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January 19, 2009

Poem du jour

Eh?
by Nathalie Anderson
published in New Yorker January 19, 2009

Eh he said and she
dreamed eh. It was
like that between them.

Not that his lips dreamed,
not that his dreamed lips
parted. Eh he’d say

and her dream was eh,
was all eh, all and
only. Sometimes

a near kiss an almost tide
drawn back withdrawn withdrawing.
Sometimes the hackled wave

raised, drew back its lip, sheered
its teeth, coughed its raw
guttural. Or

she herself voicing
involuntary eh
his whatever, his

what-it-is. But
sometimes his naked eh
with her ah alongside—

the rocked hulls nudging nuzzling
or was it scraping what
did she care? Would his eh

oh? How fast she’d
founder, taking on water,
mouth emptying full.

By day she’d hear on the air
his syllable, turn
toward or away, does it

matter? If she said ah
would he dream ah? Oh—
not like that between them.

January 18, 2009

LRB: on video games



London Review of Books, John Lanchester on video games



or read it here

Is it Art?
John Lanchester
From the economic point of view, this was the year video games overtook music and video, combined, in the UK. The industries’ respective share of the take is forecast to be £4.64 billion and £4.46 billion. (For purposes of comparison, UK book publishers’ total turnover in 2007 was £4.1 billion.) As a rule, economic shifts of this kind take a while to register on the cultural seismometer; and indeed, from the broader cultural point of view, video games barely exist. The newspapers cover the movies extensively, and while it isn’t necessary to feel that they do all that great a job of it, there’s no denying that they have a try. Video games by contrast are consigned to the nerdy margins of the papers, and are pretty much invisible in broadcast media. Video-game fans return the favour: they constitute the demographic group least likely to pay attention to newspapers and are increasingly uninterested in the ‘MSM’, or mainstream media.

There is no other medium that produces so pure a cultural segregation as video games, so clean-cut a division between the audience and the non-audience. Books, films, TV, dance, theatre, music, painting, photography, sculpture, all have publics which either are or aren’t interested in them, but at least know that these forms exist, that things happen in them in which people who are interested in them are interested. They are all part of our current cultural discourse. Video games aren’t. Video games have people who play them, and a wider public for whom they simply don’t exist. (The exceptions come in the form of occasional tabloid horror stories, always about a disturbed youth who was ‘inspired’ to do something terrible by a video game.) Their invisibility is interesting in itself, and also allows interesting things to happen in games under the cultural radar.

An example. One of the hottest philosophical topics on the internet is Ayn Rand. Her ‘objectivist’ philosophy, positivistic and materialistic and focused on the need to get society out of the way of the genius so that he can get on with his geniusness, is popular with a broad spectrum of alienated semi-young men tapping away at computer screens and dreaming of world domination. Complicating the picture is the fact that she was also the main intellectual influence on her close friend and protégé Alan Greenspan, author of the recent monetary boom we were all enjoying so much until it destroyed the world economy. The only thing which isn’t ridiculous about Rand and her ‘objectivism’ is the number of people who take her seriously. It would be a good time for someone to publish a work of fiction or make a movie going into Rand’s ideas and duffing them up a bit – for instance, imagining what it would look like if a society with no laws were turned over to the free will of self-denominated geniuses.

Well, someone has done that, except it isn’t a book or movie, it’s a video game. BioShock, which came out in 2007, was conceived by Ken Levine and developed by 2K Boston/2K Australia, and is set in an alternative-reality version of 1960. The main character – from whose perspective you play the game – is involved in a plane crash in mid-Atlantic, and ends up in an underwater city called Rapture which, he learns, was founded by one Andrew Ryan (spot the near anagram) as a genius-led paradise of unrestricted scientific experiment. The scientists invented a technology of genetic improvement, ‘splicing’, and under pressure to keep this secret, Ryan made a fatal mistake: he passed Rapture’s only law, forbidding contact with the surface. This law instantly made smuggling a profitable business, and a criminal empire developed. Rapture descended into civil war, and then into the world of the game: a dystopian horror in which genetically altered ‘splicers’ run amok. BioShock is visually striking, verging on intermittently beautiful, also violent, dark, sleep-troubling, and perhaps, to some of its intended audience, thought-provoking. The game was a huge hit, and I have yet to encounter anyone who has ever heard of it.

As a video game, BioShock fully subscribes to the conventions of the medium, and if you as a non-gamer were to pick it up and give it a try, it is these you would probably notice most. Not just the conventions of which buttons and levers you press to move about the world of the game (annoying and hard to recollect as these often are) and not just the in-game mechanics, such as the ‘plasmids’ which you have to inject to give your character the powers he needs, or the tapes which are conveniently left around for you to discover and play back to hear the story of Rapture; but also the whole package of conventions and codes and how-tos which become second nature to video-game players, but which strike non-gamers as arbitrary and confining and a little bit stupid. Northrop Frye once observed that all conventions, as conventions, are more or less insane; Stanley Cavell once pointed out that the conventions of cinema are just as arbitrary as those of opera. Both those observations are brought to mind by video games, which are full, overfull, of exactly that kind of arbitrary convention. Many of these conventions make the game more difficult. Gaming is a much more resistant, frustrating medium than its cultural competitors. Older media have largely abandoned the idea that difficulty is a virtue; if I had to name one high-cultural notion that had died in my adult lifetime, it would be the idea that difficulty is artistically desirable. It’s a bit of an irony that difficulty thrives in the newest medium of all – and it’s not by accident, either. One of the most common complaints regular gamers make in reviewing new offerings is that they are too easy. (It would be nice if a little bit of that leaked over into the book world.)

So I’m guessing that if you played BioShock, that intelligent and thought-provoking game, your main reaction would be to be annoyed by all the things about it which seem stupid. Does that matter? Shouldn’t we just leave gamers to their annoying games, until they become less annoying? Is there anything that might be done about it, to make video games less offputtingly difficult/ arbitrary/self-segregating/stupid? One of the people who has most engaged with the question is also one of the few unquestioned geniuses in the video-game world, Shigeru Miyamoto. (Well, I say his status as a genius is unquestioned, but to those who don’t accept the cultural validity of video games, of course it’s very much in question – it would be like having a genius morris dancer. Suffice it to say that in the video-game world, including the many tens of millions of people who play his games, he’s an unquestioned genius.) Miyamoto has, throughout his career, engaged with the question of arbitrariness by making his games more arbitrary, more silly – by making that silliness part of the fun. He is the inventor of Mario and Donkey Kong and Zelda and Nintendogs: in other words, he’s Walt Disney. At his best, as in the recent Super Mario Galaxy, made for the Nintendo Wii, his games are visually beautiful, witty (a quality expressed mainly through the design of the many small planet-worlds in the game, heaving with imaginatively designed traps and enemies), and have a sublime, enchanting silliness. He dislikes narrative in game design, so his games don’t have a story (except for the Zelda series), but they do offer wholly satisfying worlds – this being one of the things video games do best. Also great fun is Super Mario Kart, a racing game, again silly, with a highly welcome low level of pick-up-and-play difficulty. In it, Donkey Kong (a large gorilla) can race Princess Peach (the multiply kidnapped sort of love object of the Mario series), an Italian plumber (the eponymous Mario), his evil twin, Wario, and a small green dinosaur called Yoshi, and so on, all of the vehicles being driven by various friends and family members, and comprehensible and playable by anyone over the age of about four. Miyamoto has said he likes the idea of creating games a grandchild and a grandparent can play together, and he has done more than anyone else alive to do exactly that.

It is no accident that Miyamoto has dedicated his career to the Japanese console-maker Nintendo, for whom all of his games have been designed. Nintendo began life in the late 19th century as a maker of card games, and that emphasis on gaming survived their transition to newer technologies. That might sound like a truism – video-game maker has background in games – but as it happens the company’s two great rivals have different histories. Sony is a consumer technology company, Microsoft is a software company, and both have been more reluctant than Nintendo to understand that what people mainly want to do with games is play; their interest has recently focused more on their desire to ‘win the battle of the living-room’. Translated, that means to sell consumers a super-powerful omnicompetent console which sits in the corner of the room and gives the parent company a share of all sorts of potential future revenue streams. Sony’s PS3 is a wonder of the world, with two astounding new technologies inside, the multi-threading Cell computer chip and the new generation Blu-Ray Disc; the Xbox 360 is a powerful computer in its own right; but the much lower-tech Nintendo Wii is a lot more fun than either of them.

If one were trying to find a point where video games are turning into a form of artistic expression, however, it might be towards the more powerful consoles that one would look. The Wii is great entertainment but in spirit it is closer to a toy than a game; I don’t mean that as a criticism, it’s a virtue. In the form of games such as those of Miyamoto, it is close to a spirit of pure play. This is often elusive in the darker types of video game. A common criticism of video games made by non-gamers is that they are pointless and escapist, but a more valid observation might be that the bulk of games are nowhere near escapist enough. A persuasive recent essay by the games theorist Steven Poole made the strong argument that the majority of games offer a model of play which is oppressively close to work.[1] The Grand Theft Auto games, for example, are notorious (especially among people who’ve never played them) for their apparent celebration of random violence. The most recent iteration of the game, however, Grand Theft Auto IV, involves the main character having to spend a large amount of time building up his relationships, so that he can have people to help him do his criminal thing; and building up these relationships involves driving to see these people, taking them out to nightclubs, and sitting there with them. It’s not significantly less boring in the game than it would be in real life.

Peter Molyneux, a brilliant British game designer with a particular interest in ‘God games’ – games in which the player creates a world – had a great notion in a game called The Movies, which came out in 2005. In it the player designs and then runs a movie studio, starting at the birth of the medium and running all the way into the near future: he builds the studio, sets budgets, hires directors, manages the careers of stars, co-ordinates the production of the film, and then, within the game, actually gets to make animated films in the relevant style of the period, from silent to early colour to the present day. The player can then upload these films to the internet where anyone can watch them.[2] The Movies is an example of just how sophisticated video games can be; but it also has a not so subtle flaw, in that the business of running the studio, in the game, is all too realistic: it’s almost as much of a budget-juggling, ego-massaging, logistics-forecasting pain in the bum as it would be in real life.

