduction of something which had not got a natural explanation’. He found it impossible to carry on with the original scheme of the novel when its principal figure was dead and his invented events were obeying a fictional logic not of his but of God’s devising. It was as if the woman and her lover belonged to different orders of truth. Greene believed in God as a plotter; but he could not reconcile God’s and the human plot. It was, perhaps, like trying to reconcile truth and statements of truth.

The Resurrection is far from being the only theological stumbling block or scandal encountered in this history. It is a book full of conflicts which have, over the millennia, shaped the thinking and sometimes the conduct of the priestly classes; they require of the historian that he report them correctly and credibly. The Jesus of the gospels is intelligible as a man; he is carefully described, even to his manner of speaking; he is recognisable as a preacher who, like many of his contemporaries, was preoccupied with the imminence of apocalypse; humanity was living in the end-time. Among these early Christians, and indeed to a remarkable extent throughout the Christian era, religious thought was ‘end-directed’: apocalypse would come like a thief in the night. This is a point made repeatedly: the end being nigh, there were many worldly matters it would be a waste of time to attend to. The historian will describe beliefs of that kind without being end-directed himself.

Sometimes the language of the end-directed can be baffling. What, in the Lord’s Prayer, is meant by ‘our daily bread’? The expression has been muttered by millions since the very beginning of Christianity; it seems clear enough, but in fact it isn’t. The Greek word epiousios, translated as ‘daily’, does not mean ‘daily’. It is a rare word and the sense is obscure; the most likely learned guess seems to be that it refers to a special bread that will be needed the next day if in the meantime the kingdom should happen to come overnight and the faithful be hungry. Without some explanation from a learned expositor the poor must have thought it was just an odd way of referring to daily food, and they have probably gone on thinking so, with some reason. The Vulgate – the Catholic Bible – offers the plausible supersubstantialis for epiousios, and the Geneva Bible glosses it thus: ‘such as is sufficient for this day’. On balance the Vulgate is probably nearer the mark, but, as MacCulloch argues, ‘“give us this day our supersubstantial bread” never caught on as a popular phrase in prayer.’ Jesus, addressing God, says Abba instead of ‘Father’. This way of addressing God is apparently unknown in Jewish tradition; the Aramaic word Abba, MacCulloch writes, means something more like ‘dad’ than ‘father’. The followers of Jesus are told to use the normal Greek word for ‘father’ (pater). Is there a reason for this? The learned must always behave as if there were.

It is impossible to give a clear notion of the virtues of a book so encyclopedic in its account of the relevant history, geography, art and philosophy of its subject. Matters that greatly interest the tireless MacCulloch – from the architecture of Hagia Sophia to the Lithuanian Reformation, from Wesley’s ministry to that of Pat Robertson, from the Great Schism to the Great Awakenings, from Pentecostalism in South Korea to Lyndon Johnson’s support of Martin Luther King – must be neglected. Instead I take a hint from MacCulloch’s defence of the interest to be taken in theological argument: ‘No history of Christianity which tries to sidle past its theological disputes will make sense.’

It is possible to argue that manifold and fine-drawn as they were, the major controversies and decisions originated in the huge and controvertible claim that Christ is both God and man. The author who willingly recounts the great historical events, from the Babylonian captivity on, must not sidle past dozens of arcane but disputatious Greek theological formulas. Happily, MacCulloch seems to enjoy this microscopic Greek theology as much as the great battles, the movements of peoples, the great schisms, the rise of Islam. He relates, as historians do, the folly of great leaders, the relations between political power and religious faith, Constantine’s decisive conversion, the large imperial achievements of Justinian and Charlemagne. The mysterious evolution of papal power is another important part of his subject. But so is what may sometimes seem to us the barren quibbling of theologians.

For a rough idea of this material it might be helpful to attend for a moment to the work of one council of bishops, accounted the fourth, and held at Chalcedon, near Constantinople, in 451. More than 500 bishops, summoned by the emperor in Constantinople, turned up with the intention of settling certain disputed points of doctrine which already had a history; they were mostly devoted to differences concerning such matters as the relation of Christ’s humanity to his divinity, and of the Son to the Father. Chalcedon was meant to deal with the Eutychean heresy, which maintained that the incarnate Christ had but one nature (this was called Monophysitism) as against the Orthodox doctrine, which was Dyophysite. Monophysitism had many exotic variants, including Theopaschitism (literally ‘those who held that God had suffered’ on the cross). Gibbon’s remark on ‘the happy flexibility’ of the Greek tongue comes to mind.

Chalcedon condemned Eutyches and issued a statement of faith called the Chalcedonian Definition. It claimed that Christ was ‘perfect in divinity and perfect in humanity, the same truly god and truly man, of a rational soul and a body; consubstantial with the Father as regards his divinity, and the same consubstantial with us as regards his humanity’. This Definition was accepted by most though not all the churches; it left a legacy of bitterness, especially in the East. Some describe it as ‘an important moment in the consolidation of Christian doctrine’. It was a compromise, but not enough of a compromise: the Nestorians needed to maintain that the two natures remained distinct despite the Definition. It is easy to imagine the difficulty of disputes about the Trinity, when the relations of three Persons had to be defined and reconciled. But here the authority of St Augustine, reinforced seven centuries later by that of St Thomas Aquinas, prevailed.

In the wake of Chalcedon there developed a tremendous row about theotokos (Greek for ‘the bearer of God’), an important title of honour for the Virgin in the West, but with implications for the eternality of the Son – a doctrine the Nestorians did not accept. This quarrel is remembered because of the subtlety of the Greek distinction between homoousios (‘of one substance’) and homoiousios (‘of similar substance’).

MacCulloch suggests that the passion for detail and definition, and the need to dispute over a single iota, reflect the dependence of the laity on exact liturgical performance. I have said very little about some of the arguments he considers; his book studies in some depth the complexities of the Reformation, and the flourishing, thus far, of the modernism that it was one purpose of Vatican I to suppress. He watches them like a candid friend, without zeal to destroy. At the end of Decline and Fall, Paul Pennyfeather, now a divinity student, having said goodnight to a drunken survivor of his life in the fast lane, settles down in his Oxford room to read. ‘So the ascetic Ebionites used to turn towards Jerusalem when they prayed. Paul made a note of it. Quite right to suppress them.’ MacCulloch says little or nothing about the Ebionites, presumably because there was little to say. But he wouldn’t have suppressed them; instead, he would have asked, in his gentle way, why they turned towards Jerusalem. It seems they were vegetarian and denied the divinity of Christ, but Paul Pennyfeather isn’t concerned with the graver liturgical heresies.



March 24, 2010

Listening to Adele









Adele 2008 19







Bonus Disc

March 21, 2010

Travel: Puerto Rico, Day 2



Punto del Murro




Old San Juan




Fort San Cristobal

March 19, 2010

On vegetarianism

An interesting response to a review of a book by Jonathan Safran Foer.

Sir, - It is unfortunate that, in the course of reviewing Jonathan Safran Foer's new book Eating Animals, Mark Rowlands (March 5) never once questions any of the premisses of Mr Foer's arguments, which are specious at best. All evolutionary and biological evidence points towards a reality that human beings were destined to eat meat. In fact, it is the core thesis of the Harvard anthropologist Richard Wrangham's Catching Fire that it is cooking with fire, specifically cooking meat with fire, that is responsible for the major developments of human evolution. Moreover, Foer's focus on the subjectivity of the eating experience is destructive at best: eating (and the production of food) is a communal act and not a platform for expressing one's personal queasiness over the fact that food production often demands blood and harm. We are only able to live exclusively on a vegetarian diet due to the "high-value" nutritive qualities of modern agricultural crops that have been refined over generations, and widely available processed vegetable oils, such as olive oil. Try eating the types of wild oranges an orangutan enjoys and you will receive little in the way of nutrition or relief from hunger. The point is that vegetarian diets, in many ways, are illusory, possible only because of the vast monocultures on which they are grown, which are harmful to the environment at large and local ecologies in specific.

While it is true that the breeding and slaughtering of livestock in modern, industrial conditions is morally repugnant and unacceptable, such conditions are not an argument for changing the diet of humankind, but rather for changing the conditions of such breeding and slaughtering.

In fact, one easy remedy would be to stop growing vegetative crops in vast monocultures and return to smaller farms, which grow diverse crops on fields rotated between pasture and tillage, where livestock provides labour, fertilization and, yes, at some point, food.