That’s not atypical. Most games, as Poole argues, are work-like. They have a tightly designed structure in which the player has to earn points to win specific rewards, on the way to completing levels which earn him the right to play on other levels, earn more points to win other rewards, and so on, all of it repetitive, quantified and structured. The trouble with these games – the majority of them – isn’t that they are maladapted to the real world, it’s that they’re all too well adapted. The people who play them move from an education, much of it spent in front of a computer screen, full of competitive, repetitive, quantifiable, measured progress towards goals determined by others, to a work life, much of it spent in front of a computer screen, full of competitive, repetitive, quantifiable, measured progress towards goals determined by others, and for recreation sit in front of a computer screen and play games full of competitive, repetitive, quantifiable, measured progress towards goals determined by others. Most video games aren’t nearly irresponsible enough.

So, on the one hand, we have those games which manage to achieve a pure state of play – too few, but they do exist. In addition to Miyamoto’s masterpieces, I should mention the magnificently goofy series of games jointly produced by Lego: Lego Star Wars, Lego Indiana Jones and Lego Batman. They are perfect games for an adult and a child to play together, and the recasting of the characters in the form of animated Lego lets a child play with things with which he is fascinated but of which in the movies he’s scared; it’s difficult to be frightened of a waddling Lego version of Darth Vader who regularly falls over. The games also, crucially, give the child a sense of agency – that he has entered the story-world of the movies and is playing inside it.

This sense of agency is the cultural and aesthetic USP of video games. The medium doesn’t have, and probably never will have, a sense of character to match other forms of narrative; however much it develops, it can’t match the inwardness of the novel or the sweep of film. But it does have two great strengths. The first is visual: the best games are already beautiful, and I can see no reason why the look of video games won’t match or surpass that of cinema. The second is to do with this sense of agency, that the game offers a world in which the player is free to act and to choose. It is this which gives the best games their immense involvingness. You are in the game in a way that is curiously similar to the way you are in a novel you are reading – a way that is subtly unlike the sense of absorption in a spectacle which overtakes the viewer in cinema. The interiority of the novel isn’t there, but the sense of having passed into an imagined world is.

At the moment this is, for the most part, about entertainment. An example is the genre that has grown up in video games, known as ‘survival horror’. The basic premise is that you go into a bad place and have to escape, and to do so need to fight off zombies or variations thereof. This sounds like many a movie: what’s different is that you aren’t watching this, but playing it. The person moving down the darkened hallway, listening to the sinister creaking noise coming from behind the wall, is you. The best of these games use sound to great effect; the interiors are underlit, and the monsters, when they arrive, genuinely feel as if they are coming to get you – not the you watching the story, but the you inside the story. If this makes them sound frightening, they are, but in the cathartic way of a good scary film, and this is one instance where video games seem to me much healthier than their cinematic equivalents, which have currently abandoned themselves to a revolting vogue for ‘torture porn’. Resident Evil 4, to name the generally agreed peak of the genre, is a better scary entertainment than any horror film made in years, and if you can play it at night with the lights out, you have steadier nerves than I do.

Another example of games which exploit the involvingness of the form to good effect is the category of ‘shooters’. There are first-person shooters, in which the player’s point of view is the same as the character’s, and third-person shooters, in which the player looks at the character from the outside. There is a whole sub-genre of shooter in which creeping and crawling around are as important as the actual fighting; these are ‘stealth’ games, and the best of them, the Metal Gear Solid series, are widely seen as the pinnacle of the shooter form. To my mind, they’re over-rated. Their creator, Hideo Kojima, likes long cut scenes: the film-like interludes which break up the gameplay action, and which, because they can be made to a higher level of animation, often provide the most visually arresting sequences of a game. Combined with a taste for bizarrely complicated, recursive plots, and long sequences of wordy explicatory dialogue, this turns the games into a bit of a drag. The Metal Gear games foreground one of the problems with games, which is that the writing in them – and there’s more writing, more dialogue and more acting than non-gamers think – tends to be pretty lousy. The effort put into the imagining and realisation of worlds, especially the visual detail of those worlds, isn’t matched by the stories told and the words spoken.

At their best, though, shooters are entertaining, in the way that action films are entertaining, only better. Call of Duty 4, for instance, a first-person shooter, set in a more or less realistic present day, is faster and more thrilling than its Hollywood competitors, because it’s more involving. It’s not Jason Bourne shooting and being shot at, it’s you – and by the way, the idea that these games encourage fantasies of invulnerability is, it seems to me, wrong. Even playing them on the easiest setting, you the player are killed, and often, which is frustrating and even upsetting; you certainly feel less invulnerable than you do watching a shoot-out on TV. In 2004 the commercial version of a game developed as a training tool for the US army was released.[3] Full Spectrum Warrior, interestingly and necessarily realistic, is less about shooting and more about movement and seeking cover. It is set in a carefully non-specific Middle Eastern country, and in 2006, with the lessons of Iraq percolating through the system, a sequel came out, with various tweaks and improvements, and one big change: in this version, the player can be killed.

Games are not, in general, better than films. But they are often better than huge-budget Hollywood films. Games whose main aim is to provide unreflecting entertainment are (it seems to me) getting to a point where they are often more entertaining than expensive movies with the same aim. To their target demographic, this seems so obvious it’s barely worth stating; and when it is stated, the logic is clear. ‘Games have to be better than films because they cost more,’ is how one gamer puts it. A movie costs eight or nine quid (as much as double that for the DVD) and lasts a couple of hours, a game costs 40 quid and lasts for up to 40 hours of normal gameplay; but many games now have an extra dimension in that they can be played online, with and against other players. Call of Duty 4 has an especially active online community, who play in teams, and regard the online aspect as the best thing about the game. The young men (mostly) who shell out their 40 quid are a demanding audience.

Too demanding, perhaps. I’m not the target demographic, obviously, but I find many games too hard to play: the levels of frustration and repetition are too high. Gamers sometimes complain about this, but they’re just as likely to complain about the opposite, and one of the great things about difficulty for the game-making companies is that it stretches the play out – you can turn a five-hour game (too short for the hardcore fan) into a 20-hour one simply by making it harder to save your progress and restore your in-game health. It’s boring and annoying for the non-hardcore player. The trouble is that this hardcore player is a deeply desirable demographic: young, male, with disposable income, susceptible to advertising and marketing, hard to reach through other media, and keen to try the new thing. Gaming is profitable and has grown fast, and this audience has allowed it to do so, so the industry is to a large extent focused on giving the boys what they want.

And what do they want? The same thing the audience for any new medium always wants: they want pornography, broadly defined. They want to see things they aren’t supposed to see. This is why video games, in general (and away from the world of Miyamoto-san) are so preoccupied with violence – it’s what young men want to see. (Pornography in the sexual sense is less of an issue: they can get that from the internet, any time they want.) Their rule-bound, target-bound educations and work lives leave them with a deep craving to go and commit imaginary crimes – as well they might. Not all games are cynically, affectlessly violent, but a lot of them are, and this trend is holding video games back. It’s keeping them at the level of Hollywood blockbusters, when they could go on to be something else and something more.

It seems clear to me that by the time my children are adults, video gaming will be a medium whose importance and cultural ubiquity are at least as great as that of film or television. Whether it will be an artistic medium of equivalent importance is less clear. One of the problems is that the new consoles are difficult and expensive to create games for: no one can create a game for the PS3 or Xbox 360 without access to significant amounts of capital. The next generation of consoles is a long way away, and this will likely be even more the case by the time they’ve grown up. As the tools of filmmaking have got cheaper, those for game making have got more expensive; this might mean that the game industry never gets to move on from the need to create blockbuster equivalents. Already the industry suffers from an excessive proliferation of sequels – always a sign that the moneymen are in charge. Games do a good job of competing with blockbusters, but it would be a pity if that was the summit of their artistic development.

There are, however, glimpses of what games might one day be. Will Wright is another generally acknowledged genius of the game world. His first great creation, The Sims, took the ideas of Abraham Maslow about mankind’s ‘hierarchy of needs’ (food, shelter, security and so on, up to ‘peak experiences’) and applied them to a game in which users could set the rules for their various characters, and then allow them to go off and interact with each other. The interactions can be unpredictable. ‘Mum, what’s “intimacy”?’ an 11-year-old Sims player of my acquaintance asked her mother. A day later, she came into the kitchen again, outraged: ‘Mum, my character’s just had a baby!’ The Sims too suffered from sequelitis, but Wright went off to design another game, called Spore, arranged in five separate stages. In the first, you begin by designing single-cell organisms and supervising their fight for life; then you arrange their development into intelligent creatures; then you develop a tribe; then a civilisation, all the time arranging the parameters of the game-world. In the last stage, your civilisation travels into space, where it can be uploaded to the internet and allowed to interact with the other space-going civilisations developed by other players of the game. At the moment there are tens of thousands of these planetary civilisations to explore. There is a strong sense in Wright’s work that the most interesting thing about his games is what is done with them by the user; that the user’s experiences and reactions and creativity are the most important thing about the game.

There – I’ve done it. I’ve used the ‘c’ word. From the aesthetic point of view, a lot turns on whether games offer their users actual creativity, or whether it is just some horrible corporate simulacrum. The PS3 has a wonderful new game called LittleBigPlanet, in which you play a sock-like creature who travels through game levels full of puzzles and obstacles, and governed by fascinatingly realistic physics – and then offers you a full set of tools to design game levels of your own, and upload them for others to play. All the specifics of the levels are up to you; you can fill them with photos and music of your own choice, you can do whatever you like. That’s fun. Is it creative? I’m not sure: part of me wants to say that it isn’t, that nothing within a world so fully made by a corporation can be truly creative. But it isn’t so far off creativity, and it is possible to imagine a day in which games like this cross over to offer real freedoms, and therefore the real possibility to make something new, something of your own.

The other way in which games might converge on art is through the beauty and detail of their imagined worlds, combined with the freedom they give the player to wander around in them. Already quite a few games offer what’s known as ‘sandbox’ potential, to allow the player to ignore specific missions and tasks and just to roam around. (Many people’s favourite aspect of the Grand Theft Auto games involves their sandboxiness. A favourite sandbox activity in the California-set Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas was simply driving to the coast and watching the sun go down over the ocean.) I think more and more games will make this central to the user’s experience of the game, and one straw in the wind here is Fallout 3, a new game from the producer Bethesda. It’s set in a post-apocalyptic 2277, and your character begins the game living in Vault 101, a bomb shelter set near the ruins of Washington. The game has the usual props and targets, but one of the most striking things about it is the opportunity it offers to explore the bombed-out, desolate, intensely evocative city. This is something which, once you’ve done it, I suspect will be difficult to get out of your head – and it is a glimpse of what games can do at their best. The next decade or so is going to see the world of video games convulsed by battles between the moneymen and the artists; if the good guys win, or win enough of the time, we’re going to have a whole new art form. At a moment when there’s less good cheer than there should be, it’s something to look forward to.

[1] http://stevenpoole.net/trigger-happy/working-for-the-man/

[2] Lionhead, the developer of the game, shut down the online community on 5 December but there’s an archive of movies at http://lionhead.com/themovies/TMO.aspx#library

[3] The army also has a strategic game called Full Spectrum Command, for senior officers, which hasn’t been released to the public.

From the LRB letters page: [ 29 January 2009 ] Tom Chatfield.

John Lanchester’s book about the financial crisis, Whoops, will be published by the Penguin Press, once he’s finished writing it.

LRB: Poem du jour

Poem: ‘A Pillow Book’
Hugo Williams

1.
I lie in bed, watching you
dress yourself in nudity
for your part in a story
you are about to tell me.

Once upon a time, you seem to say,
there was a woman who took off all her clothes
and stood for a moment
with one hand on her hip.

You have my full attention
as you pile your hair on top of your head
and let it fall down again.
Up to this point I am familiar with the story.

Your movements suggest a possible outline,
but nothing is certain yet.
You lift your arms above your head
in a gesture of boredom or surrender.

Your hands touch in mid-air
and you turn them palm-side-out
in a kind of question mark,
as you ask for help with the ending.

2.
The story sets out along your limbs,
feeling its way forward
round the crook of a knee,
the angle of an elbow,

read more


getting tangled in your hair.
It follows the line of your arms
as they cross one another
taking off your pullover,

or disappear behind your back.
It hovers round your shoulders,
touches on your breasts,
moves on to the whiteness

of your skin, the long flow
of your waist where it turns into
your hips. It has stripped you down
to the merest outline,

where everything makes sense.
I turn the pages more quickly now,
wanting and not wanting
the story’s resolution.

3.
This is the only kind of work
I’m any good at –
watching you take off your make-up
and put on moisturiser.

From toner to night cream
I check the progress
of these preparations
for shades of meaning and mood.

I can’t be sure of anything
in our silent collaboration,
till you undress completely
and don’t put on your nightdress.

I let the scene go on
for as long as it wants to,
knowing that soon you will be joining me
in the complications of the plot.

I open the book for you
and you slip between its pages –
the perfect illustration
to whatever happens next.

4.
You can’t find your hairbrush
or your hairband. It’s too cold
to get undressed completely
tonight, do I mind?

You look at me suspiciously,
as if I might be
wearing pyjamas myself
under the covers.

I’m not saying anything
until I see everything
you are wearing
lying in a heap on the floor.

Oh dear, that was your last
pair of pants.
What are you going to do?
You might have to go home tomorrow.

I lie here as usual,
in thrall to the ritual,
knowing that all I have to do
is warm the bed for you.

5.
Your top goes up,
your jeans come down,
your bra goes round to the side
while you undo the clasp.

What’s left is a wisp
of something flowery,
slung between your hips
like a cocktail glass.

You tilt it this way and that,
till your movements displace
a ripple of soft porn
over the brim of the room.

I can’t help noticing
the way you push your pants down
without bending your knees,
then kick them into a corner.

Of course, I could be wrong about this
and all that is really going on
is you undressing,
getting ready for bed.

6.
You throw your things on a chair
and move about the room
with nothing on,
opening and closing drawers,

looking for something you’ve lost
among the bottles and jars
on your dressing-table.
When you find it at last

you pour something in your hand
and rub it on your body,
as if you were
conjuring yourself from a lamp.

A blue flame springs up
where you were standing
and a chain reaction
sets out round the room.

I feel the heat of you on my face
as you pass in front of me.
Now your perfume takes over
the telling of our story.

7.
I’ve heard it before of course,
this bedtime story of ours
about two people in a room
and what happens next

in the pastoral scene
in the pattern of the wallpaper,
but every time it is new.
Every time it is the same:

a woman undressing,
a man lying at her feet,
till there comes a point in the story
when you turn down the light.

I lie here watching you
move about the room,
hoping you will go over the action
one more time, to jog my memory.

How the plot twists and turns
on its toes, before revealing itself.
How the various storylines
come together finally.

8.
And always the secret music
of your perfume
accompanying your entrance
on a stage at the foot of the bed.

Its sunflower colours
of pepper and honey
echo themes of resistance
and surrender

in a play you are putting on
for my improvement.
You stand on one leg,
tugging at one striped sock

that doesn’t want to come off.
Opposing pieces of action
flow into one another,
then draw apart again.

I should understand by now
what you are saying or not saying,
but pepper and honey
have clouded my judgment.

9.
One of our characters lacks
motivation tonight.
He’s sulking slightly.
It’s been a long day.

He gets into bed first
and pulls the covers up to his chin.
He might be asleep,
or he might only be pretending.

She might be undressing,
or she might be putting on her
nightdress, hoping for
a night’s sleep herself.

The action slows
to a period of reflection,
sitting on the arm of a chair.
Her feet are killing her.

She can’t make up her mind
what she feels about all this.
She glances round the room,
looking for a place to lie down.

10.
Words reach out like hands
to hold you still,
as pictures of you undressing
fan out round the room.

You might be hanging up a shirt
behind the bedroom door,
treading your jeans underfoot
with a sulky look on your face,

or bending over
to put something away in a drawer.
You might be lifting up your arms
to put up your hair,

or looking in the bedside cupboard
for the moisturiser.
I should collect these images
to remember you by.

Each one pauses for a moment
to imprint itself on the air,
before slowly detaching itself
and disappearing forever.

11.
All I have to do
is describe the scene to myself
and I am back there,
peering into the shadows.

It is a darkened room
where a sodium glow from the street
wanders under a blind
that won’t pull all the way down.

You enter through a door on the right,
drying your hair,
laughing at one of your own jokes.
All I have to do

is watch while you explain
what is happening between us
in the language of undressing.
Are we naked tonight?

Or are we holding something back?
I don’t mind, really I don’t.
Nothing matters any more,
so long as we’re together

12.
Is that you over there
in your nightdress,
standing on one leg,
looking at the sole of your foot?

It must be you
because all your things are still here –
face creams and cotton buds,
cleanser and eyeliner,

scattered across the table
where you put on make-up
and do your hair.
I know it is you

because you don’t put the tops back
on the bottles. I do that.
I see you clearly now,
laughing at my fussiness,

or is that the ghost of you laughing?
You lean towards me,
holding your hands behind your back,
as if you are asking me to choose.

Hugo Williams’s latest collection is Dear Room.

January 17, 2009

LRB: on Pinocchio



London Review of Books, Bee Wilson on new translation of Carlo Collodi's Pinocchio
click the image above to open it in the browser,or read it here

No Strings
Bee Wilson
■Pinocchio by Carlo Collodi, translated by Geoffrey Brock Buy this book
If you only know the Disney film, it comes as a shock to read the original story of Pinocchio and discover that the Talking Cricket is killed by Pinocchio at their very first meeting. This unusual creature, who has lived in Geppetto’s house for a hundred years, offers Pinocchio a ‘great truth’, solemnly advising him that he will never come to any good if he doesn’t find a useful occupation, adding that he pities him for being a puppet.

At these last words, Pinocchio jumped up in a rage, grabbed a wooden mallet from the workbench, and flung it at the Talking Cricket.

Perhaps he didn’t mean to hit him at all, but unfortunately he hit him square on the head. With his last breath the poor Cricket cried cree-cree-cree and then died on the spot, stuck to the wall.

We are only in Chapter 4 (of 36) and already all our expectations must be overturned. In Disney, the adorable top-hatted Jiminy Cricket is Pinocchio’s perpetual companion, his ‘conscience’ as he goes on his travels. With his huge Mickey Mouse eyes and bashful smile, Jiminy, voiced by Cliff Edwards, is the character who opens and closes the film with ‘When You Wish upon a Star’. Jiminy insistently lightens the darkness of Pinocchio’s experiences with his jaunty tunes and simple moral laws.

Take the straight and narrow path
And if you start to slide
Give a little whistle! Give a little whistle!
And always let your conscience be your guide.

In Carlo Collodi’s original, there is no time or inclination for moral whistling. Peasant Tuscany in the 1880s is a much harsher world than Disney’s Mitteleuropean fantasy of 1940. In Collodi’s book, conscience is mocked by hunger and sages are ignored or destroyed by impetuous children.

So complete has been the dominance of the Disney Pinocchio that it is Collodi’s original that has come to seem like the revised version. As Richard Wunderlich and Thomas Morrissey write in their study of Pinocchio in America, ‘Pinocchio’ Goes Postmodern (2002), Collodi’s novel is now merely a ‘version among versions’: an adult version in their view, unsuitable for children, because no children’s book would allow poor Jiminy to be squashed. ‘We have repeatedly encountered people who have reacted to . . . the killing of the cricket’ as ‘repellent’ and ‘adult’, Wunderlich and Morrissey observe. But why? There are plenty of children’s books in which much worse things happen than the semi-accidental death of an insect. The Laura Ingalls Wilder books feature a pig being butchered and wild talk of Indian massacres, but no one calls The Little House in the Big Woods ‘repellent’. The difference is that Wilder writes in a purely realist register. Collodi is more heartless, using realism as a tool to undercut allegory – which does for the Pinocchio that most of us grew up with. It isn’t just Jiminy who is splatted against the wall, but the whole Disney dreamworld, and the encouraging delusion that good things come easily to those who wish hard enough.