March 18, 2010

TLS on ancient Romans


on Romans  



From The Times Literary Supplement March 17, 2010

Fortune-telling, bad breath and stress in Roman society
Is my wife having a baby? Am I going to see a death? Am I going to be sold? - a few of the questions listed in one of the most intriguing works of Classical literature by Mary Beard

Is my wife having a baby? Am I going to see a death? Will I become a councillor? Am I going to be sold? Am I about to be caught as an adulterer? These are just a few of the ninety-two questions listed in one of the most intriguing works of Classical literature to have survived: the Oracles of Astrampsychus, a book which offers cleverly randomized answers to many of ancient life’s most troubling problems and uncertainties. The method is relatively straightforward, but with just enough obfuscation to make for convincing fortune-telling (“easy to use but difficult to fathom” as one modern commentator nicely put it). Each question is numbered. When you have found the one that most closely matches your own dilemma, you think of a number between one and ten and add it to the number of your question. You then go to a “table of correspondences” which converts that total into yet another number, which directs you in turn to one of a series of 103 lists of possible answers, arranged in groups of ten, or “decades” (to make things more confusing there are actually more lists of answers than the system, with its ninety-two questions, requires or could ever use). Finally, go back to the number between one and ten that you first thought of, and that indicates which answer in the decade applies to you.
Confused? Try a concrete example. Suppose that I want to know if I am about to be caught as an adulterer, which is question 100. I think of another number – let’s say five, giving a total of 105. The table of correspondences converts this to the number 28. I then go to the twenty-eighth decade, and pick out the fifth answer, which brings good news: “You won’t be caught as an adulterer” (and in some versions adds the extra reassurance: “Don’t worry”). If I had chosen the number six, the same procedure would have offered me only a temporary reprieve: “You won’t be caught as an adulterer for the time being”. Number seven would have brought bad news of a different kind: “You’re not an adulterer, but your wife loves another man”.
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The introduction to this little book of oracles – it amounts to some thirty pages in modern editions – claims that its author was a fourth-century-BC Egyptian magician, Astrampsychus, who used a system first invented by the famous philosopher-cum-mathematician Pythagoras. Not only that: by way of an advertisement, it also claims that the book had been the vade mecum of Alexander the Great, who relied on it to decide matters of world governance, “and you also will have unwavering renown among all people if you use it too”. In fact, however wayward Alexander’s decision-making processes may have been, they could not have depended on this system of oracles, which was almost certainly nothing to do with any fourth-century magician or with Pythagoras, but was a product of the Roman Empire of the second or third centuries ad. Our best guess is that the book was not so much an early self-help manual but part of the equipment of professional, or semi-professional, fortune-tellers – who would probably have invested the mechanical process of consultation with some impressive ad-lib mystery and mumbo-jumbo.
However this oracle book was actually used, it gives us a rare glimpse – as Jerry Toner stresses in Popular Culture in Ancient Rome – into the day-to-day anxieties of the ordinary inhabitants of the Roman Empire. For (never mind the publicity yarn about Alexander the Great) this is not elite literature, or certainly not literature aimed exclusively at the elite; in fact, the question about “being sold” implies that slaves were among the intended clientele. Here we have a long list of the kinds of problems that made ordinary Roman men (and they do seem to be exclusively male questions) anxious enough to resort to fortune-tellers.
Some of these are the perennial issues of sex, illness and success (“Will I split up from my girlfriend?” “Will the one who is sick survive?” “Will I be prosperous?”). But other questions reflect much more specifically Graeco-Roman concerns about life’s fortunes and misfortunes. Alongside worries about the wife’s pregnancy, we find questions about whether or not to rear the expected offspring: a vivid reminder that infanticide was one orthodox method of family planning in the ancient world, as well as being a convenient way of disposing of those who emerged from the womb weak, sickly or deformed. Debt and inheritance also bulk large among the topics of concern, accounting for at least twelve of the ninety-two questions (“Will I pay back what I owe?” “Will I inherit from a friend?”). So do the dangers of travel (“Will I sail safely?”) and the potential menace of the legal system (“Am I safe from prosecution?” “Will I be safe if informed against?”). Even illness may be thought to be the result of crime or malevolence, as the question “Have I been poisoned?” shows.
Toner is excellent at squeezing the social and cultural implications out of this material. As well as reflecting on the perilous, debtridden, short and painful human lives that the oracle book reveals, he notes some surprising absences. There is nothing here (poisoning apart) to suggest a fear of violent crime, despite the fact that we often imagine that the Roman Empire was full of highwaymen, pirates and muggers. Nor is there anything on the institution of patronage. Modern historians have written volumes on the dependence of the poor on their elite patrons – for everything from jobs, to loans or food. Toner speculates that the intended users of these oracles were so far down the Roman social hierarchy that they were below the reach of the patronage system (which only extended so far as “the respectable poor”). Maybe. Or maybe the whole system of patronage was far less important in the life of the non-elite, than the Roman elite writers, on whom we mostly rely, liked to imagine. Or, at least, maybe it was far less important in whatever corner of the Roman Empire this strange little book originated.
Pushing the evidence a little further, Toner suggests that we might see in these oracles a rudimentary system of risk-assessment. He reckons, for example, that the answers on the fate of a newborn baby (where one in ten suggests that the baby will “not be reared” – that is, exposed or killed – and two out of ten suggest that it will die anyway) more or less match up to the social and biological reality of infant survival. Referring to other similar sets of oracles, recorded in ancient inscriptions found in cities in modern Turkey, he points out that 18 per cent of oracular responses warn that a business venture will fail – roughly the same rate of failure implied by the rate of interest that was regularly charged on so-called “maritime loans” (for shipping and trading expeditions). On Toner’s view, in other words, the oracular responses reflected real-life risks and probabilities.
I am not so sure. On that principle, there was an eight-out-of-ten chance that a consulter of these oracles would become a local councillor. That would mean either that those who used these oracles were higher up the social hierarchy than Toner would like to imagine, or that those who asked that particular question (“Will I become a councillor?”) were a self-selected group, or that fortune-telling trades in over-optimism. Conversely, it seems sometimes to trade in gloom. Five out of ten oracular answers to the question “Have I been poisoned?” suggest the answer “Yes”.
Popular Culture in Ancient Rome is, overall, a spirited, engaging and politically committed introduction to the culture of the “non-elite” in the Roman Empire. Toner notes in his introduction that his mother, to whom the book is dedicated, was a “college servant” in Cambridge; and the leading idea of the book – that there is a popular culture in the ancient world to be discovered beyond the elite literature that is the mainstay of modern “Classics” – is driven by a political as well as a historical agenda.
Toner’s achievement is to open up the world of the Roman tavern, rather than the senate house; the world of the garret rather than the villa. Drawing on material out of the mainstream of Classical literature, from the Oracles of Astrampsychus to the one surviving Roman joke book (the Philogelos or Laughter-Lover) or the book of dream interpretation by Artemidorus, he vividly conjures up a vision of Rome very different from the shiny marble of the usual image: it is a world of filth and stench (for Toner, Rome was basically a dung heap), of popular pleasures, carnival and the lower bodily stratum, of resistance, as well as submission, to the power of the elite. The only misjudged chapter is one on mental health, with its superficial modernizing ideas about the stress levels that affected the Roman poor. Despite Toner’s denial that he is trying “to give retrospective diagnoses of the dead”, we are left with the strong impression that he thinks St Anthony of Egypt was a schizophrenic, and that rank-and-file Roman soldiers were likely to be victims of combat stress and PTSD.
The big question, though, is whether the Rome that Toner conjures up for us is as “popular” as he suggests. Is this dirty, smelly, dangerous world the world of the peasants and the poor, or is it also the world of the elite? Maybe, whatever his political agenda, Toner has succeeded best not in taking us into the real life of the disadvantaged, but in showing us another side of the culture of the elite. For it is far from clear that the texts that we now choose to designate as “sub-elite” or “non-elite” (because that is where they fit on our hierarchy) were really “popular” in the ancient world. There are more hints than Toner admits in the Oracles of Astrampsychus that the intended customers included those who were relatively upmarket. “Will I become a councillor?” (which could equally well be translated “Will I become a senator?”) is not the only question to hint at privileged consumers. An early Christian edition of the text includes the question “Will I become a bishop”, with five out of ten answers indicating “yes” (albeit one, with a realistic view of the problems of power in the early Church, prophesying “You’ll become a bishop soon and you’ll be sorry”). Much the same is true of the Roman joke book. There have been all kinds of modern fantasies that the Philogelos was a record of the kind of banter you would have heard at the ancient parish-pump or barber’s shop. But the compilation of jokes as we have it is much more likely to be a desk-job encyclopedia by some rich, late Roman academic.
Besides, it is almost impossible to identify (even if, like Toner, you are looking hard for them) clearly divergent strands of elite and popular taste. Rome was not a culture, such as ours, where status is paraded and distinguished by aesthetic choices. Quite the contrary. So far as we can tell, cultural and aesthetic choices at Rome were broadly the same right across the spectrum of wealth and privilege: the only difference lay in what you could afford to pay for. This is strikingly clear at Pompeii, where the decoration of all the houses – both large and small, elite and non-elite – follows the same broad pattern, with roughly the same preferences in themes and designs. The richer houses are distinguished only by having more extensive painted decoration and by painting of greater skill: the more you paid, the better you got. Whether there was such a thing as “popular culture” (as distinct from dirt, poverty and hunger) is a trickier issue than Toner sometimes acknowledges.
In Resurrecting Pompeii, Estelle Lazer takes a different approach to the lives and lifestyles of “ordinary Romans” with her meticulous analysis of the human bones of the victims, rich and poor, of the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 ad. It is an eye-opening book in many ways, not least for its description of the conditions in which she worked on these bones in modern Pompeii – about as far from the glamour of Indiana Jones-style archaeology as it is possible to imagine. Apart from some celebrity skeletons and plaster casts of dead bodies on display to the public, most of the human remains that survived the Allied bombing raids on the site during the Second World War were piled up in two main stores, each in an ancient bath building not normally accessible to ordinary visitors. Lazer spent most of her research time, months on end over seven years, in these depots – ill-lit (she worked for part of the time with a hand-held bicycle light) and infested by wildlife. The identifying labels once attached to the bones had long ago been eaten by rodents; many of the skulls had provided convenient nesting boxes for the local birds (covering the bones and what Lazer calls the key “skeletal landmarks” with bird lime); in one store a “cottage industry” had been established, which used the human thigh bones to make hinges to restore the ancient furniture on the site. “This has contributed”, as Lazer writes, with deadpan understatement, “a novel source of sample bias to the femur collection.” From this very difficult material Lazer has drawn some very careful conclusions about the victims of the eruption and the population of Pompeii (and to a lesser extent Herculaneum) more generally. She has no time at all for the more sensational conclusions that have been based on the study of some ancient bones, and is particularly critical of the analysis of more than 300 skeletons that were found in the early 1980s in a series of so-called “boat sheds” along the seafront at Herculaneum. The study of this material was financed by National Geographic, and the magazine got the vivid, personal details about the dead that it had paid for: one, with a skeleton that suggested highly developed muscles, must have been a slave; another, who happened to be carrying a sword and dagger, was called a “soldier”; another was identified as a helmsman simply because it was found near a boat. Lazer not only points out how flimsy these identifications are (the boat turned out to be in a completely different archaeological layer from the “helmsman”, and the so-called “soldier” also carried a bag of carpentry tools); she also underlines how tricky and contested the conclusions drawn from ancient skeletal material almost always are, no matter who is paying and with what sensationalist aims.
Determining the sex of pre-adult skeletons is always a guessing game. There has been no reliable DNA sequence obtained from any of the human remains at Pompeii or Herculaneum. Most striking of all, two different studies of the bodies in the boat sheds have produced estimates of the average height of the victims that differ by several centimetres. There is clearly something more involved here than getting out a ruler and just measuring the skeletons.
But despite (or maybe because of) her caution in drawing ambitious conclusions from the bones, Lazer has a great deal to say about the population of Pompeii – beyond the well-known fact, now repeatedly demonstrated from the analysis of hundreds of teeth and jaws, that the levels of oral hygiene in the Roman world were truly dreadful. (When the Roman poet Martial attacked some of his contemporaries for their bad breath, it was probably not poetic fantasy.) One important observation relates to the demographic profile of the victims. It is often said that those left behind in the city, as Vesuvius rumbled and eventually exploded, must have been the weaker section of the population: the very young, the very old, the disabled, or those in some other way incapacitated. In carefully going through the stored bones, Lazer has found no indication of any such bias: the surviving human remains seem to represent a typical distribution of age and sex that you would expect in a Roman town.
Even more important for our understanding of Roman society in general is the relative homogeneity of human remains. Pompeii was a port town, and to all outside appearances decidedly multicultural – from the famous temple of the Egyptian goddess Isis to the Indian ivory statuette found in one of the houses. Yet the tell-tale visible characteristics of the skeletons (for example, double-rooted canine teeth, or particularly distinctive formations of the tibia) suggest to Lazer a relatively homogeneous population, “either as a result of shared genes or a common environment during the years of growth and development”. More than that, the tell-tale characteristics of the skeletons at Herculaneum appear to be consistently and significantly different. This would imply that – whatever their multicultural trappings – these small towns around the Bay of Naples were more like inbred Fen villages than the homes of a mobile population, as we often assume.
Resurrecting Pompeii is a remarkable (if not always elegantly written, or meticulously edited) book, partly because Lazer is so careful never to go beyond what her most exacting standards of proof will allow. She also consistently writes with respect for the material she is dealing with, never seeming to forget that her material is all that is left of the human victims of a terrible natural disaster, albeit 2,000 years ago.
The eruption of Vesuvius was, of course, an ancient tragedy of rare proportions. But in the calculations of the victims, in their decision whether or not to run for it or to stay put, it must remind us of the dilemmas of those who consulted the Oracles of Astrampsychus. As Toner suggests, the fact that seven out of ten answers to the question “Am I going to see a death” say “yes” tells us something of the realities of ancient life, for everyone.
Jerry Toner
POPULAR CULTURE IN ANCIENT ROME
248pp. Polity. £55 (paperback, £17.99).
978 0 7456 4309 0