‘If your heart is in your dream,’ Jiminy sings in the film, ‘No request is too extreme/ When you wish upon a star/As dreamers do.’ An angelic chorus then chimes in to assure us that ‘Fate is kind.’ But Collodi’s Fate isn’t kind. The presiding spirit of the book is ‘i casi son tanti’ (one of Geppetto’s sayings): anything can happen, and probably will. In the course of his picaresque journey, Collodi’s Pinocchio has his feet burned off, is used as firewood, defrauded of all his money, hanged by his neck from a tree by murderers, caught in a weasel trap, imprisoned in a doghouse, nearly fried and eaten by a fisherman, turned into a donkey, whipped by a ringmaster in a circus and swallowed by a giant shark. Nor is Pinocchio himself the sweet hapless innocent of the Disney film, as his short way with the cricket suggests, but a wilful, greedy and occasionally vindictive brat. For much of the book, he is less concerned with becoming a real live boy than with satisfying his most immediate appetites.

Coming to Collodi more than a hundred years later, and reading it as a revision of Disney rather than the model for it, we’re inclined to see it as a work of subversion. In the film, the Blue Fairy resembles an angelic Jean Harlow, all feminine sweetness and sparkle, a blonde twin of Disney’s Snow White, a beauty who reduces all boys and men to blushing idiots. In the book, she is changeable and sprite-like, the girl with ‘sky-blue hair’, capable of switching from Pinocchio’s sister to his mother to a strange goat with dazzling sky-blue fleece. She has no wings or fairy wand. Stromboli, the film’s theatrical impresario, is the original’s Fire-Eater the puppet-master, a monster who can show pity only by sneezing. Geppetto is no longer a benevolent toy-maker leading a comfortable life in his cosy little workshop with his goldfish, his cat and his bad German accent, but a poverty-stricken and hot-tempered old fool. His initial motivation for making a boy out of wood is not paternal yearning but greed: ‘I thought I’d make myself a nice wooden puppet, I mean a really amazing one, one that can dance, and fence, and do flips. Then I’d travel the world with it, earning my crust of bread and cup of wine as I went.’

There is thus much less distance between Geppetto, the good father, and the rest of the wicked world than there is in Disney. In Collodi, everyone is greedy, but the greed takes more or less malevolent forms, from Pinocchio’s childish hunger to the sinister avarice of the cunning Fox and Cat, who, as in Disney, pop up at every opportunity to lead the puppet astray. But in the book the Fox and Cat are murderous, not simply venal. At one point, they set upon Pinocchio in disguise, trying to steal the coins he has hidden in his mouth. The cat attempts to stick a ‘nasty-looking knife’ between Pinocchio’s lips, at which Pinocchio ‘chomped down on the hand with his teeth, bit it clean off, and spat it out’.

Compared with this, the Disney Pinocchio is a flaccid little creature, a true toy. In his introduction to this new translation Umberto Eco recalls the shock that Italians felt when they first saw the cinematic Pinocchio, with his button nose and ‘odd and off-putting Tyrolean hat’ instead of the sugarloaf hat from the old Mazzanti illustrations. When we first see the Disney Pinocchio, he is lifeless, lacking even a mouth until Geppetto paints one on. All of his agency – his life force – comes either from Geppetto or from the Blue Fairy. Collodi’s Pinocchio, by contrast, is wilful before he has even been carved. As a log of wood, his voice shouts out that the hatchet hurts him and the plane tickles his tummy. When Geppetto makes him into a puppet, all his attempts to establish mastery over the wood are mocked: Pinocchio kicks Geppetto, steals his wig and laughs at him. Pinocchio’s absurdly long nose is not the dishonest puppet’s punishment, but a way of cocking a snook at the father who thinks he can cut it down to size (‘the more he trimmed it . . . the longer that impertinent nose became’). The cartoon Pinocchio has one moral flaw: he is too passive – too easily led. In the book Pinocchio is cheeky and headstrong: ‘This insolent, mocking behaviour made Geppetto feel more miserable and wretched than he had ever felt in his life, and turning to Pinocchio he said: “What a scamp of a son! You’re not even finished yet and already you’re treating your father with disrespect. That’s bad, my boy, bad!”’

It’s right that Collodi’s Pinocchio should seem subversive. A Tuscan radical whose real name was Carlo Lorenzini (1826-90), Collodi was consciously satirising the genre of moralising fables and fairy tales. His Pinocchio begins:

Once upon a time there was . . .

‘A king!’ my little readers will say at once.

  No, children, you’re wrong. Once upon a time there was a piece of wood.

In that sense Pinocchio has more in common with those postmodern children’s books in which nursery stories are upturned – The Stinky Cheese Man and Other Fairly Stupid Tales by Jon Scieszka and Lane Smith (1993) is a good example – than it does with fairy tales themselves. The narrative – which teems with talking animals – constantly plays with fairy-tale convention. Cinderella’s carriage pulled by mice-horses is reconfigured as the Blue Fairy’s carriage, which is not only drawn by mice but driven by a poodle and lined with whipped cream. The nasty trick played by the Fox and the Cat, who persuade Pinocchio to bury his money in a magic field, echoes the benign trick played by Puss in Boots when he tricks the king into thinking that his master owns an ever fertile field.

Collodi/Lorenzini knew the genre well. Six years before Pinocchio made its first appearance, in serial form, as Story of a Puppet in the children’s newspaper Il Giornale per i bambini in 1881, Collodi had published a translation of French fairy tales of the 17th and 18th centuries, the bulk of them by Charles Perrault, with others by Mme D’Aulnoy and Mme Leprince. The collection included ‘Beauty and the Beast’, ‘Cinderella’, ‘Sleeping Beauty’, ‘Little Red Riding Hood’ and ‘Puss in Boots’. This was a change of direction for Lorenzini, who, at the age of nearly 50, was a melancholy childless bachelor, a gambler, journalist and playwright who had never previously written for children. In Florence in 1848, Lorenzini had co-founded a satirical newspaper, Il Lampione, which championed democracy against the forces of reaction. A year later, the forces of reaction – in the form of the Bourbon King Ferdinand – were back in power and the paper was shut down, after which Lorenzini switched to opera and theatre criticism (there are many allusions to Commedia dell’Arte in Pinocchio), literary parodies and skits, interspersed with several periods fighting as a volunteer in the Wars of Independence.

The oldest son of a cook and a seamstress, Lorenzini took the name Collodi from his mother’s village, 60 kilometres north of Florence, which stood on a hill lined with olive trees. Today the village is notable mainly for its Pinocchio Park, a collection of bronze statues depicting characters in the book, and its array of shops touting long-nosed wooden dolls. After 1865, when Florence was briefly the political capital of Italy, Lorenzini worked on a special dictionary of the Italian language according to Florentine usage, translating Frenchified words into Tuscan equivalents. Pinocchio itself is scattered with Tuscan colloquialisms, including its title. Pinocchio is a Tuscan word for ‘pine nut’ (the more common Italian word is pinolo). Pine nuts were an important Tuscan ingredient, sprinkled on top of a castagnaccio or chestnut-flour cake, studded into small biscuits, added with raisins to a hare stew, or simply scavenged from the tree. As so often in Collodi’s writing, the name signals a contempt for pretension. Pinocchio is not a king. He is not French. He is a mere Tuscan pine nut.

As Ann Lawson Lucas writes in her introduction to the Oxford World’s Classics edition, ‘the magical and the picaresque are constantly brought down to earth by acerbic, sardonic, hard-headed Tuscan realism.’ Much of the story is dominated by hunger. Pinocchio dreams of being a gentleman with ‘a cellar of liqueurs and cordials, and shelves full of candied fruit, cakes, dessert breads, almond cookies and wafers topped with whipped cream’, but his real life is one in which a dish of cauliflower dressed with oil and vinegar, given to him by the Blue Fairy, counts as a feast. The puppet searches Geppetto’s house for food, ‘a little bread, even stale bread, a crust, a dog’s bone, a little mouldy corn mush, a fish skeleton, a cherry pit – in short anything he could chew on’. He finds an egg, but just as he is about to scramble it, it hatches and the chick flies away. Geppetto gives Pinocchio the pears he has been saving for his own breakfast. When Pinocchio demands that they be peeled, Geppetto is shocked at his ‘fastidious’ palate: ‘In this world, even as children, we have to learn to eat anything and everything, and to like it.’ After Pinocchio finishes the peeled pears, he is still hungry. So he eats the cores and the peel too.

Collodi uses Pinocchio’s hunger to point up the ineffectiveness of moralising. As the puppet himself observes: ‘Everyone scolds us, everyone warns us, everyone gives us advice.’ But when it comes to a choice between the claims of virtue and the claims of hunger, hunger will always win. Like one of Aesop’s animals, Pinocchio lusts after some bunches of muscadine grapes, but when he tries to pick them, he is caught in the farmer’s trap. Up pops a pious Firefly.

‘Well, who taught you to take other people’s belongings?’

‘I was hungry.’

‘Hunger, my boy, is not a good reason for taking things that don’t belong to us.’

  ‘It’s true, it’s true,’ shouted Pinocchio, crying, ‘and I’ll never do it again.’

Fair enough, but in truth the only thing that triumphs over hunger in Collodi’s world is the fear of death. Collodi knew death well, in a domestic setting as well as from the battlefields of the Wars of Independence: of his nine younger siblings, four died. The threat of death is everywhere in Pinocchio, from the giant fish that swallows Geppetto ‘like a ravioli’, to the Blue Fairy’s temporary death from a broken heart, to the puppet’s endless near-death experiences. There is a terrific scene in which Pinocchio is mortally ill, and the Blue Fairy tries to administer some bitter medicine. ‘Drink it, and in a few days you will be cured.’ Pinocchio whines that he doesn’t like bitter stuff, at which the Fairy offers him a sugar lump. He eats the sugar, and continues to refuse the medicine. Only when four black rabbits burst in, ready to carry him away in a coffin, does he consent to the medicine, drinking it down in a single gulp: ‘For I don’t want to die – no, I don’t want to die.’

The book has the manic energy of Candide, as it rushes from one extreme situation to another. The new translation by Geoffrey Brock is wonderfully faithful to Collodi’s speed and vigour. Until now, the best-known modern translation has been Ann Lawson Lucas’s, and in several respects it is still a better buy, thanks to Lucas’s detailed explanatory notes and full historical preface, which are more useful than Umberto Eco’s thin introduction to the new edition. Judged purely as a translation, however, Brock’s version is more natural and engaging, with a better feeling for how to turn colloquial 19th-century Tuscan into colloquial modern English (or rather colloquial American, which is effectively the same thing).

Brock is better at the humour, and unlike Lucas doesn’t use quaint idioms (‘Poodle’ and ‘Tuna’ rather than ‘Poodle-Dog’ and ‘Tunny-Fish’) or over-translate (Lucas turns ‘tortellini’ into ‘steak and kidney pudding’, apparently unaware that today most English-speaking children are far more familiar with different pasta shapes than with stodgy meat puddings). Sentence by sentence, Brock’s Pinocchio has better rhythms. In Chapter 18, Pinocchio passes through a town of idiotic animals all of whom have allowed themselves to be duped in some way – butterflies who have sold their wings, ‘tailless peacocks’. Lucas calls this town Sillybillytrap, but Brock makes it ‘Chumptrap’, a more plausible coinage. In Chapter 2, we learn that Geppetto is teased by the local children, who give him the nickname ‘Polendina’, from ‘polenta’, on account of his yellow wig. Lucas renders this nickname as ‘Semolina’, even though her end-notes concede that semolina is similar to polenta only in texture, not in colour. Brock translates it as ‘Corn Head’, a more effective insult which also retains the idea of yellowness.

Brock is happy to leave Geppetto as Geppetto, whereas Lucas insists on making him ‘Old Joe’ – partly out of a ‘desire to get away from the awful, denaturing “cuteness” of the Walt Disney school of thought’. As a scholar of Collodi, she is clearly upset by the dominance of the film version, calling it the ‘famous, or notorious’ film and lamenting ‘the saccharine-sweet, roly-poly Disney Pinocchio, hardly a puppet at all’. Her distress is understandable, but can hardly be resolved by giving Geppetto a new name. You might just as well rechristen the whole book ‘Pine Nut’.

Umberto Eco observes that thanks to Disney, Pinocchio is a myth, a ‘pop religion’ which has spawned its own devotional objects. An exhibition in Milan last year devoted to the puppet, Eco notes, included

comic books, 325 sequels in Italian alone (including Son of Pinocchio, Pinocchio’s Grandmother, Pinocchio Drives a Car and Pinocchio the Diver), 400 postcards, ten board games, hundreds upon hundreds of figurines, 14 calendars, ten musical compositions, 40 posters, 40 records and several hundred miscellaneous objects (wooden toys, dolls, tins, glassware, celluloid rattles, little Pinocchios made of cloth or plastic or rubber or resin, jigsaw puzzles, ceramic figures, cut-outs, decks of cards).

Eco doesn’t share Lucas’s horror: his initial ‘discomfort’ on seeing the film has given way to the view that it is ‘delightful’. Nevertheless, he cherishes the hope that ‘beyond the myth, there remains the book.’

Maybe. But it is just as true that beyond the book, there remains the myth, and the myth of Disney is simply more powerful. This is not just because the best early Disney animation provides so many incidental thrills – Geppetto’s mechanical clockwork, Monstro the whale leaping through Hokusai waves – that text cannot match. It is also that Disney restored the story from an irony-laden parody to a true fairy tale. Lucas wrings her hands at ‘Walt Disney’s wholesale distortion of the novel’, as if it were possible to adapt a book without distorting it. It took more than 750 artists and two years of production to create Disney’s second feature (the first, Snow White, appeared in 1937). The film started life as something much closer to Collodi: its structure was episodic, there was no Jiminy Cricket, and Pinocchio was a properly wooden, pointy-nosed puppet with a sarcastic and egotistical persona. What worked on the page didn’t screen so well. No one could sympathise with this brat. Six months into production, at huge cost, Walt Disney called a halt, demanding a rethink. A new humanoid Jiminy was brought in to give the narrative more shape, and Pinocchio got his button-nosed makeover, becoming an infant who eagerly follows wherever he is led, instead of a wilful puppet.

It was Disney’s genius to take Pinocchio’s unrealness and turn it into something that made him seem more human rather than less. In the book, despite all the horrible things that happen to him, we seldom feel sorry for Pinocchio. He is, after all, made of wood, a hard little Tuscan pine nut who can stand up for himself. Nothing can really harm him. In the film, Pinocchio’s woodenness gives him extra pathos, because, but for Jiminy, he is alone in the universe. In Collodi, where pigeons talk and fairies turn into goats, no one ever questions the oddness of a wooden puppet wandering about by himself in the wicked world; the Disney Pinocchio always stands out as special and strange, as a means of exposing the ugliness of adult ways. It is his innocent artifice that makes him vulnerable to the horrible overtures of Stromboli, the Fox and the Cat. Watching him cheerfully stumble through the song ‘I’ve Got No Strings’, while surrounded by real, cynically manoeuvred puppets, is unbearable.

Collodi knew that real children are not so innocent. No matter. The power of the Disney Pinocchio myth has little to do with the business of becoming honest, brave and unselfish – the surface moral. It is about the pathos of a child let loose in a world of grown-ups. Becoming a real boy means being restored to the safe world of childhood in Geppetto’s house (rather than taking responsibility and growing up, as Pinocchio does at the end of Collodi’s book). This may be hokum, but it’s also deeply affecting. As Steven Spielberg recognised in his SF version of Pinocchio, A.I., the only way to crank up the pathos still further is to remove Geppetto’s love. In A.I., an android boy, David, is offered as a child replacement to a woman who cannot love him: ‘How can a human ever love a machine?’ She abandons him. After traversing a vile succession of flesh fairs and dens of iniquity, David eventually jumps despairingly into the sea, still hoping to find the Blue Fairy who could make him real and make his ‘Mummy’ love him. Collodi’s Pinocchio, though hungry for love, would never do such a thing; his desire to live is too strong.

With Collodi’s frenetic pacing, there is no time to give more weight to one incident than another. This is precisely the point: ‘I casi son tanti.’ The next thing is always about to happen. With Disney the horror is cumulative. Nearly 70 years on, the sequence in which Pinocchio is lured to Pleasure Island, a place where boys are encouraged to drink beer, smoke cigars and gamble, only to be turned into donkeys, has lost none of its terror. It’s much scarier than the equivalent section in Toyland in the book. ‘You boys have had your fun!’ the evil puce-faced coachman bellows. ‘Now pay for it!’ The suggestion is of something more than donkeywork; there is a hint of the worst depravity and abuse. How grateful we are when Jiminy Cricket pops up to rescue Pinocchio. That talking cricket may be conventional, sentimental, highly irritating, but Disney was right to rescue him from an early death.

Bee Wilson is the author of Swindled: From Poison Sweets to Counterfeit Coffee.

January 14, 2009

Le Monde: Mortalite


Au cours de la seconde moitié du XXe siècle, la mortalité de 40 ans à 70 ans a baissé de moitié en Europe de l’Ouest. De 1952 à 2001, elle a, selon l’Insee, reculé de 54 % chez les femmes et de 39 %chez les hommes. Cette baisse spectaculaire est notamment due à la réduction des maladies cardio-vasculaires et, plus récemment, à la diminution de la mortalité par cancer. Au cours de ce demi-siècle, la géographie de la mortalité à l’âge adulte a évolué. Pour les hommes, la Norvège et la Suède, qui étaient dans le trio de tête de la longévité en 1952, le restent en 2001 ; la France et la Finlande ne quittent pas les trois dernières places. Pour les femmes, les mauvais élèves de l’Europe de l’Ouest ont changé : la Finlande, l’Espagne et l’Irlande ont été remplacées par le Danemark et le Royaume-Uni. Comment expliquer ces différences de mortalité entre les douze pays étudiés par l’Insee ? « Le tabac est certainement l’un des facteurs essentiels de la dégradation relative de la position des habitantes du nord de l’Europe comparée à celle du sud », constate l’auteur de l’étude, Stein Emil Vollset. Il souligne également l’importance de « l’exercice physique, de la prise modérée d’alcool, de la forte consommation de fruits et de légumes et du régime alimentaire
méditerranéen ».