Estelle Lazer
RESURRECTING POMPEII
408pp. Routledge. £65.
978 0 415 26146 3



Mary Beard’s most recent books are The Roman Triumph, 2007, and Pompeii: The life of a Roman town, 2008. It’s a Don’s Life, a collection of her TLS blogs, was published last year. She is Professor of Classics at Cambridge and Classics editor of the TLS.

March 17, 2010

TLS on Lenin

on Lenin  

Just when you thought there was nothing left to say about Lenin, along comes a fine book that represents him afresh by concentrating on his life before achieving power. Vladimir Ilyich and his wife Nadezhda Krupskaya spent seventeen years leading a parlous nomadic existence as underground agitators before their return to Russia in March 1917. Helen Rappaport treats her subject as “a rather inconsequential-looking man . . . with his dowdy wife” pursuing a secret goal. Whether his politics were right is not her concern. This is Lenin for a new generation of readers who can afford to look dispassionately on his human story.
The result is a dramatic, atmospheric tale, about a dogged little fellow, bald with a red beard, who came off his bicycle when his tyre got wedged in a Geneva tramline, and was twice again knocked down in France cycling back from air shows, for which he had a passion. He sent his London landlady a picture album to mark his and Nadya’s happiest year anywhere, in digs near King’s Cross, in 1902–03. Four years later, in Finland, he leapt from a train into deep snow to escape the tsarist secret servicemen, the Okhrana. A network of Finnish sympathizers got him out of the country over ice that cracked so ominously that even the atheist muttered a prayer. His British Museum ticket was in the name of Dr Jacob Richter, LL.D. In Geneva, he registered as a reader at the Société de Lecture as “W. Oulianoff, gentilhomme russe”. The conspiratorial couple moved in the longer term to Geneva from their beloved London after the board of the underground journal Iskra voted to relocate. Via stints in Capri with the well-off Maxim Gorky, and London again, the Ulyanovs arrived in Paris. “Why the hell did we go to Paris?”, Vladimir Ilyich lamented. Two interim enemies were the reason. While the Swiss authorities cracked down on Russian underground activity, the Mensheviks, with whom Lenin still worked, and who wanted to legalize their efforts to reform Russia, had more supporters in Paris. Lenin probably caught the syphilis that killed him in Paris, resorting to prostitutes after Nadya fell ill. If Lenin’s cause had been a noble one, this drama could easily have been rewritten as a tragedy.

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His professional life had a double focus. He strove to assume total control of the Russian Social Democratic and Labour Party for his Bolshevik faction, which dwindled to a membership of one. He kept up a deluge of unswervingly Marxist articles on Russia. Those articles and the books What Is To Be Done? (1902) and Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1909) were written in a jargonridden style that blended scientific pretence with merciless obloquy, and helped poison a short century of Left–Right politics across the world. Everyone who didn’t agree with Lenin was a shithead. He was a self-conscious Jacobin, a deliberate oversimplifier, dictatorial and bureaucratic, who knew what it took to gain power and keep it. An ideological hardliner, he was ready to fudge even the issue of nationalization when his Bolshevik colleagues objected. Call it the people’s ownership, he suggested.
As Helen Rappaport observes in one of her occasional judicious comments – one feels she must once have admired him – Russia for Lenin was an abstraction. It was a problem that could be solved scientifically. He further assumed that this wayward country could be controlled in much the same way that he disciplined his own life. Here again one senses a tragedy in the making, of which, dead in 1924, he would never know. It is also the reason why conservative Russian critics of Lenin like Solzhenitsyn hated him most, because he forced a Westernism on a country whose spiritual self-identity was elsewhere. Words like konspiratsiya, which covered the rules of underground procedure, from the codes and invisible writing (in milk, made visible by immersion in hot tea) that Nadya spent hours deciphering, to the use of false passports, were par for the Leninist course. Though he had admirers everywhere, it was, curiously, the love and immediate support of women that sustained this apparent machine of a man: Nadya, Nadya’s ailing mother and above all his mistress, the French-born Inessa Armand.
The drama inherent in this compellingly well-written narrative climaxes when the sealed train leaves Zurich, with half the crowd cheering Lenin on and the other half booing a deal with Germany. Ironically, that deal had been the idea of Yuli Martov, the Menshevik leader about to be plunged into terminal obscurity by Lenin’s triumph. What happened to the various Lenin-in-exile memorial sites that flourished in the Communist era reflects a wider, still untold story. The French museum closed in 2007; the Finnish one is still open. The Poles desecrated the Lenin shrines they had had forced on them. London, insured by distance against real contact with Leninism, put up plaques but had to shield a commemorative Lubetkin bust, the product of Britain’s wartime alliance with Stalin, from Mosley’s fascists. It can still be seen in the Islington Museum, as its object recedes into history as a trace.

Helen Rappaport
CONSPIRATOR
Lenin in exile
373pp. Hutchinson. £20.
978 0 091 93093 6
US: Basic Books. $27.95.
978 0 465 01395 1

Lesley Chamberlain is the author of Motherland: A philosophical history of Russia, 2004, and The Philosophy Steamer: Lenin and the exile of the intelligentsia, 2006.

March 10, 2010

New Yorker on John Stevens

Supreme Court Justices are remembered for their opinions, but they are revealed by their questions. For many years, Sandra Day O’Connor chose to open the questioning in most cases, and thus show the lawyers—and her colleagues—which way she, as the Court’s swing vote, was leaning. Today, Antonin Scalia often jumps in first, signalling the intentions of the Court’s ascendant conservative wing, and sometimes Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., makes his views, which are usually aligned with Scalia’s, equally clear. New Justices tend to defer to their senior colleagues, but Sonia Sotomayor, in her first year on the Court, has displayed little reluctance to test lawyers on the facts and the procedural posture of their cases; these kinds of questions had generally been the province of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who, at times, has not seemed entirely pleased by the newcomer’s vigor. Samuel A. Alito, Jr., often says little; Clarence Thomas never says anything. (Thomas has not asked a question at an oral argument since 2006.)

John Paul Stevens, who will celebrate his ninetieth birthday on April 20th, generally bides his time. Stevens is the Court’s senior Justice, in every respect. He is thirteen years older than his closest colleague in age (Ginsburg) and has served eleven years longer than the next most experienced (Scalia). Appointed by President Gerald R. Ford, in 1975, Stevens is the fourth-longest-serving Justice in the Court’s history; the record holder is the man Stevens replaced, William O. Douglas, who retired after thirty-six and a half years on the bench. Stevens is a generation or two removed from most of his colleagues; when Roberts served as a law clerk to William H. Rehnquist, Stevens had already been a Justice for five years. He was the last nominee before the Reagan years, when confirmations became contested territory in the culture wars (and he was also, not coincidentally, the last whose confirmation hearings were not broadcast live on television). In some respects, Stevens comes from another world; in a recent opinion, he noted that contemporary views on marijuana laws were “reminiscent of the opinion that supported the nationwide ban on alcohol consumption when I was a student.”


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Ever since last fall, when it emerged that Stevens had hired only one law clerk for the next year, instead of his customary four, there has been growing speculation that he will soon retire. Since 1994, Stevens has been the senior Associate Justice and so has been responsible for assigning opinions when the Chief Justice is not in the majority. He has used that power to build coalitions and has become the undisputed leader of the resistance against the conservatives on the Court. “For those fifteen years, John Stevens has essentially served as the Chief Justice of the Liberal Supreme Court,” Walter Dellinger, who was the acting Solicitor General in the Clinton Administration and is a frequent advocate before the Court, says. In Stevens’s absence, leadership of the Court’s liberals would fall, by seniority, to Ginsburg, but she is also elderly and has suffered from a range of health problems. Even if President Obama appointed a like-minded replacement for Stevens, that person, while taking his seat, would not fill his role.

Stevens is an unlikely liberal icon. When he was appointed, he told me recently, he thought of himself as a Republican and always had—“ever since my father voted for Coolidge and Harding.” He declined to say whether he still does. For many decades, there have been moderate Republicans on the Court—John M. Harlan II and Potter Stewart (appointed by Eisenhower), Lewis F. Powell and Harry Blackmun (Nixon), David H. Souter (Bush I). Stevens is the last of them, and his departure will mark a cultural milestone. The moderate-Republican tradition that he came out of “goes way back,” Stevens said. “But things have changed.”

So has Stevens. His positions have evolved on such issues as civil rights and the death penalty, and he has led the Court’s counteroffensive against the Bush Administration’s treatment of the detainees at Guantánamo Bay. And, as Stevens’s profile has risen, and his views have moved left, so, too, has criticism of him from conservatives reached a higher pitch. “From the beginning of his time as a Justice, you could see Stevens’s roots in the New Deal Court and his willingness to justify an expanding welfare state,” Richard Epstein, a libertarian-leaning law professor at New York University, said. “On these issues, he’s been consistent and consistently wrong about everything—and highly influential.”

Still, Stevens’s views suggest a sensibility more than a philosophy. Many great judicial legacies have a deep theoretical foundation—Oliver Wendell Holmes’s skeptical pragmatism, William J. Brennan’s aggressive liberalism, Scalia’s insistent originalism. Stevens’s lack of one raises questions about the durability of his influence on the Court.

But, more than anything, his career shows how the Court has become a partisan battlefield. In that spirit, Roberts last week denounced President Obama’s criticism of the Court in his State of the Union address, saying that the occasion had “degenerated to a political pep rally.” When Stevens leaves, the Supreme Court will be just another place where Democrats and Republicans fight.

Stevens tends to weigh in at oral argument at around the halfway point, and he does something that none of his colleagues do: he asks permission. “May I ask you a question?” or “May I ask you this?” Frequent advocates find this tic amusing and endearing, a little like the bow ties that he always wears. “However Justice Stevens is going to come out on an issue, he is going to do it in a way that is very friendly and avuncular and good-natured,” Paul Clement, who was George W. Bush’s Solicitor General from 2005 to 2008, says. “He’ll say something like ‘This is probably obvious, but I have this one question. Could you help me with this one point?’ An experienced advocate knows that you have to be on your guard, because he’s probably found the one issue that puts your case on the line.” Jeffrey Fisher, who clerked for Stevens in the 1998-99 term and is now a professor at Stanford, says, “The reason he very rarely speaks first is that he really listens to his colleagues and tries to figure out what is on their minds and tries to figure out what the swing votes care about in the case.”

On September 9th last year, Stevens engaged in a classic version of advocacy-by-interrogation during the argument of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. The Court was hearing the case before the first Monday in October, the traditional start of its year—an indication of how important some of the Justices thought it was. In 2008, Citizens United, a right-leaning nonprofit organization, had used some corporate contributions, along with money from individuals, to produce and promote a documentary critical of Hillary Clinton. (“She is steeped in controversy, steeped in sleaze,” the narrator says.) The group planned a video-on-demand broadcast on the eve of several Democratic primaries. But the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (also known as McCain-Feingold, after its two chief sponsors) forbids political advertisements paid for by corporations in the weeks before a primary. Citizens United challenged the law, asserting that its right to freedom of speech was violated.

The Court had first heard arguments in the case in March, 2009, and the questions raised then were mostly narrow ones—whether McCain-Feingold pertained to video-on-demand technology, for example. Months passed without a decision. But, in June, the Court issued an unsigned order asking for the case to be reargued on new terms. Such an order, which requires a majority, had never been issued since Roberts became Chief Justice, in 2005, and only rarely in earlier years. The Court now told the lawyers to address much broader issues about the relationship of corporations to the First Amendment. Specifically, it asked whether two decisions, from 1990 and 2003, which upheld restrictions on corporate speech, should be overturned.