January 13, 2009

TLS: on Byzantium

Monuments of magnificence
Alexander Murray

Military authority and the Byzantine quest for an incarnational faith.
BYZANTIUM. Royal Academy of Arts, until March 22 Robin Cormack and Maria Vassilaki, editors. BYZANTIUM 496pp. Royal Academy of Arts. Pounds 55 (paperback, Pounds 27.95). 978 1 90571 126 0
In the third century AD the Roman Empire stretched from the Atlantic to the Tigris and from the Esk to the middle Nile. But it was in trouble, and when Constantine became Emperor in 312 he faced an overriding need: defence, against enemies now principally in the East and above all in a revived Persia. Rome was too far to the west to remain an effective capital, so in 324 Constantine began what would soon be called "New Rome", on the site of the thousand-year-old Greek city of Byzantium. As a soldier, Constantine appreciated that the site on the Bosphorus was virtually impregnable, if decently defended, and the perfect departure point for military and other government operations, to be sent off in all directions by land or sea. (The site is plausibly represented at the Royal Academy, a la Google Earth, in a drawing by a fifteenth-century Italian geographer).
Politically, Constantine's choice of site for the new capital stamped the Empire with two characteristics. One is almost too obvious to be noticed: longevity. An empire centred on "Constantine's city", Constantinopolis, could survive losses of a kind fatal for kingdoms less strategically endowed (like Baghdad or Moscow, both of which fell to the Mongols). In the nineteenth century, a fading Turkish Empire with the same capital (its name translated into Turkish as "Istanbul") was to be called "the sick man of Europe". The same had been true of the Byzantine Empire for much of the Middle Ages, and for the same reasons - and not because of the much- mentioned Venetian conquest of
1204, a symptom as much as a cause. A site less privileged would have fallen in the early 1070s, to Turks who had captured an emperor in battle (Romanus IV: one of the emperors pictured on coins shown in the exhibition), and who were close enough to the walls of Constantinople to frighten Westerners - brothers only semi-estranged from the Eastern Christians - into devising the expeditions known now (but not then) as crusades. But Constantinople held, substantially recovered, and in the event baulked the Turks of their ambition for nearly four centuries. And when the city did succumb in 1453, it was a city already in economic decay, falling to an army more than ten times as numerous as its defenders, and much richer. Within months, the decrepit city had become the buzzing capital of a new and more eastward-looking world. It would have fallen long before, but for Constantine's choice of site, backed by the endurance, as an ideological consequence, of the brave defenders' belief that "Rome" must last for ever.
A second characteristic followed from the first. Unlike an island or a territorial saucer ringed by mountains, the Byzantine Empire was defined by its centre, not its periphery. So it developed an exceptionally strong concept of the state, as unifying factor of a variety of peoples, a "Byzantine Commonwealth" (as one Slavonic historian has called it). This strong concept of state was expressed in the Emperor's status. Constantine's move had exposed the imperial office to theocratic traditions older and stronger than anything comparable in the West, traditions which saw a ruler as quasi-divine. These traditions were now to be reflected in the Emperor's cult and court, and included such embellishments as those singing birds made of gold, which Liudprand of Cremona saw on a visit in 949-50, and which would inspire W. B. Yeats in "Sailing to Byzantium". Among the positive outcomes of this strong state polity, the most conspicuous was an ethnic mix. All Byzantine emperors had "barbarian" blood in their veins, and the distinction of "Greek" and "Turk" is largely deceptive: what with the enslavements, migrations, conversions forced and unforced, and other vagaries common on unsettled frontiers, modern Turks and Greeks have the same DNA. There were also negative outcomes. One, which passed from Byzantium to successor states like Russia, was the state's firm control of trade and industry. A measure of "Adam Smith" relaxation, and late eleventh-century Byzantium might have been able to pay its soldiers without letting com-petitive Italian cities have privileges, destined to give them an ambivalent dominance in the later Byzantine economy.
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It may be asked, what has any of this to do with us now? Everything has gone, everyone is dead, and has been for most of a millennium. True historians know, of course, that this apparent emptiness is an illusion and that the past is still present, in ways mostly invis-ible. But what of the visible artefacts which must, on any logic, have been used daily by the millions of people in that thousand-year-old empire - things that they wore, admired, studied, used as tools or worked with as precious metal, in or out of monetary circulation? The answer is, they have mostly gone, recycled like the human beings who used them. Wear-and-tear apart (no small item), the idea that the twentieth century was a time of unique violence and destruction is one of its historians' most tempting illusions: they should really look into the dustbin they call medieval history. The conqueror of Constantinople in 1453, Mehmet II, rewarded his
100,000 soldiers by letting them pillage and kill for three days. Books made good bonfires, whether they were Greek classics or religious scriptures. Mehmet
II was not exceptionally cruel for his ilk, rather the contrary: he protected most churches (better than some successors). Sack and pillage was a normal punishment for a city which had resisted siege, and had happened frequently elsewhere in and round the Empire. Whatever does remain from the Byzantine world is a fraction of what there once was.
Whence the triumph of the exhibition at the Royal Academy of Arts. It brings together more than 300 surviving artefacts, from places once within Byzantine political or cultural boundaries. Even on its own, each object, like a footprint, is potentially a witness to the world it was made in; a witness given words by expert commentary from an international team of historians and archaeologists, with the results laid out in ten rooms, arranged in an order part-chronological, part-thematic, and equipped with an audio guide and a magnificent catalogue.
The direct provenance of the items reflects in part the Empire's multi-ethnic character, and incidentally, also, recent thaws in East-West relations. America and northern Europe currently house about half the items, but the rest come from properly "Byzantine" locations: Greece and its islands (with at least a hundred exhibits), and other places once in the Greek Empire or its cultural sphere: Moscow, St Petersburg, Kiev, Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia, Ohrid, Tblisi, and, apparently after a little coaxing, Mount Sinai. (No amount of coaxing, alas, could conjure anything from Turkey). High on that list should come Italy, once a contented part of the Empire, even after the move, and later its shrewdest beneficiary. One church in Monza still has a set of oil "ampullae" given to it in 600 by the Lombard Queen Theodolinda; and an icon of the Virgin and Child, brought at about the same time to help christianize the old Pantheon in Rome, is still there (or would be but for its loan to London). The assiduity with which the heirlooms are cared for is accidentally revealed by item 48. It is a gap, with a photograph, where there should be a shawl-sized silk rectangle, woven with an "Annunciation", a standard luxury manufacture from Syria, c800, and apparently brought to Rome by one of its Levantine-born popes, to be discovered in 1905 as the lining to a reliquary. Its curators in Rome agreed to lend it but found, when preparing its move, that the 1,000-year-old fabric was just too fragile, so they risked their honour by letting it stay put. Their honour shines.
I visited the exhibition on the day it opened and it was full enough to make me wait to see some items, especially those picked for the audio guide - like the silver-gilt and enamel icon of St Michael, made in Constantinople in the twelfth century, or the bizarre, silver-gilt perfume brazier shaped like a city. The waiting was nevertheless worth it. I was accompanied by my twenty one-year-old goddaughter, an art student. I noticed that she was taking notes from time to time; and at the end I asked her which exhibit she would most like to live with. I had seen her gravitating towards the mosaics, including three haunting "micromosaic" icons (their tesserae just 5mm wide), borrowed from present homes in St Petersburg, Paris and Rome. But my god-daughter had to choose just one, and opted for a bigger mosaic, from the Greek mainland (Thebes), a sixth-century depiction of four "labours of the months". I had feared she might pick my own first choice, so had mentally made a short list of alternatives. It started - perhaps this was too ostentatiously humble - with a bowl, cracked but mended, sole survivor of thousands mass-produced in late thirteenth-century Cyprus, this one incised and painted with a dancer, arms swung sideways in reckless abandon. But I also had a good look at the two dozen ivories, mostly religious diptychs or triptychs, intricately carved in tenth- and eleventh-century Constantinople. Deep down I knew this was window dressing.
My choice had already made itself, and was of course a person, a face, strictly pre-Constantinian, but very much part of his world - as it is now of ours, in the British Museum. The face is of a middle-aged woman, elegant but wholly unaffected, wearing discreet earrings and a small necklace. She was surely wife and mother to a self-respecting family. She appears here in "encaustic" (wax fixed by heat) on a limewood panel once on a mummy-tomb in Hellenistic Egypt, made some year between AD 55 and 70. Robin Cormack (co organizer of the exhibition with Maria Vassilaki of Athens) tells us in the catalogue that we must not take her picture for a likeness. So be it; but she looks more like a real human being than anything else in the exhibition.