For a century, Congress and the Supreme Court had been restricting the participation of corporations, and individuals, in elections, mostly through limits on campaign contributions. The Court had come to see campaign spending as a form of speech, but one that clearly could be regulated, especially if the speaker was a business. The notion that corporations did not have the same free-speech rights as human beings had been practically a given of constitutional law for decades, and the 1990 and 2003 decisions (both joined by Stevens) reflected that consensus. Now the Court seemed open to what had been radical notions—that corporations had essentially the same rights as individuals, and could spend potentially unlimited amounts of money in elections.

Stevens never uses his questions to filibuster, and his first query was simple. “Does the First Amendment permit any distinction between corporate speakers and individual speakers?” he asked Theodore B. Olson, the lawyer for Citizens United and a Solicitor General in the second Bush Administration.

Olson hedged, saying, “I am not—I’m not aware of a case that just—”

“I am not asking you that,” Stevens persisted. “I meant in your view does it permit that distinction?”

Finally, Olson said, “I would not rule that out, Justice Stevens. I mean, there may be.”

Stevens was trying to alert his colleagues to the extreme shift in the law the case implied. But Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito had already made plain that they were seeking just such a change. As has often been the case, Stevens’s only hope appeared to be to get the vote of Anthony M. Kennedy, to make a majority with himself, Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sotomayor. (So far, Sotomayor seems to be voting much like Souter, an ally of Stevens, whom she replaced.) When Elena Kagan, the Solicitor General, rose to defend McCain-Feingold, Stevens had his chance.

Stevens asked Kagan if it would be possible for the Court to rule narrowly. There could, for example, be an exception for nonprofits like Citizens United, or for “ads that are financed exclusively by individuals even though they are sponsored by a corporation.” Kagan, grasping the lifeline that Stevens was throwing her, said, “Yes, that’s exactly right.”

“Nobody has explained why that wouldn’t be a proper solution, not nearly as drastic,” Stevens went on. “Why is that not the wisest narrow solution of the problem before us?”

His strategizing was for naught. In a decision announced on January 21st, Kennedy, joined by the four conservatives, wrote a breathtakingly broad opinion, overturning the 1990 decision and much of the 2003 decision, and establishing, for the first time, that corporations have rights to free speech comparable to those of individuals. In the 1990 case, the Court’s majority opinion cited “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” Kennedy’s opinion simply asserted that “independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”

Stevens’s ninety-page dissenting opinion in Citizens United (the longest of his career) was joined in full by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, and was a slashing attack on the majority, laden with sarcastic asides. “Under the majority’s view, I suppose it may be a First Amendment problem that corporations are not permitted to vote, given that voting is, among other things, a form of speech,” he wrote.

To make his displeasure clear, Stevens read his dissent from the bench. Justices usually read pared-down versions of published opinions, but Stevens prepared a twenty-minute stem-winder. When the moment came, however, he stumbled frequently, skipped words, and, at times, was hard to understand. (As when he said, “As the corp, court has long resembled . . .”) For the first time in public, Stevens looked his age.

Stevens charged that the way the majority had handled the case was even worse than the legal outcome. “There were principled, narrower paths that a Court that was serious about judicial restraint could have taken,” he wrote. “Essentially, five justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case before us, so they changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to change the law.” He added, referring to the Court, “The path it has taken to reach its outcome will, I fear, do damage to this institution.” It suggested that, after thirty-five years on the Supreme Court, John Paul Stevens was about to walk away from a place he no longer recognized.

Several weeks later, I sat with Stevens in his sun-streaked chambers at the Court. He had begun his day with a tennis game (singles), then showered and changed into a white dress shirt, suit, and bow tie at the Court. He wears a hearing aid, but walks at an athlete’s loping pace and shakes hands with a punishing grip; he keeps two well-used putters on hand to practice his short game on the office carpet.

For many years, Stevens, who grew up in Chicago, and his wife have divided their time between Washington and Fort Lauderdale, where they own a condominium. In the nineteen-eighties, Court insiders dubbed Stevens the FedEx Justice, because he spent so much time in Florida and corresponded with his chambers by overnight mail. Stevens still flees Washington at every opportunity, especially in the winter (though he now communicates electronically). He deals with his colleagues mostly by memorandum, occasionally by telephone, and rarely in person, except when the Court is in session. His law clerks report that months go by without another Justice visiting his chambers. Under Chief Justice Rehnquist, most of the Justices kept their distance from one another, and this has continued under Roberts, but Stevens in particular is, while cordial, remote.

Yet in person Stevens is as genial as he appears on the bench. He is ever hopeful about his home-town Cubs, and a devoted player, and fan, of golf—“though I have to confess, I miss Tiger.” His financial-disclosure form lists honorary memberships in four country clubs—near Chicago, near Indianapolis, near Washington, and in Florida. But when, in our conversation, the subject turned to the contemporary Supreme Court Stevens’s tone darkened.

I asked him if the center of gravity had moved to the right since he became a Justice. “There’s no doubt,” he said. “You don’t have to ask me that. Look at Citizens United.” He added, “If it is not necessary to decide a case on a very broad constitutional ground, when other grounds are available, then doesn’t that create the likelihood that people will think you’re not following the rules?”

Stevens doesn’t pretend that he’s more in tune with the Court than he is. When I asked him if there were any cases he especially regretted, he said, “Dozens. There are a lot I’m very unhappy with.” The first two that came to mind: District of Columbia v. Heller, in which the Court, in 2008, recognized an individual’s right to own weapons under the Second Amendment; and Bush v. Gore, halting the recount that the Florida Supreme Court had ordered in the 2000 Presidential race. He was in the minority in both.

On some subjects, his own views have shifted. Writing on affirmative action, in 1980, he noted, “If the National Government is to make a serious effort to define racial classes by criteria that can be administered objectively, it must study precedents such as the First Regulation to the Reich’s Citizenship Law of November 14, 1935”; yet in 2003 he engineered the preservation of racial preferences in admissions in a case involving the University of Michigan Law School. In 1976, he joined his colleagues in ending a moratorium on the death penalty; in 2008, he wrote that executions are “patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.” Stevens has always supported abortion rights and an expansive notion of freedom of speech.

In all areas, Stevens has favored gradual change over sudden lurches and precedent over dramatic overrulings. But, especially since Roberts took over as Chief Justice, Stevens has found himself confronting colleagues who have a very different approach—an aggressive, line-drawing conservatism that appears bent on remaking great swaths of Supreme Court precedent.

On a wall in Stevens’s chambers that is mostly covered with autographed photographs of Chicago sports heroes, from Ernie Banks to Michael Jordan, there is a box score from Game Three of the 1932 World Series, between the Yankees and the Cubs. When Babe Ruth came to bat in the fifth inning, at Wrigley Field, according to a much disputed baseball legend, he pointed to the center-field stands and then proceeded to hit a home run right to that spot. The event is known as “the called shot.”

“My dad took me to see the World Series, and we were sitting behind third base, not too far back,” Stevens, who was twelve years old at the time, told me. He recalled that the Cubs players had been hassling Ruth from the dugout earlier in the game. “Ruth did point to the center-field scoreboard,” Stevens said. “And he did hit the ball out of the park after he pointed with his bat. So it really happened.”

Stevens has a reverence for facts. He mentioned that he vividly recalled Ruth’s shot flying over the center-field scoreboard. But, at a recent conference, a man in the audience said that Ruth’s homer had landed right next to his grandfather, who was sitting far away from the scoreboard. “That makes me warn you that you should be careful about trusting the memory of elderly witnesses,” Stevens said. The box score was a gift from a friend; Stevens noticed that it listed the wrong pitchers for the game, so he crossed them out with a red pen, and wrote in the right names.

This meticulousness is evident in Stevens’s judicial writing. Most Supreme Court Justices, if they write first drafts of their opinions at all, concentrate on the legal analysis, which usually includes the flowery language that gets quoted in newspapers and textbooks; it is for their law clerks to write up the facts of the case, the driest part. Stevens always does the facts himself (and says he does all the other drafting, too). For many years, his was the only chambers to review individually the thousands of petitions for certiorari that come to the Court each year; the others pooled their efforts. (Alito also recently left the cert. pool.)

It was not a surprise that Ernest Stevens, the Justice’s father, got tickets to the World Series. The Stevenses were prominent citizens of Chicago. The Justice’s grandfather James Stevens had gone into the insurance business, and, with the profits, he and his sons Ernest and Raymond bought land on South Michigan Avenue and built what was then the biggest hotel in the world, with three thousand rooms. The Stevens Hotel opened in 1927, and featured a range of luxurious services, a bowling alley, and a pitch-and-putt golf course on the roof. There was a big, stylized “S” over the main entrance. “We stayed at the hotel sometimes, every now and then,” Stevens told me. “I have pleasant memories, and there are also some unpleasant aspects of it, too.”

The Depression hit the family hard. As chronicled in “John Paul Stevens: An Independent Life,” a biography by Bill Barnhart and Gene Schlickman, which will be published in May, questions arose about whether the Stevens family had embezzled funds from the insurance company to prop up the hotel. In January, 1933, three months after Ruth’s called shot, the Chicago Herald-Examiner reported, “The Stevens children were sent to bed so they could not see their father arrested.” After Ernest Stevens was released on bail, according to the new biography, four men brandishing a submachine gun, two shotguns, and a revolver ransacked the Stevens home in search of cash. Ernest and Elizabeth and two of their children, William, age fifteen, and John, age twelve, as well as the family cook and two maids, were herded upstairs and held in a bedroom after one of the boys was forced to open a safe in the first-floor library.
It remains unclear whether the intruders were police officers or gangsters (or both), but they found no secret stash of cash.

Later in 1933, the patriarch, James, had a debilitating stroke. A few days afterward, John’s uncle, Raymond, committed suicide rather than endure the disgrace of a criminal prosecution. Ernest Stevens thus had to go to trial alone, and in the toxic environment of the Depression he was swiftly convicted. He faced ten years in state prison. Deliverance came in 1934, when his appeal reached the Illinois Supreme Court and the justices unanimously reversed his conviction. “In this whole record there is not a scintilla of evidence of any concealment or fraud attempted,” the decision said. Still, the family never recovered its former wealth, and lost control of the hotel. (It is now known as the Chicago Hilton and Towers; the “S” is still there.)

“It was a tough period, no doubt about it,” Stevens told me. Notably, what saved his father was an appellate court. Stevens dismisses the connection as a “coincidence,” adding, “Of course, I respected the decision, but I was pretty young at the time—though I remember the words ‘not a scintilla of evidence.’ ”

The influence may be greater than Stevens acknowledges. His jurisprudence is distinguished by his confidence in the ability of judges to resolve difficult issues. “Generally, he respects the heck out of the profession of which he’s a member,” Deborah Pearlstein, a research scholar at Princeton who clerked for Stevens in 1999-2000, said. “Whether you take the examples from his personal life, or the litany of cases he’s heard in decades on the bench, his reliance on and confidence in judges to find out the truth was pretty unswerving.” Writing for a unanimous Court in 1997, Stevens rejected Bill Clinton’s argument that the Paula Jones case should be postponed until after his Presidency so that it would not interfere with his duties: “If properly managed by the District Court, it appears to us highly unlikely to occupy any substantial amount of [Clinton’s] time.” (“I get razzed a lot for predicting there wouldn’t be anything to come out of the case,” Stevens told me, “because they were, in effect, saying that the opinion is what triggered the impeachment and all the rest of it.” But, he said, “the opinion really had absolutely nothing to do with what followed, because the only issue was when the trial was going to occur, not whether it would occur. And it was agreed by everybody that discovery would go forward. So we are not responsible for the fact that they took the deposition, and the deposition is what got the President in trouble.”)

In Bush v. Gore, Stevens framed his colleagues’ decision as an insult to the judicial role, one that could, he wrote, “only lend credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work of judges throughout the land.” In words that became better known than anything in the collectively written majority decision, he continued:

Although we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year’s Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation’s confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law.

John Stevens rallied from the family trauma of his teen-age years and excelled at the Lab School of the University of Chicago. (Sasha and Malia Obama were students there; the Obamas lived about a mile away from where Stevens grew up, on the city’s South Side.) He enrolled at the university in 1937. He was the editor of the newspaper, a stalwart of the tennis team, the head class marshal, a member of Phi Beta Kappa. Toward the end of his undergraduate career, the dean of students, Leon P. Smith, rather mysteriously suggested that he take a correspondence course, and Stevens did. He later learned, he said, that Smith “was an undercover naval officer who had been asked to see if he could get people interested in cryptography. Somewhere toward the end of November of 1941, they sent me a letter that said you’ve completed enough of the assignment, so you’re now eligible to apply for a commission.” He enlisted on December 6, 1941. “The next day, the war started,” he said.

Stevens spent most of 1942 in Washington, learning to analyze enemy transmissions, before being transferred to Pearl Harbor, where he served until 1945. “All of the intercepted Japanese traffic would come over the desk,” he said. “I was responsible for a twenty-four-hour period. The timing was such that when I came on, which would be eight o’clock in the morning, you know, that would correspond to a new day in Japan.” He went on, “I’d write up a report for Captain Layton, who was the intelligence officer for Admiral Nimitz. And we would give a summary of what we could learn from the day’s traffic.”

Like many veterans, Stevens will shed a customary reserve to share a war story. He tries to have lunch with the law clerks from the chambers of each of his colleagues in the course of a year. Thomas Lee, who clerked for Souter in 2001-02, during his lunch with Stevens mentioned that he, too, had been a Navy cryptologist. “I told him that I had served almost exactly fifty years after he did, and in the same place—in the Pacific,” Lee, who is now a professor at Fordham Law School, told me. “He asked me to stop by his chambers so we could continue talking about it.” Lee did, and the Justice told him about a moral dilemma that had haunted him for decades.

In April, 1943, a coded message came across Stevens’s desk—“one eagle and two sparrows, or something like that,” he said. Stevens knew the transmission meant that an operation based on intelligence from his station had been a success. American aviators had tracked and shot down the airplane of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who was the architect of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the leader of Axis forces in Midway. Stevens was a twenty-three-year-old lieutenant, and the mission, essentially a targeted assassination, troubled him. “Even at the time, it seemed to me kind of strange that you had a mission that was intended to kill a particular individual,” he told me. “And it was an individual who was a friend of some of the Navy officers.” (Before the war, Yamamoto had trained with the U.S. Navy and studied at Harvard.) Ultimately, Stevens concluded that the operation, which was approved by President Roosevelt, was justified, but the moral complexity of such a killing, even in wartime, stayed with him. “It is a little different than your statistics about so many thousands of highway deaths—that doesn’t mean all that much,” he said. “But if somebody you know is killed, you have an entirely different reaction.” The morality of military action became a lifelong preoccupation.

Veterans of the Second World War dominated American public life for decades, but Stevens is practically the last one still holding a position of prominence. He is the only veteran of any kind on the Court. (Kennedy served briefly in the National Guard; Thomas received a student deferment and later failed a medical test during Vietnam.) “Somebody was saying that there ought to be at least one person on the Court who had military experience,” Stevens told me. “I sort of feel that it is important. I have to confess that.” The war helped shape his jurisprudence, and even today shapes his frame of reference. In his dissent in Citizens United, he questioned the majority’s insistence that the United States government could never discriminate on the basis of the identity of a speaker by saying, “Such an assumption would have accorded the propaganda broadcasts to our troops by ‘Tokyo Rose’ during World War II the same protection as speech by Allied commanders.” Since Tokyo Rose is not exactly a contemporary reference, Stevens told me, “my clerks didn’t particularly like that.”

Stevens’s Second World War experience also played a part in perhaps his most anomalous opinion as a Justice. In 1989, he dissented from the decision that protected the right to burn the American flag as a form of protest. “The ideas of liberty and equality have been an irresistible force in motivating leaders like Patrick Henry, Susan B. Anthony, and Abraham Lincoln, schoolteachers like Nathan Hale and Booker T. Washington, the Philippine Scouts who fought at Bataan, and the soldiers who scaled the bluff at Omaha Beach,” he wrote in an unusually lyrical dissent. “If those ideas are worth fighting for—and our history demonstrates that they are—it cannot be true that the flag that uniquely symbolizes their power is not itself worthy of protection.”

“The funny thing about that case is, the only consequence of it—nobody burns flags anymore,” Stevens told me. “It was an important symbolic form of protest at the time. But nobody does it anymore. As long as it’s legal, it’s not a big deal. You just don’t have flag burning.”

The war followed Stevens at the beginning of his legal career, too. After being discharged, in 1945, he raced through Northwestern Law School in two years, winning valedictorian honors. (He also acquired a new name, at least professionally. “I had a professor who said that every lawyer should have something unique about them,” he told me. “Some people sign their names in green ink, some people did other things. I had this very boring name. Who can remember ‘John Stevens’? So I added my middle name. I’ve used it ever since for work, but my friends have always called me John.”) Stevens earned a Supreme Court clerkship with Justice Wiley B. Rutledge, an F.D.R. appointee. In his year at the Court, Stevens worked on a case, Ahrens v. Clark, that had echoes sixty years later.