That particular face, along with many others less "real", points to what may be the exhibition's most lasting impression on a visitor; and this impression, in turn, leads us to a third - religious - consequence of Constantine's move. More obviously than in the West, in the fourth century the East was where religion was happening, in currents bound to stir in the new capital. The strongest current was towards monotheism, growing both within and without its most high-profile expression, Christianity. Politically, mono-theism was a threat.
The quasi-divine head of a centralized state cannot tolerate a rival.
Constantine's mentor, Diocletian, had felt this menace in his bones, and paid Christianity the compliment of beheading its more salient devotees. Constantine took another course, and joined them, thereby admitting changes to both Empire and Christianity so seismic that historians have been trying to assess them ever since. Of the early results of Constantine's conversion, the most telling was the definition of Christian doctrine, by the ecumenical councils, held under imperial aegis from 325 to 451. The creeds that emerged from these councils were a culminating achievement of Greek philosophy, in an endeavour to define the indefinable. The councils' Christological debates nevertheless reflected preoccupations which, like a scarlet pimpernel, ran back and forth across the boundaries of Christianity.
The deepest of these preoccupations was with the nature of God. How could God be infinitely high above us, and simultaneously in any sense like us - weak, selfish, cruel, human, subject to suffering and death? Christianity addressed the enigma head-on with a God-man who was none of these bad things. But the underlying tension had to work itself out within the Church as much as it did in the interstices between Christianity and "other religions". Consider the ubiquitous Byzantine image of Christos Pantocrator, "Ruler of All". Is he really human, or superhuman? The same man surely could not also have undergone torture and death, like a criminal. This tension left its mark on many artefacts, among them the early crucifixes (a cross with Christ's figure nailed to it). No examples are known until around 400. Even then, a crucifixion image had to show next to it the resurrection, to give reassurance that Christ was still God incarnate. And, that reassurance notwithstanding, Christ on the cross was for a long time still not shown as dead. He has his eyes open and his head straight, unlike that of a man dying or dead (as in item 129, from c600-50, possibly Egyptian). Only in the early eighth century, and then only intermittently, does the notion of a God who died and suffered become digestible, so that his eyes appear closed or his head droops, as in a crucifix from late tenth-century Constantinople (compare this with other earlier, and later, examples). In the thirteenth century, finally, but only at the innovative Western end of the Byzantine cultural zone, Christ's suffering is fully confronted, as here in a two-sided processional cross from Pisa.
Along with these iconographical shifts went doctrinal discussion, a Greek speciality. St Gregory Nazianzen (died 389) once protested that if you went to a shop in Constantinople wanting to buy a loaf, "the baker, instead of telling you the price, will argue that the Father is greater than the Son. The money changer will talk of the Begotten and the Unbegotten instead of giving you your money, and if you want a bath, the bath-keeper assures you that the Son surely proceeds from nothing". Underlying all these hyper-technical discussions was the same tension, between God's humanity and divinity. When the Council of Chakedon decreed, in 451, that the divine and human were two natures in the single person of Christ, this was too much for some believers. They thought it an insult to God, and were thenceforth rejected by the rest of the Church as "monophysites" (upholders of one nature). The monophysites were especially strong in Syria and Egypt, in the latter of which they became distinguished as "Copts" (from "E-gypt"), two of whose linguistically instructive texts are on display. But the scarlet pimpernel had not stopped crossing boundaries. It was not only within Christianity that the fervour for God's transcendence worked itself out. By 700, Syria and Egypt had fallen to Islam, with a speed suggestive of the religious tendencies already present there. Muslims carried the same tradition of Semitic monotheism but with a view of Christ as a prophet not as God incarnate. This position cost the Empire half its territory.
It feared to lose more, and with reason. Muslim monotheism had had its eyes on Constantinople almost from the start. In the eighth century, having disposed of the old Persian Empire, Islam pressed hard on Byzantium. The soldiers most effective in defending imperial frontiers - and whose leaders hence became emperors - happened to come from the provinces bordering on Syria. They were fired by a similar zeal, not only for battle but for God's unqualified transcendence. So the scarlet pimpernel smuggled himself back into Christianity in the form of iconoclasm. In 726, the Emperor Leo III, "the Isaurian", ordered that all religious images in the Empire be destroyed. They were an insult to God, who, because of it, had allowed the Byzantines to lose recent battles. The iconoclastic decrees tore another big hole in the Byzantine legacy and consequently in this exhibition. Pre-iconoclastic art is only represented, here as anywhere in the East, by the one exception, a paradox. All Semitic traditions associated certain miracles with Mount Sinai. Another small miracle was added in that the peninsula had been lost to the Empire before the iconoclastic decrees and was now under Islamic rule. Despite theoretical objections to religious images, by a mutual respect between the Muslim authorities and the monks who prayed on a site holy to both traditions, the icons in the Sinai monastery were saved. In the eleventh century a mosque was built inside the monastery walls, and is still there. It is hard by the icons, ten of which are in the exhibition.
The struggle for and against images lasted in Byzantium until 843. The "iconodule" argument then prevailed: if God really did become man, and his purpose thereby was partly to show human beings what God was like, it could not be wrong to portray the incarnate Christ. Surviving icons abound from that time, including a depiction of the Triumph of Orthodoxy in 843. They all depict faces - tranquil, majestic, aweinspiring but kind. None frighten. Our thoughts go back to our Greek-Egyptian ancestress, the respectable wife and mother. How much did Greek icons originally owe to images on Egyptian tombs? It is a question for experts, as is another, about the same icons but at the opposite end of the time line: whether Western portraiture, developed largely in Italy, owes some of its origin to Greek icons, by way - say - of "crusader" art, now almost entirely destroyed. A hint of connection may be found in Gentile Bellini's picture of the fifteenth-century Greek convert to Catholicism, Bessarion. The Cardinal's face is represented naturalistically, but he holds upright, like a placard, a big, flat reliquary, covered with icons.
Icons, and the religious doctrines surrounding them, lead us finally to an effect of Constantine's move which may have been the most fundamental of all.
Constantine built New Rome for military reasons, and he remained primarily a soldier, as did most of his successors. (What Byzantine military priorities did to Christian concepts of sainthood can be seen in the platoons of "soldier saints", for example the depictions of St George and St Theodore as armed and mounted knights.) But they inherited a theocratic tradition transformed, not extinguished, by the Emperors' Christianity. Their office put them into an intimate relation to Christ (as expressed, for instance, in the depiction on coins of Christ's direct coronation of the Emperor). True to this tradition, Constantine had tried to make Byzantium also the Empire's spiritual capital.
Here he met an obstacle. Ghosts do not like moving. The ghosts of early Christianity were in old Rome, and there they stayed. Constantine and his successors filled their new city with the choicest relics, including those of the "true cross" allegedly discovered by his mother, Helena (its fragments bestowed on favoured beneficiaries, like the early owner of item 188). And after the rival patriarchates at Antioch, Jerusalem and Alexandria had fallen to Islam, Constantinople stood alone as rival to old Rome. For all that, its patriarchs never took Roman primacy away. They could be dismissed by the Emperor if he found them too awkward; and the iconoclastic controversy, when others had wavered, had seen old Rome standing doctrinally firm. Rome continued to claim, and to a large extent vindicate, its ultimate spiritual authority in the Church on earth, even as the two huge halves of the old Roman Empire edged slowly apart in the tenth and eleventh centuries. This disjunction between the political and military move, and the immobility of spiritual authority, fed the concept that the two kinds of authority were distinct; and in the course of the Middle Ages, this distinction passed into Western practice, and established, in the foundations of a specifically "Western" consciousness, the principle that the holders of military and political power are not necessarily "right", in any sense of that word, least of all about theo- logical niceties.
That, at least, is one visitor's way of reading the exhibition. There are other ways, and additions and adjustments doubtless to be made to this one, sketched here in the trust that any interested visitor will draw a similar amount of instruction and delight from these priceless survivals. That would be the best reward for the months of skilled devotion, by many scholars in different countries, that have put together an assemblage necessarily ephemeral, and definitely worth visiting - even if we do have to wait to see St Michael.