The matter grew out of the wartime detention of some hundred and twenty German-born U.S. residents, who were still being held at Ellis Island in 1948. The issue was whether these detainees had the right to challenge their incarceration in an American court. In a memo to Rutledge, Stevens wrote, “I should think that even an alien enemy ought to be entitled to a fair hearing on the question whether he is in fact dangerous.” Nevertheless, a six-to-three majority saw it the other way, so Rutledge and his twenty-eight-year-old clerk collaborated on a lengthy dissent, which said that the majority had torn at “the roots of individual freedom.”

Rutledge and Stevens were vindicated in 1973, when the Court effectively overruled its Ahrens precedent in a case involving the Kentucky legal system, but the issue of the rights of enemy aliens in wartime largely disappeared from the Court’s docket for many decades. It returned with a vengeance in the second Bush Administration. As Stevens said of the Ahrens dissent, with typical understatement, “It was relevant in the Guantánamo case.”

After his clerkship, Stevens returned to Chicago and took a job at one of the city’s first religiously integrated law firms. Abner Mikva clerked on the Supreme Court the year after Stevens, then returned to Chicago to start a career in public life. “Those were the days when there was such a thing as a moderate Republican, and that’s what he was,” Mikva said of Stevens. “He was a pretty conservative Republican on economic issues, but he was always a great progressive on civil rights and social rights.”

Stevens’s career resembled that of moderate Republicans like Harlan, Stewart, and Powell. All were successful corporate lawyers who leavened their private practice with periods of public service. Three years after joining the firm, Stevens did another short stint in Washington, this time as a lawyer on the Republican staff of the House Judiciary Committee, where he worked on antitrust issues. Back in Chicago, he became a widely renowned antitrust litigator while enjoying the life of a golf-playing suburban burgher. He and his wife, Betty, had four children, two of them adopted, and he took up flying a private plane as a hobby, which also enabled him to visit clients around the Midwest.

Robert H. Bork, the conservative scholar who was an unsuccessful nominee to the Supreme Court, was also an antitrust lawyer in Chicago in the late fifties, and in one case he and Stevens represented co-defendants. “I found him an amiable man, with conventional views for the time, and he gave no hint that he would become such a liberal in later years,” Bork told me.

Stevens likely would have lived out his life in prosperous obscurity if one of Chicago’s periodic corruption scandals hadn’t intervened. A local character, a wheelchair-bound frequent litigant named Sherman Skolnick, alleged that two justices on the Illinois Supreme Court had taken bribes to sway their votes in a political-corruption case. The court formed a committee to investigate, which appointed Stevens as its counsel. In a series of dramatic hearings in 1969, Stevens established that the two judges had indeed taken bribes. Both resigned, and Stevens became a public figure. The next year, Senator Charles Percy, an Illinois Republican, put Stevens up for a judgeship on the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Richard Nixon followed Percy’s advice, and, in 1970, Stevens began his judicial career.

Gerald Ford, coming into office in 1974, sought to demonstrate a renewed commitment to ethics at the Justice Department by naming as Attorney General Edward H. Levi, the dean of the University of Chicago Law School. When, the following year, William O. Douglas left the Supreme Court, Levi pushed for Stevens, his fellow-Chicagoan, whose anti-corruption credentials looked especially desirable in that post-Watergate moment. “Ford’s purpose was not to make a big splash and change the world,” Jack Balkin, a professor at Yale Law School, said. “Ford was still smarting after the pardon of Nixon. He wanted to unite the country. There was no attempt to nominate a strong ideologue. That just wasn’t on the table. They wanted a straight-arrow, middle-of-the-road, normal guy, excellent lawyer—and that’s what they got in Stevens.” Ford nominated Stevens, who was then fifty-five, on November 28, 1975, and the Senate confirmed him just nineteen days later, by a vote of ninety-eight to zero.

Stevens’s corruption investigation had a profound effect on the kind of judge he became. One of the justices on the Illinois Supreme Court had written a draft dissenting opinion in the case in which his colleagues were paid off but at the last minute had decided to remain silent. (Dissents were rare in Illinois.) “If there is disagreement within an appellate court about how a case should be resolved, I firmly believe that the law will be best served by an open disclosure of that fact, not only to the litigants and their lawyers, but to the public as well,” Stevens wrote in the introduction to “Illinois Justice,” a 2001 book about the scandal. As a result, “I do clutter up the U.S. Reports with more separate writing than most lawyers have either time or inclination to read.”

This is true. Especially in his early years, Stevens wrote a lot of opinions, including many short dissents and concurrences. The point of all this writing has not always been clear—he’s not warning of corruption among his colleagues—and initially the number of opinions gave Stevens a reputation for eccentricity. “His early concurrences did not move the ball—they were personal statements,” Mikva said. “They were not stirring, Brandeis-type dissents. It used up a lot of his time.” (Also in his first few years in Washington, Stevens divorced and remarried. His second wife, Maryan Mulholland Simon, an old friend from Chicago, is a dietician, whose ministrations Stevens credits for his longevity.)

At first, Stevens settled into the ideological center of the Court, which at the time was bounded, on the left, by William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, and, on the right, by Rehnquist, then an Associate Justice, and Chief Justice Warren E. Burger. The turning point came in 1994, when Blackmun retired and Stevens became the senior Associate Justice on the Court. Then, as now, the Court was closely divided between liberals and conservatives, so both sides had at least a chance of cobbling together majorities in important cases. This part of the job requires political deftness, which Stevens, in his Lone Ranger mode, had not often displayed. But he flourished in the role.

“Stevens controlled the assignment of opinions with great skill,” Walter Dellinger said. “Sometimes he has assigned the opinions to himself, but more important are the cases in which he gave up the privilege of writing the opinion in landmark cases in order to secure a shaky majority.” In 2003, Stevens asked O’Connor to write the opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, the University of Michigan Law School case. The same year, Stevens bestowed on Kennedy the opportunity to write Lawrence v. Texas, the epochal gay-rights case invalidating bans on consensual sex between adults of the same gender.

Decisions like Lawrence, as well as abortion-rights cases, which are based on what are known as “unenumerated rights” in the Constitution, have long drawn the ire of conservatives. “It’s in recent years that Stevens has most become an activist judge, on issues like homosexual rights,” Bork told me. “He finds rights in the Constitution that no plausible reading could find there.”

But such cases also raised his standing with liberals. “It was particularly selfless for Stevens to assign Lawrence to Kennedy,” Dellinger said. “He could have chosen the honor of writing Lawrence for himself. But it seems he wanted to make sure that the tentative vote to strike down the Texas law held up, and assigning the opinion of the Court to Kennedy locked in the majority.”

Still, the summit of Stevens’s achievements on the bench came during the Bush Administration, in the series of decisions about the detention of prisoners at Guantánamo Bay, and he kept for himself the most important of these opinions. In the 2004 case of Rasul v. Bush, among the first major cases to arise from Bush’s war on terror—and the first time that a President ever lost a major civil-liberties case in the Supreme Court during wartime—Stevens wrote for a six-to-three majority that the detainees did have the right to challenge their incarceration in American courts. In his opinion, which was written in an especially understated tone, in notable contrast to the bombastic rhetoric that accompanied the war on terror, he cited Rutledge’s dissent in the Ahrens case—which he himself had helped write, fifty-six years earlier. One of Stevens’s law clerks, Joseph T. Thai, later wrote an article in the Virginia Law Review entitled “The Law Clerk Who Wrote Rasul v. Bush,” which concluded that “Stevens’s work on Ahrens as a law clerk exerted a remarkable influence over the Rasul decision.”

Two years after Rasul, Stevens wrote the opinion for the Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, in which a five-to-three majority rejected the Bush Administration’s plans for military tribunals at Guantánamo, on the ground that they would violate both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva conventions. (Roberts did not participate in that case, because as a judge on the D.C. Circuit he had joined the opinion that Stevens overruled.)

Stevens’s repudiation of the Bush Administration’s legal approach to the war on terror was total. First, in Rasul, he opened the door to American courtrooms for the detainees; then, in Hamdan, he rejected the procedures that the Bush Administration had drawn up in response to Rasul; finally, in 2008, in Boumediene v. Bush, Stevens assigned Kennedy to write the opinion vetoing the system that Congress had devised in response to Hamdan.

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration conducted its war on terror with almost no formal resistance from other parts of the government, until Stevens’s opinions. He was among the first voices, and certainly the most important one, to announce, as he wrote in Hamdan, that “the Executive is bound to comply with the Rule of Law.”