January 12, 2009

TLS: On Driving

Click me to see a larger image Driving lessons by Jon Garvie
A world tour to unmask the false gods of mobility, speed and 'beware children crossing' signs.
review of the following books:
Tom Vanderbilt. TRAFFIC Why we drive the way we do (and what it says about us) 416pp. Allen Lane. Pounds 20. 978 0 7139 9931 4 US: Knopf. $29.95. 978 0 307 39772 7
Brian Ladd. AUTOPHOBIA Love and hate in the automotive age 204pp. University of Chicago Press. $22.50; distributed in the UK by Wiley. Pounds 13. 978 0 226 46741 2

Traffic has a bad reputation, much of it fictional. London's choked suburbs provoked J. G. Ballard's vision of fetishized pile-ups in Crash. Gridlock on the freeway propels Michael Douglas into sociopathic free fall in the film Falling Down. The opening voiceover in Paul Haggis's recent Oscar-winning film Crash suggests that alienated Los Angelinos crash into each other "just so we can feel something". For commuters, traffic is an enemy to be beaten or beaten by. For commentators, it is an easy scapegoat, synonymous with social breakdown, urban decay and imminent environmental collapse. All this, suggests Tom Vanderbilt in Traffic: Why we drive the way we do (and what it says about us), is surprising, given that "traffic" once meant the mutually enriching exchange of goods and culture.
A basic paradox governs humanity's relationship with roads. We like them wide, clear and quick, but such circumstances often kill us. Traffic, by contrast, improves health prospects. A line of vehicles crawling along congested roads at 20 miles per hour imitates nature. That speed is the maximum at which even Olympians can run. It is also the limit beyond which humans cannot maintain eye contact and other, vital, non-verbal forms of communication. If cars collide at 20 miles per hour or less, it is unlikely that anyone will die. When humans exceed such limits en masse, the ability to self-organize recedes and death often ensues.
The facts about driving are stark but wilfully ignored. Road fatalities will be the third largest global cause of death by 2020 and more people die each month on American roads than were killed in the September 11 attacks, but where is the war on cars? The majority of deaths spring from egregious human error, yet we persist in labelling them "accidents". Such events are normal, not deviations from an otherwise safe activity. But to recognize this means accepting an unwelcome truth: over millennia, evolution has equipped us to deal with the demands of horses and carts, not horsepower. Driving kills because it is too complicated for our poor brains. The army of evolutionary biologists, molecular physicists and social psychologists whom Vanderbilt interviews have not, between them, produced a robot capable of negotiating a roundabout safely.
read more
In order to sustain global auto-mania, we require overwhelming self-delusion.
Every study on the subject has found that most people think that they are "above average" drivers. Hubris rules the roads. We pay attention fitfully and mistake luck for skill. We treat each disaster averted as a triumph of proficiency. We magnify our losses (the traffic was terrible) and forget our gains (arriving unharmed at our destination). In order to absorb the gulf between the risk of death and the reward of a trip to the supermarket, we require elaborate coping strategies. Economists have suggested that a dagger attached to the steering wheel and pointed at the driver's chest would represent an automobile's "negative externalities" accurately. Instead, we have tended to buy SUVs (more likely to crash than smaller cars), with airbags and computerized gizmos which provide illusions of control. Often, while driving, we eat, text, talk, or drink as if to quell the panic which similarly dangerous situations produce.
So much for self-deception and the frailty of human consciousness. But the second, more important insight in Vanderbilt's study is that road engineers and urban planners tend to design systems which encourage disaster. Smooth roads, enormous signs and distorting markings soothe our brains into believing that we are travelling more slowly than is the case. They prompt false feelings of safety and dull the attention. All this despite the fact that the average driver must attempt to process 1,340 pieces of information per minute. Such innovations, Vanderbilt argues, are "akin to giving a lot of low-fat ice-cream and cookies to someone trying to lose weight". More profoundly, the car-led growth of suburbs and the emergence of exclusively vehicular cities, from Phoenix to Dubai, have destroyed ancient bonds between human and habitat.
Regardless of era and locality, most societies have maintained commuting times of about one hour. This time period has satisfied the need to balance domesticity and mobility from modern London to ancient Rome. The Italian physicist Cesare Marchetti noted that the mean area of Greek villages, from the classical era onwards, has remained approximately seven square miles - an expanse which can be covered in one hour's walk. According to Vanderbilt's surveys, contemporary cultures retain the idea that one hour is an acceptable commute. But the distances made available through car travel unravel the fabric of the village by removing individuals from society. The rich move away from urban centres as affluence increases. And, crucially, they are more likely to crash on their daily return to work into cities which are no less crowded despite their departure.
Vanderbilt has toured the world in search of alternatives. In a book which catalogues human blindness, one perspicacious Dutchman stands out. Hans Monderman, the (recently deceased) "world's most famous traffic engineer", suggested that drivers ignore road signs and race through vulnerable areas because engineers opt for paradigms which impose the "traffic world" of the motorway atop the "social world" of the village. Motorways snake through hamlets in place of cobbled paths. It is commonplace to note that signs that warn drivers to slow down or watch for children have little effect. Monderman realized that these signs, in fact, make things worse by absolving drivers of the need to engage with their environment. He then, heroically, carried this insight through by banishing all the signs, road humps and other safety paraphernalia from the small Dutch village of Oudehaske. Sucked back into their environment, people drove more carefully, and a dramatic fall in accidents resulted. Kensington and Chelsea Borough Council, hardly the most radical of institutions, attempted a similar experiment on Kensington High Street. It resulted in a 60 per cent fall in deaths and serious injuries.
Vanderbilt's anecdotes point to the need for some benevolent despotism. While drivers do not naturally act in their own best interests, they do respond to the perceived order of their environments. It was once thought that road fatalities correlated directly to GDP. It now seems that corruption is the stronger index. In Finland, road penalties are matched to income. Hence, one businessman incurred a $71,400 fine for driving at 43 miles per hour in a 25 mile-per-hour zone. Unsurprisingly, the moralizing Nordics offer the world's safest driving environment. From this perspective, a global prescription seems obvious: smaller roads, fewer markings, more punitive laws.
Vanderbilt, however, cannot quite bring himself to recommend such a route. This reluctance springs from doubts as to whether human nature can ever be improved.
Kensington Council's original intention was not to lower fatalities but to prettify the street and encourage shoppers. This raises Traffic's most important rhetorical question: whether progress only occurs organically, or rather by accident. Why else has Monderman's revolution not spread? A large portion of this book is devoted to our perceptive limitations. Beguiling instances of human failure encourage the idea that people will never design their way out of a jam. New World ants are the world's most efficient commuters. They move in vast self-organizing swarms thanks to a single precept: avoid being eaten by those behind you and move towards your succulent compatriots ahead. Human traffic draws on a far more complex "ballet of wants and needs". The book's most poignant finding is that commuters prefer an ideal of sixteen minutes of "me-time" in their vehicles. Cars offer emotional transport, as well as physical, so we cannot consider them objectively.
Vanderbilt offers no solutions. Sometimes he admires the laissez-faire approach of New Delhi traffic engineers, where central planning founders on the wanderings of sacred cows. But he is equally appreciative of the nerve centre in LA which delivers eighty limousines to Oscar night on time. Instead of recommending particular policies, he sticks, finally, to bland admonishments that driving "is all more complicated than it appears. We would do well to drive accordingly". The epilogue centres on the author's own experiences in a driving school and provides tips to readers. This is a curious coda to an argument which emphasizes that road problems are insoluble at an individual level.
Traffic is a book of the moment. Its unconsummated courtship with ideas of paternalism, organization and risk has brought tributes from such authors as Cass Sunstein (Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness,
2008) and Nassim Taleb (Black Swan, 2007). Autophobia, by Brian Ladd, is a more coherent work, but will inevitably generate less attention. It provides a short, scholarly essay on the history of automobile opposition. Ladd begins from the viewpoint that cars and traffic engineering always represent political choices. Nineteenth-century English conservatives detested the car, believing that it would destroy the looks and manners of the countryside. Italian Futurists exalted "the beauty of speed" in the 1920s, hoping that it would usher in a new violent age, shorn of "emasculating tendencies" like democracy.
Mussolini and Hitler followed through such ideas, the latter bequeathing the autobahns and the Volkswagen to subsequent road enthusiasts. Ladd's explicitly anti-car study questions why machines associated with individual freedom have appealed so greatly to fascists of all stripes (Russian and Chinese central planners were both great admirers of Henry Ford).
Opponents of cars have laboured the same points for more than a century: damage to the environment, social atomization and, of course, a high risk of accident and death. In opposition, the pro-car lobby requires abstract arguments which refuse to address the same set of "facts" and foreground ideology instead. From Hitler to Margaret Thatcher, car advocates have seen them as literal engines of change; vehicles by which to remake society, whether on the basis of individualism or collectivism. Thatcher's dictum that "Any man who rides a bus to work after the age of 30 can count himself a failure in life" provided cover for a period of deregulation which broke free of traditional corporatist conservatism with its natural suspicion of change. Cars have always been dangerously radical experiments. As with Traffic, Ladd's book is full of scarcely credible statistics. In 1906-07, more than 90 per cent of the cars registered in Berlin were involved in an accident. The genius of the pro-car lobby has been to convince the public that roadkill is acceptable collateral damage.
Both Vanderbilt and Ladd raise the theory of "induced traffic", still the most contested idea among engineers and planners. Across the globe, most great motorway-building sprees have relied on a hydrology model. This assumes that traffic, like water, is an independent variable. The sum of cars on the road represents needs and desires statistically. The answer to clogged roads is, therefore, more roads. These theories ignored the fact that new routes tend not to redistribute traffic into even flows, but rather increase the overall volume. As early as 1907, American protesters observed that, on the road, supply induces demand. But to free marketeers, then and now, this is anathema.
The suggestion that drivers, acting freely, will not allocate scarce resources in the most efficient way is one short step from state socialism. Even globally admired regulatory schemes such as London's congestion zone cause these ideologues to despair.
Neo-liberals portray the free market as an expression of innate human characteristics, exempt from society and history. Cars are essential to this vision; not only a lucrative part of the market, they accelerate it and help to justify the whole. Ladd's suggestion that mobility is a "false god" equates to a wider belief that car-led economic growth is not worth the social consequences. This is a more difficult conclusion than the need for driving lessons, and a better one. But the belief in mobility as progress, which has captivated us over the past 150 years, suggests that we will not learn easily from our mistakes.
Both Vanderbilt and Ladd raise the theory of "induced traffic", still the most contested idea among engineers and planners. Across the globe, most great motorway-building sprees have relied on a hydrology model. This assumes that traffic, like water, is an independent variable. The sum of cars on the road represents needs and desires statistically. The answer to clogged roads is, therefore, more roads. These theories ignored the fact that new routes tend not to redistribute traffic into even flows, but rather increase the overall volume. As early as 1907, American protesters observed that, on the road, supply induces demand. But to free marketeers, then and now, this is anathema.
The suggestion that drivers, acting freely, will not allocate scarce resources in the most efficient way is one short step from state socialism. Even globally admired regulatory schemes such as London's congestion zone cause these ideologues to despair.
Neo-liberals portray the free market as an expression of innate human characteristics, exempt from society and history. Cars are essential to this vision; not only a lucrative part of the market, they accelerate it and help to justify the whole. Ladd's suggestion that mobility is a "false god" equates to a wider belief that car-led economic growth is not worth the social consequences. This is a more difficult conclusion than the need for driving lessons, and a better one. But the belief in mobility as progress, which has captivated us over the past 150 years, suggests that we will not learn easily from our mistakes.

January 11, 2009

TLS: Why Read and Write Book Reviews?

These are tough times for books and for book reviews. The Daity Telegraph has dispensed with its literary editor, Sam Leith, and its weekly literary columnist, A. N. Wilson. Bookish types in the United States are still lamenting the demise of literary supplements at the LA Times and other newspapers. One explanation put forward is that the influence of review supplements has been usurped by the book blogs, in which opinion is democratized, often to point zero. As the usually sensible Peter Wilby put it in an article in the Guardian (which so far remains kindly disposed to literature), "All the punter wants to know is whether the book' s worth buying. Better still, they'd like a decent precis so they need not bother reading the thing".
This is wrong-headed. A "good review", in a literary editor' s eyes, is not one that is favourable, but one worth reading in its own right. Mr Wilby writes: "Even in upmarket weeklies such as the New Statesman, books have always been minority interests" . As a former editor of that journal, he might have known that, when edited by Claire Tomalin or Martin Amis, the review pages - written by V. S. Pritchett, Jonathan Raban, Julian Barnes and the like - were the main reason for buying it.
A Scottish periodical once asked a number of distinguished writers to contribute to a symposium, in which the question was posed, "What do you consider to be the main purpose of reviewing?" (New Edinburgh Critical moment Review, February 1980). The poet Douglas Dunn replied: "It is important to bear in mind that reviewing is a form of writing, a highly developed genre". Edwin Morgan backed this up: "the review is in itself on the verge of being an art form" . Anthony Burgess pointed out that "the books that sell best - Harold Robbins, Barbara Cartland - are hardly ever reviewed" but "a good critic is of immense value". Almost all critics start in the literary pages of newspapers and magazines. They also benefit from the attention of discriminating editors. "Reviews are where young men and women can make reputations", Dunn wrote. All were agreed that the review is a vital organ in the body of literature. The point was eloquently made by Tom Paulin: A hook re view is, or ought to he, an aci of taste which contributes to the health of a culture. Reputations are formed and reasse ssed in the review columns, and at its best reviewing is part of the living spirit of a civilization - it forms and changes taste, it di scusses a particular text and relates it to tradition and the present moment, and it displays the operation of a sensibility. Mr Leith probably did not call this to mind each time he prepared to sub a piece of copy; but the presence of a qualified literary editor at every newspaper would be read as an affirmation of its spirit.

January 10, 2009

TLS: A Poem

In 1950, the ornithologist David Lack published Robin Redbreast, a compilation of robin lore - the bird's "unnatural history". Dr Lack's son Andrew has issued an expanded version, Redbreast: The robin in life and literature (SMH Books, £19.95), which adds poems by Ted Hughes, Norman MacCaig and others. Among the more curious verses is
this from about 1800, concerning one Ellen Gee of Kew - LNG of Q - who was stung in the eye by a bee and died:
Ye nymphs of Q, then shun each B,
List to the reason Y;
For should ABC U at T,
He'll surely sting your I,
Now in a grave L deep in Q,
She' s cold as cold can B;
Whilst robins sing upon A U
Her dirge and LEG.