“The Second World War was the defining experience of his life, and he is proud of being a veteran,” Cliff Sloan, a Washington lawyer who clerked for Stevens in the mid-eighties, said. “No one can challenge his patriotism, and that’s why he was the right guy to take on the Bush Administration’s position at that time and in that way.”

Stevens, throughout his years on the Court, has drawn not just on history and precedent but on contemporary values and even on his own experience as a judge. According to Stevens, that approach has its origins in his brief stint as a lawyer on the staff of the House Judiciary Committee. “That was probably one of the most important parts of my education,” Stevens told me. He recalled an incident involving an antitrust law: “I remember explaining one of the tricky problems in the statute to one of the members of the committee. I got all through it, and he said, ‘Well, you know, let’s let the judges figure that one out.’ ”

What that told him was that “the legislature really works with the judges—contrary to the suggestion that the statute is a statute all by itself,” Stevens said. “There is an understanding that there are areas of interpretation that are going to have to be filled in later on, and the legislators rely on that. It’s part of the whole process. And you realize that they’re not totally separate branches of government—they’re working together.”

Andrew Siegel, a Stevens clerk and now a law professor at Seattle University, said, “Stevens believes that constitutional decision-making is conducted through the interpretation of a mix of various sources—a complex balancing act.” He added, “The glue holding it all together is judicial judgment.”

This is the core of Stevens’s disagreement with his great intellectual adversary on the court, Antonin Scalia. When it comes to interpreting statutes, Scalia believes that the Court should be guided by the words of the law “all by itself,” as Stevens put it. Steven G. Calabresi, a law professor at Northwestern and a co-founder of the conservative Federalist Society, told me, “What makes Stevens a moderate liberal is that he is fundamentally a legal realist, which means that when the text and history of the Constitution point in one direction, and good results and good consequences point in the other, he’ll usually go with what he sees as the good results.” He added, “Scalia sees the role of the judge as to read the text and apply it—period. Stevens thinks the law is more of a living thing, and he takes text and history and applies it in a way that he thinks serves the purposes of the framers, not necessarily their exact words.“

Just about every year, Stevens and Scalia take each other on in one or more cases. These contests reflect the temperaments of the two men—Stevens’s cautious balancings against Scalia’s caustic certainties. One dramatic example came in 2008, in Baze v. Rees, which asked whether execution by lethal injection amounted to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Stevens and Scalia were both part of the seven-member majority, which said that lethal injections were permissible, but wrote separate concurring opinions. Stevens’s showed how his experience on the Court had soured him on the death penalty. “State-sanctioned killing is . . . becoming more and more anachronistic,” he wrote, and he proceeded to show that all of the purported justifications for the death penalty—deterrence, retribution—failed in practice. “I have relied on my own experience in reaching the conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty ‘represents the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or public purposes.’ ” Still, he felt bound by the precedents of the Court to uphold lethal injections.

Scalia wrote as a “needed response to Justice Stevens’s separate opinion.” He criticized Stevens’s assertions about the death penalty, but it was Stevens’s invocation of his own “experience” that really outraged Scalia. “Purer expression cannot be found of the principle of rule by judicial fiat. In the face of Justice Stevens’s experience, the experience of all others is, it appears, of little consequence,” Scalia wrote, adding, “It is Justice Stevens’s experience that reigns over all.”

Scalia’s mockery gets to the heart of his critique of Stevens’s jurisprudence—that his variability simply amounts to a judge’s whim. “That flexibility and malleability that Stevens talks about is really just a license for a judge to reach any result he wants,” M. Edward Whelan III, a former Scalia clerk who runs the conservative Ethics and Public Policy Center, said. “Scalia believes in rules.” According to Calabresi, “Stevens gives judges too much freewheeling power, and that’s not the way our system was supposed to work and not the way it works the best.”

True to form, Stevens dismisses doctrinaire originalism, but says that historical evidence does have its uses. “The original intent cannot be the final answer—the world changes,” Stevens told me. “But I think it’s always a part of your job to take a look at what you can find out about the original drafting and all the rest of it.” In Heller, the gun-control case, Scalia invoked his view of original intent to find that the Second Amendment gave individuals a personal right to possess weapons. In his dissent, Stevens looked exhaustively at the same historical evidence and reached an opposite conclusion: that the authors of the Second Amendment intended to create no such right. “I’ve written a lot of opinions in which I’ve looked at the history pretty carefully,” he said. For Stevens, then, original intent is one factor—but only one—that should tell a Justice what the Constitution means.

On September 29, 2005, Stevens administered the oath of office to Roberts in a ceremony at the White House. “I didn’t think that ceremony should have been at the White House,” Stevens told me. “I feel very strongly about that. I think the proper place for that ceremony is at the Court. It has great symbolic importance. After a nominee has been confirmed, he’s a member of the judiciary—he’s not primarily the person who was selected by the President for the Court.” Still, Stevens went ahead with the ceremony, because “I think he was a particularly fine appointment, and I didn’t want anyone to get the misimpression that I didn’t approve of him.”

During Roberts’s tenure, though, Stevens’s view of the Constitution—holistic, gradualist, inclusive, broadly sourced—has most often been on display in dissent in important cases. The replacement of Rehnquist and O’Connor by Roberts and Alito made not only a more conservative Court but also a more aggressive one, with far less regard for precedent. This is evident in areas from abortion law (where the Court upheld for the first time a total ban on a specific medical procedure) to antitrust (where the majority overturned a ninety-six-year-old line of cases). William Rehnquist was no liberal, but he did not lead an attack on the Court’s past.

Stevens believes that even the 1954 landmark, Brown v. Board of Education, which struck down the doctrine of “separate but equal” in education, is under assault. In 2007, when the Court, in an opinion by Roberts, struck down the Seattle school-integration plan, Stevens, in dissent, could only murmur in wonder: “It is my firm conviction that no Member of the Court that I joined in 1975 would have agreed with today’s decision.”

Even Stevens’s manners at oral argument are not entirely the result of Midwestern politeness. “You want to be sure to get it in,” he said. “The bench is a little more active than it was years ago. You’ve got four or five Justices who are very active.” Is that a good thing? “I’m not a Clarence Thomas, but I think a little more permission to the lawyers to develop their own argument would be better than the way it does develop.”

How long will Stevens remain on the Court? Good genes (one of his older brothers practiced law until he was ninety-one), a happy home, plenty of exercise, and even more luck could allow Stevens to keep up the fight into his tenth decade. Last December, he had lunch with Peter Isakoff, a Washington lawyer who was one of his early Supreme Court law clerks. “He had just played tennis that morning—singles!—and I was just kind of amazed,” Isakoff recalled. “And so I asked him, ‘Do you still run?’ And he looked at me and said, ‘Well, how else are you going to get to the ball?’ ”

With the election of Barack Obama, the question of Stevens’s retirement has become more pressing. Even though Stevens was appointed by a Republican President, many assume that he would never willingly have turned his seat over to George W. Bush. I asked Stevens about his plans.

“Well, I still have my options open,” he said. “When I decided to just hire one clerk, three of my four clerks last year said they’d work for me next year if I wanted them to. So I have my options still. And then I’ll have to decide soon.” On March 8th, he told me that he would make up his mind in about a month.

Stevens needs a little more than two years to surpass Douglas for the longest tenure on the Court, and about one year to equal Oliver Wendell Holmes as the oldest serving Justice, but he said that those numbers were irrelevant. “I’ve never felt any interest in trying to break any records,” he said. He has had a closeup view of the complexities of retirement decisions for Supreme Court Justices. William Douglas, whom Stevens replaced, stayed on the Court after a series of strokes that incapacitated him; his colleagues awkwardly forced his resignation. On the other hand, O’Connor left the Court in good health, which continues, and has watched her successor, Alito, undo part of her legacy.

Did it matter which President named his replacement?

“I’d rather not answer that,” Stevens said. The Republican Party may have moved right since 1975, but Ford himself never displayed anything but pride in his choice of Stevens for the Court. In 2005, a year before his death, Ford wrote, in a tribute to Stevens, “For I am prepared to allow history’s judgment of my term in office to rest (if necessary, exclusively) on my nomination thirty years ago of John Paul Stevens to the U.S. Supreme Court.”

As for Obama, Stevens said, “I have a great admiration for him, and certainly think he’s capable of picking successfully, you know, doing a good job of filling vacancies.” He added, “You can say I will retire within the next three years. I’m sure of that.”

He will not be seen again, under any circumstances, at a State of the Union address. “I went to a few of them when I was first on the Court, but I stopped,” Stevens told me. “First, they are political occasions, where I don’t think our attendance is required. But also it comes when I am on a break in Florida. To be honest with you, I’d rather be in Florida than in Washington.”